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Abstract 
Walter Lippmann’s intellectual journey represents the journey of American liberalism in the 
20th century: an attempted return from infatuation with the progressive ideals of inevitable 
historical development and scientific progress to the stability of human rights and freedom. 
America’s path to defining its brand of liberalism finds expression in the philosophical works 
of Lippmann, who was at the center of this struggle. Lippmann was a defender of the liberal 
democratic state whose value as a thinker derives from his attempt to understand the 
problem of political freedom (are people competent to self-rule in a mass democracy?) 
throughout this critical time period. In this struggle Lippmann remains a nuanced, though 
fierce exponent of political freedom as he sought to verify the foundations of political 
legitimacy and authority on which true political freedom depends. He began his quest as a 
progressive, averring scientific realism against entrenched dogmas and traditions, but, by 
remaining consistent on this question of political freedom (insofar as he sought to preserve 
and expand it), was led to conclude his quest arguing for a sustainable liberalism 
characterized by an attentiveness to the human person. 
1 
Introduction – A Hero for Sustainable Liberalism 
Of all the towering figures in 20th century American political life, few were as 
versatile and insightful as Walter Lippmann. His intellectual and personal history traced, 
better than any other single man, the character of America in the 20th century: he began 
his career in all the hope and optimism of an unchallenged progressivism, and ended it 
amidst the Vietnam conflict, despair, and disillusionment.  Neither academician nor 
politician, Lippmann is best known for his career as a journalist. His column, “Today and 
Tomorrow”, ran in all major newspapers in the United States for almost 40 years, regularly 
commanding the attention of millions of the most politically engaged people in America.12 
Yet, despite Lippmann’s fame as a journalist, this is at best only half the story of his career. 
Beginning with A Preface to Politics in 1913, and culminating with Essays in the Public 
Philosophy in 1955, Lippmann also authored many significant works of political philosophy. 
His proximity to events in the political arena, and his access to the public mind through his 
columns ascribe an unique character and importance to these works of political philosophy 
as a valuable resource to understanding the American mind, and with it the tumultuous 
development of liberalism in 20th century America. 
Lippmann’s intellectual journey represents the journey of American liberalism in 
the 20th century: an attempted return from infatuation with the progressive ideals of 
inevitable historical development and scientific progress to the stability of human rights 
1 Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980) xvii 
2 As an additional prefatory note, it must be said that the most outstanding of all works concerning Lippmann is 
Ronald Steel’s biography, Walter Lippmann and the American Century. Steel places Lippmann in the context of 20th 
century politics and culture, writing about Lippmann’s personal life as well as his place in the public sphere. It is an 
exceptional biography, and an indispensable reference for any scholar interested in Lippmann. I have used it 
extensively to understand the biographical curiosities of Lippmann’s life and times. All quotations hereafter in the 
format of, Steel, pg. x. 
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and freedom. America’s path to defining its brand of liberalism finds expression in the 
philosophical works of Lippmann, who was at the center of this struggle. Lippmann was a 
defender of the liberal democratic state whose value as a thinker derives from his attempt 
to understand the problem of political freedom (are people competent to self-rule in a mass 
democracy?) throughout this critical time period. In this struggle Lippmann remains a 
nuanced, though fierce exponent of political freedom as he sought to verify the foundations 
of political legitimacy and authority on which true political freedom depends. He began his 
quest as a progressive, averring scientific realism against entrenched dogmas and 
traditions, but, by remaining consistent on this question of political freedom (insofar as he 
sought to preserve and expand it), was led to conclude his quest arguing for a sustainable 
liberalism characterized by an attentiveness to the human person. The key, then, to 
understanding Lippmann and the great depth of his contribution to American liberalism is 
to understand his philosophical journey through careful exegesis of his major works of 
explicit political philosophy. 
Lippmann’s popularity, as well as his unique versatility and perceptiveness has 
prompted a large amount of secondary literature about his life, politics, philosophy, and 
influence. What is unique to my goal of a philosophical analysis of Lippmann’s major works 
of political philosophy is my attempt connect a common theme through Lippmann’s works 
to show consistency amidst his widely varied philosophies,3 and then to situate that 
3 In addressing the majority of those who have sought to apprehend some vision of Lippmann’s mind, the 
central misunderstanding of his thought in his major works of political theory follows in reaction the ‘turn 
towards conservatism’ in his late works, The Good Society, and Essays in the Public Philosophy. Hari N. Dam, 
Heinz Eulau, Charles Forcey, Christopher Lasch, David Elliot Weingast, Morton White, and, most prominently 
Benjamin Wright,  have all written on this theme, portraying Lippmann, in varying degrees of harshness, as a 
betrayer of his progressive, liberal, or democratic roots. 
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journey in regard to American liberalism’s engagement with progressive idealism. No work 
accomplishes both of these goals, and only two book length studies4 argue for any serious 
continuity in Lippmann’s political philosophy. My analysis is distinctive because it 
evaluates Lippmann’s thought explicitly for lessons on a sustainable liberalism with a new 
interpretation of Lippmann’s works that stresses a limited, but present continuity on the 
grounds of Lippmann’s intellectual consistency. This emphasis on continuity offers greater 
sensitivity to the corrections Lippmann makes to his own work, and greater insight into the 
consequences of these corrections for liberal democracy. 
Chapter One – The Context of Lippmann’s Political Thought: Some Important Features of 
Liberalism and Progressivism 
 
To achieve the ends of my thesis, it must be shown that there is a conflict between 
liberalism and progressivism that is at the heart of American political life in the 20th 
century, and that Lippmann’s career engages these political trends and thereby offers 
insight into the disambiguation of liberalism and progressivism. The central difficulty in 
this dissertation will be to associate elements of progressive or liberal philosophy, linked 
traditions with slippery and contentious definitions, to Lippmann’s somewhat discursive 
works of political philosophy. Because it is my desire to offer a new reading of Lippmann 
that offers insight into the way Lippmann’s engages with these traditions, I direct my 
argument through a set of main themes that encompass the crux of the division between 
liberalism and progressivism, and then connect these themes through each of Lippmann’s 
                                                          
4 Larry L. Adams, Walter Lippmann (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977) and Charles Wellborn, Twentieth 
Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philosophy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1969) 
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works. One of the central problems with this approach is that, as any observer of American 
political history will attest, our definitions of liberalism, and progressivism are easily 
confounded, and no simple analytic will fully distribute the traditions in a way that is 
satisfactory to all. It is therefore my aim that the interpretative categories I establish should 
express essential (though not always comprehensive) features of liberalism and 
progressivism that are also predominate in Lippmann’s work.  
The methodological framework is primarily defined in my first chapter, which 
describes liberalism and progressivism in the context of American political thought, 
primarily in contradistinction to the liberalism of the American founders. The purpose of 
this account is to establish an intellectual framework for discussing constitutionalism, 
natural rights, and human nature, political categories which I believe are the most essential 
to productively differentiating progressivism and liberalism, and which attach readily to 
Lippmann’s arguments. I structure my examination of Lippmann’s works around these 
themes in order to draw nuanced conclusions about his philosophical development, and, 
because the categories are well established in the origins of American political thought, the 
design allows for direct reflection upon how Lippmann’s philosophical development was 
responsive to intellectual trends of American political thought. 
Chapter Two - A Preface to Politics: Reason and Nuanced Progressive Idealism 
 
This chapter opens the discussion of Lippmann’s philosophical career, and begins 
with a brief biographical sketch with a focus on Lippmann’s intellectual influences leading 
up to A Preface to Politics. Though it is my intention to limit my exegesis to the content of 
his philosophical works, and avoid an intellectual biography, in order to understand 
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Lippmann as he understood himself, it is necessary to pay attention to his immediate 
influences and antagonists. The most lengthy manifestation of this in this study comes in 
discussing his early years at Harvard and shortly thereafter, before the publication of his 
first work of political philosophy. In Preface, we find, as I will argue is present in all of 
Lippmann’s works, recourse to both Nature and History, to the founders and the 
progressives, to strands of both progressivism and liberalism across the categories of 
constitutionalism, natural rights, and human nature. Lippmann consolidates these varied 
and disparate elements into a defense of a particular vision of human freedom. Every 
chapter in this study finds that Lippmann’s works all manifest some element of this 
quixotic desire to diagnose the means by which men enjoy the most political freedom. It is 
through engagement with this problem that my framework defining liberalism and 
progressivism gains cogency.  
Chapter Three: Drift, Mastery and Scientific Realism 
Lippmann’s ‘sequel’5 to A Preface to Politics, called, Drift and Mastery(1914), 
retained the iconoclastic spirit of its predecessor, but also contained many revisions and 
new ideas such that it is difficult to draw too strong a connection to Preface, a book written 
just one year prior. He continues the themes of rejecting the past with hope for the future, 
he increases his emphasis on the development of the future through scientific realism and 
what he calls “industrial statesmanship.” The book moves Lippmann closer to one of his 
idols, Teddy Roosevelt, and his political platform, and includes striking condemnations, not 
                                                          
5 His friends and admirers, notably Graham Wallas, expected this book to be a sequel to Preface to Politics. Indeed, 
most commentators did view it as a continuance of Lippmann’s youthful iconoclasm, though my argument 
contends that there is a notable divide between Preface and Drift.  
6 
of private property in its full scope, but rather private property as a stultifying, sacrosanct 
tradition. Lippmann both claims that the productivity of the economy should not be 
hampered by government action, and that the time has come for government takeover of 
basic industries, mining operations, railroads, and the like.67 The seeming paradox is 
resolved in Lippmann’s mind because of his stark optimism in scientific/bureaucratic 
management, but offers a curious contrast from the later Lippmann who values property 
rights. I will attempt to dissolve part of this tension by suggesting that Lippmann’s youthful 
self has downplayed the role of scarcity in his theoretical political musings, and that his 
conclusions are more ideologically neutral as a result. 
Lippmann later said glibly of his early books that he attempted to “solve all the 
world’s problems,” but if the subject of my study is the development of Lippmann’s thought 
as context for American political theory, it is imperative that the texts be read closely and 
purposefully. A close reading and attempt to make sense of Lippmann’s motivations is key 
to this enterprise, and sets up interesting conflagrations with the more well-known works 
by Lippmann. 
Chapter Four – Public Opinion and the Tyranny of the Masses: A Democratic Critique 
In this chapter I combine my analysis of, Public Opinion (1922), Lippmann’s most 
famous book, and The Phantom Public (1925), two works that formed the basis of 
Lippmann’s democratic critique and signaled his growing disillusionment with progressive 
idealism, particularly in the wake of WWI. This chapter is critical to describing the 
6 Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914) Ch. 6 
7 For details on the citation index, see the section of this paper labeled, “Notes.” 
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development of Lippmann’s thought, which is particularly compelling concerning his views 
of ‘social science.’ Early Lippmann is confident in the role of social science/science in 
facilitating the work of great men who rule, who have both the need and talent to 
transgress institutional limitations. In this middle period of Lippmann’s thought, 
knowledge and the authority of science are largely assumed, and represented in masterful 
men who manifest an idealized form of statesmanship. Though he remains animated by a 
need to provide new, progressive solutions the new problems of mass democracy, this very 
spirit is what leads him closer to the founders and the principle of Nature as a foundation 
for the ‘traditions of civility.’ 
Chapter Five – Solving Society: The Disinterested Humanist 
 A Preface to Morals (1929)8 seems like a natural corollary to Phantom’s pessimism 
insofar as Lippmann appears to retreat from the intractability of political affairs to 
humanistic moral philosophy. But it also feels strangely apolitical for someone who accused 
Plato of defining an ideal society, only to leave the world to Machiavelli.9 My argument is 
that this retreat by Lippmann reflects both his progressive and liberal inclinations. On one 
hand he argues that political thinking is “Notably inferior in realism and in pertinence to 
the economic thinking which now plays so important a part in the direction of industry.”10 
This reflects a subtle confidence in the progress of economic industry, where one is granted 
the luxury of eschewing political affairs. This also grounds itself in Nature through appeals 
he makes to the role of government, which is dramatically reduced, and ameliorates the 
                                                          
8 Walter Lippmann. A Preface to Morals (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 1982) 
9 Walter Lippmann. Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1960) Ch. 28 
10 Morals, Ch. 13 
8 
 
abstractions necessary to circumvent institutional governance. Despite a harsh tone of 
realism, Lippmann’s political commentary in Morals primarily serves to disinvest the 
seemingly abstract government of its power in favor of refocusing our attention on the 
state of the souls which inhabit the polity. Lippmann follows this theme, the management 
of political affairs through the education of human affairs, into his last work, Essays in the 
Public Philosophy (1955) where he adds to the disinterested humanism of Morals the 
support of what he calls the ‘traditions of civility.’ 
Chapter Six – Economics, Material Well-Being, and The Good Society 
 Lippmann’s Method of Freedom (1934) is an astounding reentry into political life. 
The essential point of Method and its sequel, The New Imperative (1935), is that the 
government should be responsible for the maintenance of the standard of living of its 
people. At first glance, this is diametrically opposed to the Lippmann in Morals, and even of 
Opinion and Phantom, however, Lippmann retains certain characteristics of humility 
amidst his new optimism. Fundamentally, he claims that human liberty should extend as 
far as possible, and that “the state is the servant and not the master of the people.”11 He 
explains a method of ‘free collectivism’ that is distinct from the collectivism of communist 
and fascist societies primarily in its ability to continually reorient itself around private 
enterprise, and to adopt temporary emergency measures in response to events such as the 
Great Depression. This emphasis on emergency methods for emergency situations helps 
explain his support and later break from FDR and the New Deal programs. The works again 
split Lippmann ideologically, on one hand he appeals to a natural right to work (a new 
                                                          
11 Walter Lippmann. Method of Freedom (New York: Macmillen, 1934), Part III 
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world without a frontier means that there are occasions where there are no opportunities 
to get jobs unassisted), and on another, he again appeals to executive authority, shunning 
legislative institutions which he sees corrupted by special interest groups. Not only does 
Lippmann continue to tacitly balance progressivism with liberalism, but he explicitly calls 
for a balancing of their proxies, liberty and authority.12  
The Good Society (1937)13 overlaps strongly, and is in some ways a prequel to Essays 
in the Public Philosophy (1955), but it is chronologically more compatible with Imperative 
and Method, and because it is often mistakenly viewed as a complete repudiation of those 
works, they must be examined together.14 I will stress two themes of continuity with his 
previous works: one, that the model of free collectivism is refined rather than completely 
abandoned, and two, that what progressives and some liberals see as a retreat to free 
market moralism, comes only with heavy qualifications from Lippmann, and familiar 
repudiations of past models of laissez-faire dogmas. To the former, his explicit rejection of 
New Deal style programs is tempered by a call, repeated from Method and Imperative,  for 
money spent (not on direct public assistance) on public works, education and heath as both 
“relief and remedy.”15 To the latter, Lippmann emphasizes what he sees as a false 
dichotomy between individual rights/laissez faire, and progressive stateism/collectivism.16 
He envisions property rights as managed extensively through a court system that depends 
on common law jurisprudence. 
                                                          
12 Walter Lippmann. The New Imperative (New York: Macmillen, 1935) , Part II 
13 Walter Lippmann. The Good Society (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 2005) 
14 See Wright, Ch.4 and 5. 
15 Walter Lippmann. The Good Society (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 2005) Ch. 11 
16 Good, Ch. 12 
10 
Chapter Seven – Making Liberalism Sustainable: The Public Philosophy 
Whatever vicissitudes Lippmann’s thought underwent, he always remained 
preeminently concerned with the problem of freedom in the modern world. Essays in the 
Public Philosophy (1955) was no different.  While Lippmann retains some hallmarks of the 
progressive mind in that he saw in the modern world a new, and unmet challenge to the old 
order of natural law: “The school of natural law has not been able to cope with the 
pluralism of the later modern age—with the pluralism which has resulted from the 
industrial revolution and from the enfranchisement and the emancipation of the masses of 
the people.”17  The mature Lippmann, however, instead of rebelling against the tradition, 
cites that very rebellion as the cause for our inability to cope with modernity’s new 
challenges. Essays is a culmination of Lippmann’s search to support liberal democracy, and 
his conclusion that the revival of American political life and discourse depends on the 
rearticulating of a political philosophy expressed as natural law is an outgrowth of his new 
understanding, and fervent desire to protect men and keep them free in the modern age. 
17 Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Transaction Publishers, 1989), Ch. 8 
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Chapter One – The Context of Lippmann’s Political Thought: Some Important 
Features of Liberalism and Progressivism 
Liberal Origins 
To understand Lippmann’s search for a profitable, sustainable liberal democracy, 
the origins of and dangers to liberalism need to be sketched.18 Perhaps better than any 
other democratic thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville understood the great consequence and 
tenor of the liberal tide. In one of the most passionate lines of Democracy in America, 
Tocqueville states that, “the entire book you are going to read was written under the 
pressure of a sort of religious terror in the author’s soul, produced by the sight of this 
irresistible revolution that for so many centuries has marched over all obstacles, and that 
one sees still advancing today amid the ruins it has made.”19 For Tocqueville, democracy’s 
ascendance is providential, and he is severely aware of the diverse challenges that will face 
those who wish to restrain and govern it. 
 The path and development of liberalism began in Europe and was driven by 
theologico-political problem, and by the slow withdrawal of aristocratic, classical mores 
and virtues in the face of their liberal democratic heirs. Liberal thinkers who wish to 
sustain democracy tend to recognize the acute limitations of liberal democratic progress. 
Walter Lippmann’s thought was characterized by constant doubt and worry about the 
                                                          
18 Pierre Manet’s works, particularly, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, Trans. Rebecca Balinski (University of 
Princeton Press, 1996) were particularly influential in my understanding of, and framing of the liberal project in this 
context. 
19 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), 6 
12 
capacity of liberal democratic politics, and to understand that concern is to touch a nerve 
deep within the original birth and logical path of the liberal revolution. 
The insistence at the great heart of liberalism that, as Hobbes says, “every man 
acknowledge another for his equal by nature,”20 conflicts with the aristocratic, classical 
impulse for excellence. How is one to be excellent and thus distinguished while being 
inherently the same? Hobbes condemns those who succumb to the passion of excellence, 
“The breach of this precept is pride.”21 Liberalism in some ways sets itself against the 
passions, against human nature. But does liberalism seek to conquer the passions 
definitely, or to balance them? The former option inclines toward apotheosis and utopia, 
and the latter to modest politics, and perhaps a greater freedom. How to sustain particular 
liberal democratic regimes is coevally a question of human nature, and one side to a 
problem generated by the theologico-political problem. 
The theologico-poltiical problem is the conflict of locating political power in the 
temporal or the spiritual, in reason or in revelation, in Athens, or in Jerusalem.  It is the 
essential question about the locus of political authority, though the division extends 
naturally to particular human activity. The nub of this immensely complex issue is that 
Church’s elemental good, salvation, is not of this world, but the Church is nonetheless 
tasked with leading men to that salvation. The corollary duty to oversee human action then 
manifests in the politically problematic pressure to oversee the actions of rulers, 
particularly those who in the church’s view endangered the salvation of their subjects.  It is 
not difficult to see how the imposition of theocracy therefore tends to follow into temporal 
20 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, Chapter XV 
21 Ibid. 
13 
 
orders. The political problem for the Christian West was then how to allow political unions 
the latitude needed to govern themselves while respecting the universal authority of the 
Church.  
The principle of the liberal revolution seeks to reunite this divided man by 
reconsidering the terms of political association. The result is a radical political freedom 
expressed as natural rights, foremost among them liberty, property, and life 
(security/freedom from oppression/pursuit of happiness). Natural rights doctrines at the 
heart of liberalism’s revolution are therefore expressed as freedom of movement, 
particularly as unconstrained movement, which is a response to the ancien regime’s 
impossible demand of lawful obedience to divided authorities. Political freedom then, the 
destruction of obstacles, is the aim of liberalism. 
This revolution therefore operates between actors who can be delineated in 
accordance with their response to this movement: the reactionary seeks to return to an 
older era, predating liberalism’s natural rights rhetoric; liberals support the project of 
liberalism (more conservative liberals wish to slow its momentum, while more liberal 
supporters want to nudge it along); and progressives wish to accelerate liberalism’s 
progress indefinitely. These movements and antagonisms occur within the liberal regime 
along the axis of the state and civil society. In a liberal regime, the state’s authority and 
legitimacy are conferred through consent of the governed. The regime’s constitutional 
order or institutional arrangements are agreed upon for the purpose of expressing natural 
rights claims through the demolition of obstacles to those freedoms. The civil society exists 
14 
naturally insofar as it is an expression of the social nature of man, but in a liberal regime it 
exists in contradistinction to the state. 
The state and the civil society are codependents in a tensional relationship.  The 
state’s justice rests primarily upon the politicized virtues attendant to its claim to rule 
impartially—it is no coincidence that Hobbes, Locke, and other liberal philosophers 
imagine an Archimedean point, the ‘state of nature’ wherefrom the justice of social order 
can be theorized and computed. The civil society, usually manifested as some form of 
commercial society in liberal regimes, is left ‘free’ through the construction of laws which 
ensure unrestraint. Where the ancien regimes commanded from on high, the liberal regime 
was content to leave men to be free, socially and economically. Civil society needs the state 
to enforce laws, and fundamental natural rights, and the state needs commercial society to 
produce wealth (a product of free association in commercial society) and consent (tacit, or 
otherwise in accordance with a particular constitutional order) to furnish its effective 
power. 
For all the great benefits men have reaped from the rise of liberalism, there is an 
implicit crisis concerning the direction of liberalism’s momentum. The problem emerges 
from liberalism’s internal logic which pressures the incessant dismantling of all obstacles 
to human freedom: once the obstacles are removed, where should one go? Against what 
force should liberal society direct itself? There is a lack of positive affirmation for particular 
conduct in private life in liberalism, unlike every other political regime before it, all 
directed by visions of virtue, excellence, holiness, conquest, etc. Liberal regimes are 
typically slow to acknowledge that liberty is a condition for human action, but not an end in 
15 
 
itself. What is the right to the pursuit of happiness if people do not possess knowledge of 
that which they pursue? The conflict is embodied in the desire to forge a strong (intentional 
and essential) communion of the great freedom in liberal society and a vision of truth 
which merits perpetuation. To say this another way, can men secure in liberalism the 
natural objects of their desire? That a society has a purpose is a condition for its 
sustainability, else its perpetuation is conditioned upon radical contingency.  
Liberty and equality work harmoniously when there are clear barriers to abolish, 
but when the barriers are obscured, when people disagree about which barriers need to go, 
when they begin interrogating small obstacles in the same manner as they once 
interrogated the great edifices which initially oppressed the promises of liberty and 
equality, there is more strife and little consensus. Disconcert is the price of liberalism’s 
triumph, and liberalism frays in the face of this search for common purpose, and struggles 
to account for expanding definitions within what Rawls defined (broadly, he hoped) as the 
liberal principle of legitimacy: “Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it 
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.”22 Liberals expect reason to immaculately 
generate consensus, and uncritical liberals often fail to acknowledge that this consensus is 
innately threatened by limitless liberty. Consider Locke in Chapter XXI, Section 55, of his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “Were all the concerns of man terminated in this 
life, why one followed study and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting: why one 
                                                          
22 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
16 
chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety and riches, would not be because every 
one of these did NOT aim at his own happiness; but because their happiness was placed in 
different things.” Locke’s observation can be read as a warning, particularly of the taste for 
material well-being if left unchecked by some moral satisfaction: there no limit to the 
diversity of pursuits in the name of happiness. A sustainable liberalism inherently depends 
on the character and agreement of these ‘happinesses.’ In America, Tocqueville saw the 
civil society’s preponderance of religiosity as an essential bulwark against the materialistic 
temperament engendered by the equalizing of conditions brought on by the rise of 
democracy. The freedom to pursue a diversity of individual, material happinesses was 
constructively hemmed by a coeval desire for moral satisfaction, in this case manifest 
through American religious character. Whether waning religiosity is a symptom or cause of 
the liberal democratic revolution, it is liberalism’s friendly critics, like Lippmann, who are 
interesting because they sense this lacuna of purpose, and judiciously warn and hope to 
guide, farsighted, against these tendencies and, often, their remedies. 
To suppose in response that the indeterminable freedom of liberal society should be 
somehow guided is not as heartening as it is obvious. The great danger resides in how 
exactly liberal peoples should do this. To secure the natural objects of men’s desire the 
state could assign quotas and direct behavior more combatively, but this would threaten 
the success of the commercial civil society and roundly weaken its underlying assumptions, 
and guarantees of rights, liberty and equality. On the other hand, it is not clear that a 
rudderless liberal society, prone to authoritarianism when confronted by hardships, 
particularly economic crisis, can alone approach an end outside of indeterminate liberty. It 
is no coincidence that Lippmann and other friendly liberal democratic critics felt so sharply 
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the sting of the first and second world wars. Liberalism’s substitute purpose, for the 
moment, is a faith that it is moving toward a human order that is in some measure 
satisfying. Caught between despotism/dogmatic truth and indeterminate faith, it is not 
surprising that modern liberals should wonder: what exactly were the medieval shackles 
from which liberalism was supposed to free them? 
This intractable situation is the basis of the balancing act that is at the heart of 
modern liberalism. At stake is the capacity of the liberal democratic regime’s ability to self-
sustain. It is exactly this question of a sustainable liberal regime which was taken up by the 
American founding fathers. Few were either reactionaries or progressives, seeking a return 
to pre-enlightenment (pre-liberal) political orders, or pro forma Jacobin radicals devoted to 
impalpable progress. In the sense of the preceding discussion, they were all liberals whose 
prescriptions were grounded in the claim of nature, of philosophy, which dampened their 
radicalism, but allowed them varying degrees of conservativism and liberalism as it relates 
to arresting or cautiously encouraging movement of the liberal regime to its unspecified 
end. The founders’ later antagonists, the progressives, would be less bothered by the 
indeterminable structure of the liberal regime, less bothered by the question of 
sustainability, and fundamentally buoyed by their radical faith in History to deliver the 
regime to a welcome future. Understanding liberalism’s origins and its crisis, the balance of 
the state and the civil society, the great promise of its guarantee of rights and the great 
danger of its momentum, sets the stage for a more particular discussion of its movement in 
America. 
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 To evaluate the continuity and message of Lippmann’s political thought requires 
both foundations and criteria well suited for the exegesis of Lippmann’s works of political 
philosophy. In this case the pursuit of these definitions runs headlong into a vast literature 
of academic and political debate, not to mention the canon of western political thought. The 
sheer volume which burdens those who would explain and articulate the antagonisms 
between liberalism and progressivism suggests that any pretense of comprehensiveness 
would be too ambitious. This diversity plagues the goal of comprehensiveness also invites 
the indictment of ‘cherry-picking.’ The goal here is identifying a set of working definitions, 
no more, no less. 
Disentangling liberalism and progressivism in American political life and culture is 
largely a Sisyphean task. Academicians, politicians, pundits, and especially the casual 
political observer all find it difficult to separate the two political philosophies due to a 
perceived overlap both historically and politically. The very terms ‘progressive’ and ‘liberal’ 
have come in and out of vogue in the world of political capital, often used and shunned by 
various institutions with remarkably diverse sets of political beliefs. Yet through the fog of 
war, persistent distinctions have existed through American political history, and continue 
to persist though substantive philosophical inclinations within the (mostly) competing 
doctrines. What follows is a presentation of an useful set of philosophical distinctions 
which separate the core substance of liberalism from progressivism, traced through the 
history of political thought into the American context. This distinction will then be used to 
characterize Lippmann’s thought, and pursue an understanding of his development as a 
thinker. This opening chapter will be successful if it produces a working understanding that 
separates the hallmarks of liberal and progressive thought while also placing the debate in 
Liberalism and Progressivism: Definitions for Evaluating Lippmann’s Thought
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the larger context of American political philosophy, and western political philosophy. This 
understanding will then be used as a means by which Lippmann’s works will be 
interpreted, and his development as thinker studied. 
One promising approach is to set Lippmann’s thought within the framework of 
political foundations. The structure of this framework is as follows: liberalism takes 
Nature23 as its political foundation, progressivism, History.24 A recent work by political 
scientist James Ceaser, Designing a Polity, attempts a definition: “a foundation is a first 
principle that explains or justifies a general political orientation; it is offered as an 
authoritative standard or fundamental idea of right.”25 Though the very term 
“foundationalism” really only exists in contradistinction to non-foundationalism, particular 
‘foundations’ can be understood “merely as a formal property of any polity.”26 This useful 
typology divides American foundational concepts into two categories: History and Nature, 
which are readily available in American Political Thought, and in Lippmann’s books of 
                                                          
23 When speaking of nature as a foundational concept, I will capitalize it for the sake of clarity. However, I will 
also capitalize History, and this creates a certain ambiguity. History is, in this context as well as others, 
perceived by progressives as a process (ex. “Progress”), to speak in quasi-Hegelian terms, of dialectical 
changes unfolding in the flow of time toward a vision of an ‘ethical state.’ I in no way wish to, by association, 
offer a deleterious definition of ‘Nature as process to a fixed end’ through its capitalization. This should be 
evident through my exegesis, but bears mentioning at the outset. 
24Political scientist James Ceaser defines a foundation, “merely as the formal property of any polity.” This sort 
of conceptual organization offers immediate connection between one ideological persuasion in the American 
tradition, and its animating form. The central advantage of this approach arises by offering categories which 
are philosophical in nature. James A. Ceaser, Designing a Polity (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2011), pg. 7 
25 James A. Ceaser, Designing a Polity (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011) pg. 7 
26 Ibid 
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political theory.27 These categories are broad, but can be identified roughly with currents in 
liberalism and progressivism.28 
Within the inquiry through foundations the founders, as liberals, and the 
progressives naturally seem to adopt Nature, and History, respectively. This makes 
exploring their antagonisms worthwhile, because to American progressives, their political 
philosophy embodies some combination of a correction or a repudiation of the philosophy 
of the American founders. For reasons often as much rhetorical as philosophical, this 
sometimes manifests as an re-articulation of the aims of the founders29 that maintains their 
spirit, or, more combatively, sometimes as arguments directly against the liberalism 
espoused by men such as Washington, Madison, Hamilton and Jefferson. For whatever 
purposes the progressives make reference to the founders, there is in that tendency a point 
of departure: it is necessary to understand the liberalism of the founders to understand the 
motivations of the progressives. The division between the two camps offers a useful proxy 
between the foundational concepts of Nature and History. This distinction is present in 
Lippmann’s thought as he often turns to the founders either for the purpose of criticism or 
inspiration, often both. This is one of many points of contact with his thought, offering deep 
                                                          
27 Ceaser also includes the category of Faith, which is an important explanatory feature of American political 
thought and practice. Foundations in faith operate primarily in culture, providential teachings can be found at 
the heart of the progressive’s “social gospel” movement, and deductions from religious teachings are merge 
with and buttress claims on behalf of “the laws of nature and nature’s God.” However, it is almost completely 
absent in the works of Lippmann, present only as a difficult sort of Neoplatonism. The absence of faith is, of 
course, important, but is better treated as the philosophical portrait of Lippmann emerges in the exegesis of 
his work. 
28 “Progressive” will be capitalized only when referring to the Progressive party. The lower-case progressive, 
will be a reference to the generalized ideology. 
29 See Wilson on the Founding. Newtonian Science. In I. Bernard Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers 
(Norton, 1997) 
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insight though an extended brief on the foundationalism of the founders and the 
progressives. 
Liberalism of the Founders: Grounded in Nature 
In Federalist 1, Alexander Hamilton introduces the great question of governing a 
liberal constitutional republic, of judging “whether societies of men are really capable or 
not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are 
forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” Hamilton 
sensed the magnitude of the moment, the great experiment of a government of “reflection 
and choice”, and rightly judged that failure in this project would “deserve to be considered 
as the general misfortune of mankind.”30 The Federalist is preeminently concerned with the 
political consequences of this new project, which would determine whether men could live 
in liberty and freedom, or would instead be forever fated to live slavishly under essentially 
despotic, contingent political orders. 
 Fundamental to the founders’ political science was constitutionalism, natural rights 
doctrine, and a realist view of human nature. Consider Jefferson: “We had no occasion to 
search into musty records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to investigate the laws and 
institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry. We appealed to those of nature, and found them 
engraved in our hearts.”31 A foundation in Nature is a foundation in rational 
philosophical/scientific inquiry. Though for some of the founders this meant a Christian 
rationalism, and others a political psychology, the amalgam of their views amounted to an 
                                                          
30 Federalist 1 
31 Quoted in Designing a Polity, 8 
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articulation of natural rights doctrine. “Not myth, mystery, or History, but philosophy or 
science—the terms were then synonyms—could serve, perhaps in a simplified version, as a 
public foundational concept. There could be ‘public philosophy’”.32 The foundation in Nature 
formed the grounds upon which the Founders rested their political prescriptions for 
institutional governance. This political science of natural rights stands in opposition to the 
philosophy of History, and a rigorous, almost strictly empirical natural scientism, both of 
which would beget the later forms of progressive opposition to the philosophy of the 
founders.33  
Progressives: A Lost Foundation and Modern Crisis 
 The progressive movement, though nebulous and difficult to study as a continuous 
body of thought, often manifests as a rejection of the founders and their political science. 
Progressive leaders and intellectuals view the world as complex and unmanageable 
without a large, active central government. The view, engendered in large part by rapid 
industrialization34 in the eras following the founding, is animated by the idea of progress 
within history35 which rejects natural rights theory and pronounces a belief in the 
                                                          
32 Designing a Polity, 10 Emphasis mine. 
33 Designing a Polity, pg. 68 Cesear speaks extensively about both the Philosophy of History and natural 
history as opponents to the natural rights theory of the founders. He finds the latter to be the forerunner of 
biology, anthropology, etc. And as such it constitutes the branch of progressive opposition to the founders 
expounded in highly scientific theories of social order which are to be administered by the central 
government. Both the Philosophy of History and natural history (as just briefly outlined) will be treated in the 
section of this paper that deals with the progressives, but more emphasis will be placed on the former as a 
definitive element of the Progressive mind-frame. 
34 Though many progressive accounts of this phenomenon exist, see, for example, the work of American 
progressive leader and economist, Richard T. Ely in "Industrial Liberty" Publications of the American 
Economic Association 3rd Series, 3 no. 1 (1902) 
35 Much of my analysis for this section, as well as my understanding of the categories of foundationalism and 
non-foundationalism rely on the work of James A. Ceaser, Nature and History in American Political 
Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), as well as Designing a Polity (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011) 
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unassailable progress of humanity. The words of Woodrow Wilson stand as ready as any 
encapsulation of the promise of History:  
Progress! Did you ever reflect that that word is almost a new 
one? No word comes more often or more naturally to the lips 
of modern man, as if the thing it stands for were almost 
synonymous with life itself, and yet men through many 
thousand years never talked or thought of progress. They 
thought in the other direction. Their stories of heroisms and 
glory were tales of the past. The ancestor wore the heavier 
armor and carried the larger spear. "There were giants in those 
days." Now all that has altered. We think of the future, not the 
past, as the more glorious time in comparison with which the 
present is nothing. Progress, development,—those are modern 
words. The modern idea is to leave the past and press onward 
to something new.36 
Though the concept of History well defines the foundation of all progressive 
thought, in considering the progressive allegiance to the general idea of progress, it is 
helpful to consider the writing of enlightenment forerunner to the progressives, Marquis de 
Condorcet in his Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind:  
This picture, therefore, is historical; since subjected as it will 
be to perpetual variations, it is formed by the successive 
observation of human societies at the different eras through 
which they have passed. It will accordingly exhibit the order in 
which the changes have taken place, explain the influence of 
every past period upon that which follows it, and thus show, by 
the modifications which the human species has experienced, in 
its incessant renovation through the immensity of ages, the 
course which it has pursued, and the steps which it has 
advanced towards knowledge and happiness. From these 
observations on what man has heretofore been, and what he is 
at present, we shall be led to the means of securing and of 
                                                          
36 Woodrow Wilson, from The New Freedom, 1913. American Progressivism: A Reader. editors Ronald 
J.Pestritto and William J. Atto, (Lexington Books, 2008) pg 49 
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accelerating the still further progress, of which, from his 
nature, we may indulge the hope.37 
Because of this enlightenment era introduction of the idea of progress, Progressivism is 
perhaps best understood by its relation to enlightenment thought: on the one hand it can 
be seen as a continuance of enlightenment thought in an ‘new’ era fashioned by the 
industrial revolution, and, in another version, it can be seen as a philosophy of History and 
wholesale rejection of the enlightenment tradition’s attempt to understand nature.38 The 
former accentuates the sciences of political economy and institutional tools of an active 
central government, and is grounded more in the immediate observable progress within 
history noted by Condorcet. The idea of progress, at first closely tied to observable 
progress, initiated by positivists such as Concordcet, was once the central organizing 
principle of the otherwise nebulous movement.   
The science of History furnished an age where men sought to direct the inexorable 
force of movement in history. “The task of directing progress now fell to the pragmatic 
philosophers and social scientists.”39 So long as History’s movement was guided, and 
remained true to its perceived course, the progressive movement had no difficulty in 
connecting their goals with those of the end of History. “We may indulge the hope,” said 
Condorcet. A second conception banishes the virtue of hope within history for a radical 
                                                          
37 Marquis de Condorcet, Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind (translated 
from the French) (Philadelphia, 1796). Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1669/789 on 
9/23/2015. 
38 This classification of the different types of progressive thought is given in James Stoner’s conference paper, 
“Progressivism, Social Science, and Catholic Social Teaching in the Building of the American Welfare State,” at 
a conference on “Progressive Challenges to the Constitution,” sponsored by the Center for Political and 
Economic Thought, St. Vincent College, Latrobe, Pennsylvania, April 9, 2011. I have found it very useful for 
conceptually organizing the different strands of progressive thought in America. 
39 Designing a Polity, 10 
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faith in the limitless perfectibility of man.  Exacerbated by the collapse of immediately 
observable progress in the wake of WWI and the totalitarian cataclysms of the 20th century, 
the radicalized faith in History moved away from observable hope for progress, and 
became more antagonistic towards constitutional limits, natural rights, and realism 
concerning human nature. In many ways the Progressive movement predating WWI was 
shattered, and rearticulated in a manner hostile to the natural rights foundation on which a 
sustainable Liberalism depends. This coexistence has been the story of the 20th Century, 
and the story of Lippmann’s public philosophy. To delve more deeply the categories of 
those divisions must be examined more thoroughly. 
The competing doctrines can be shown to coexist in a relatively balanced political 
climate until the foundation of the progressivism which rested in the 
observational/empirical progress of history crumbled, and divided the progressive 
movement in two: empirical  progressivism disappeared, and non-foundational 
progressivism, characterized by an explicit rejection of natural rights doctrine, emerged, 
revealing itself as an always-present element in empirical progressivism and as the future 
of the movement which would continue to aver against the liberal consensus in the 20th 
century. The attack on nature as a foundational concept was launched by the non-
foundational progressives, particularly John Dewey, who were unwilling to concede any 
standard of natural rights, considering it untenable as a metaphysical position. Because the 
idea of natural rights entailed a fixed human nature that necessarily limits man’s 
possibilities, these progressives instead opted for a more robust notion of progress that is 
foundationless. By questioning the idea of progress in History some philosophers and 
progressive leaders began to reevaluate the very idea of foundations. They rejected the 
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empirically flawed notion of progress in History as an outdated form of “historicism,” and 
instead embraced a new sort of non-foundationalism that took the idea of eventual 
progress on nothing more than “an act of faith.” It became the hallmark of a fatalistic 
progressivism. The distinction between the observable and fatalistic progressivism will help 
clarify what parts of Lippmann’s thought, particularly his early thought, remained 
consistent and active throughout the course of his career. 
Refining Categories for Lippmann’s Political Thought 
Through the density and variety of this brief on the distinctions within and 
motivations of liberalism, the scope of American political thought offers many potential 
modes of interpretation. However, there are three categories that form the crux of the 
division: Constitutionalism, Natural Rights, and Human Nature. Evident in each is the 
tension between Nature and History, where claims on behalf of Nature and liberalism are 
distinct from those of History and progressivism because the former tend to imply limits on 
political order, and the latter tend to reject them.  
To broadly identify these tensions:  
Natural right’s appeal to Nature amounts to assertions of truth and falsehood as a pursuit 
of the good in an ordered universe. The progressive rejection of nature argues some 
version of the historicity of moral-political judgments: that they are circumscribed by their 
particular place and time, or that there is no ground, providential or natural, for the very 
concept of natural right. A notion of progress within History is instead inserted as guide 
and master.  
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Constitutionalism appeals to Nature as a doctrine of limits (natural rights, limited power) 
through which a people enumerate the terms and conditions under which they consent to 
be governed. Limited government is possible only in democratic societies if the demos is 
willing to impose limits upon itself though representation (rather than direct democracy) 
and agreed institutional mechanisms. Constitutionalism tends to appeal to History when it 
is treated as an evolving organic process, thus moving towards an idealized ‘ethical’ state. 
Constitutional limits are often diminished through active political actors who circumvent 
institutional structures, and through excessively sweeping jurisprudence which seeks a 
particular result identified though an appeal to History. 
The view of Human Nature endorsed by the foundation in Nature is rooted in fixed ends of 
human flourishing engendered by a particular philosophical anthropology. History, 
conversely, rejects the ideas of fixity and limits engaged by the traditional study of man, 
and instead advocates a faith in the perfectibility of humanity through state intervention 
and guidance. Nature aligns with the notion that the government is the product of the 
exercise of practical wisdom naturally available to those who practice self-government, and 
History favors man in motion, directed towards his apotheosis by the state as the basis of 
all morality. 
Where does this leave us in the quest for a distinction between liberalism and 
progressivism? At the very least, there are two foundational concepts, Nature and History. 
Each formalizes properties constitutive of liberalism and progressivism and divides them 
in a way that can organize the interpretation of Lippmann’s thought. Yet the distinction is 
incomplete: there is too much overlap, too much rhetoric to disambiguate the ideological 
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doctrines within a single factor analytic. The real task of disambiguation will come through 
examination of the particular with reference to the general framework. The benefits of 
foundational categories extend to the task of clarifying Lippmann’s political ideas in the 
scope of the political ideas which animate the varieties of liberal and progressive thought. 
Further, by stepping away from the secondary literature’s tendency toward indexical 
analysis of Lippmann as a partisan in one particular tradition on the basis of practical 
politics and/or biographical circumstance, there can be clarification of his purposes 
through a re-reading of his engagement with the philosophical trends of the 20th century, 
and a new philosophical understanding of the ideas which form the basis of political 
ideologies. That task, however, can only be completed through sustained, careful, and 
philosophically motivated exegesis of Lippmann’s treaties on political philosophy. 
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Chapter Two - A Preface to Politics: Reason and Nuanced Progressive Idealism 
Lippmann’s first book was nothing less than an astonishing success in the 
estimation of its contemporary cultural and political observers. Teddy Roosevelt went so 
far as to call Lippmann: “the most brilliant young man of his age in all the United States.”40 
The book is an unique and in some ways even a profound tackling of the deepest elements 
of a dueling progressivism and liberalism that would persist throughout his corpus. Yet for 
all its complexity in this regard, its incoherencies are difficult to overlook. Many friends and 
critics attribute this to the boisterous optimism of his youth, but it is in large part due to his 
split allegiance to History and Nature as guiding principles, and the beginning of his quest 
to resolve their dispute. To understand this context for his first book begins with the 
immediate intellectual influences upon its authorship. In discussing his first book, the most 
relevant influences felt by a young Walter Lippmann occurred during his time at Harvard, 
which was in turned shaped by his early life. 
Though uneventful, Lippmann’s childhood was pleasant, and offers a picture of the 
man he was to become. He was born in New York City on September 23, 1889 to Jacob and 
Daisy Lippmann. Jacob’s family were comfortably upper-middle class garment 
manufacturers, quickly rising when the Lippmanns inherited a substantial fortune upon the 
death of Daisy’s father. Walter was born and bred as a gentleman, accompanying his 
parents on regular trips to Europe, exposed to the social and cultural elite, and enjoying a 
secure existence as their child. He was educated well, and in Jewish preparatory schools 
                                                          
40 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “Walter Lippmann: The Intellectual v. Politics, : in Walter Lippmann and His Times, 
ed. Marquis Childs and James Reston (New York Harcourt, Brace, 1959) pg. 197 
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where the climate stressed assimilation and submerging that Jewish identity in New York 
cultural life, and Lippmann often hid through omission his Jewish identity. 
One hallmark through all of Lippmann’s career has always been his fascination with 
men of action, leaders possessed of both the reason and moral courage to manifest 
productive change in accord with democratic sensibilities. His father was not such a man, 
genial and kind, but cowed by his wife and uninspiring to the young Lippmann. He would 
turn elsewhere for fatherly advice and tutelage, to such figures as Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Graham Wallas, Judge Learned Hand, and art historian Bernard Berenson, among others. 
Professionally Lippmann was also drawn to political figures with a sort of mastery and 
commitment to innovation and democracy. Among these figures numbered Teddy 
Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Winston Churchill, and Charles de Gaulle. Though each fell in 
and out of favor with Lippmann, they each in some way represented an avatar for the 
contemplative Lippmann. Active leaders who would accomplished much through 
boundless energies, particularly Teddy Roosevelt, whom Lippmann very much admired 
early in his career.41 
All of these men were revered for their ability to disperse the bogeys of ‘constructed 
evils,’ a term he uses in his early work, Drift and Mastery, to describe the stultifying effects 
of ‘stale tradition.’ Biographer Ronald Steel notes that for Lippmann, “Reason became a 
kind of religion...And he continued to look for men who could see beyond the ‘bogeys’ and 
‘constructed evils,’ for great leaders who could direct the passions of lonely men in crowds 
and guide them toward higher paths.”42 Steel notes a story Lippmann tells in Drift and 
                                                          
41 Steel, pg. 5 
42 Steel, pg. 6 
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Mastery about a telling confrontation in Lippmann’s youth, what he called the most heroic 
moment of his life: a confrontation with a suspected ghost. A family maid planted the idea 
in the impressionable child’s mind, and, in the darkness of his bedroom, Lippmann resolved 
to confront an image which appeared to him to be that of a ghost. Lippmann lauds himself 
for stepping out of bed, turning on the light and identifying the ghost as a laced curtain, and 
returning to sleep. While it is clear Lippmann was indeed gratified and motivated by this 
guide of reason, it is less clear whether either he or Steel realized that the youth still 
needed to get out of bed to disperse the bogeys, reason alone being unequal to the task. 
Shunning the recommendations of his father and prep school debate coach that he 
become a lawyer, Lippmann chose a rather more romantic profession for himself, that of an 
art historian. Deeply influenced by John Ruskin, a Victorian era art and social critic, 
Lippmann spent his European vacations in museums, ignoring the simple pleasures of rest 
and relaxation enjoyed by his parents. Ruskin’s work had inculcated a social awareness, 
and reformist sensibility in Lippmann, but, importantly, had also linked it to an aesthetic 
purity.  This is particularly telling concerning Ruskin’s view of labor and art:  
We want one man to be always thinking, and another to be 
always working, and we call one a gentleman, and the other an 
operative; whereas the workman ought often to be thinking, 
and the thinker often to be working, and both should be 
gentlemen, in the best sense. As it is, we make both ungentle, 
the one envying, the other despising, his brother; and the mass 
of society is made up of morbid thinkers and miserable 
workers. Now it is only by labour that thought can be made 
healthy, and only by thought that labour can be made happy, 
and the two cannot be separated with impunity.43 
                                                          
43 The Works of John Ruskin, Edited by Edward Tyas Cook, and Alexander Wedderburn (Cambridge university 
Press, 2010) 
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Lippmann was primed with this sense and expectation of the continuity of aesthetic 
nobility with decent labor, something that informed his early criticism of the excesses of 
private property support of corporatism, and later restrained his endorsement of the right 
of private property in a liberal democratic state. Both Lippmann and Ruskin admired pre-
classical Greek and Roman, and Gothic architecture, and were disparaging of the vulgarity 
of self-expression and indulgence of the renaissance artists. Together they condemned the 
perversions and corrupting influence of the modern world. Lippmann entered Harvard, just 
days shy of his seventeenth birthday, convinced he would follow this career of art historian, 
reformer, and social critic. 
  Harvard was a truly unique experience for a young man with Lippmann’s innate 
intellectual curiosity. Spurned by the socially elite clubs on account of his Jewishness, 
Lippmann found a home in the intellectualism of the university, rejection fueling his 
emerging social conscience. An iconoclast at even a young age, one of Lippmann’s first 
published articles was an attack on a professor: Barret Wendell, author of a recent work 
called The Privileged Classes, a condemnation of mass tastes on behalf of a sort of 
anglophillic cultural absolutism. Lippmann penned an acerbic critical piece for a school 
magazine, replete with all the expected indignation of a progressive anti-elitist. The work 
caught the attention of retired Professor William James, who personally sought out and 
congratulated Lippmann on his insights, and began a friendship with the young man 
centered around weekly tea times on Thursday mornings.44 
                                                          
44 Steel, 16-7 
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 Ronald Steel notes that while Lippmann was never drawn to the gloomy social 
Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, he found great accord with the iconoclasm of James, 
particularly in James’ explicit rejection of all dogmas in the favor of experience and 
rigorous empiricism. James influenced Lippmann’s early views with his experimental 
pluralism and view of truth as efficiency. “‘The true’, to put it very briefly, is only the 
expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of 
our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the 
whole, of course.” 45 The meliorism and practicality tempered any dramatic utopian 
thinking in which Lippmann may have engaged without James’ influence, but James also 
impressed upon the early Lippmann the notion that moral judgments are ineffectual guides 
to understanding the value and purpose of life, also complicating any recourse Lippmann 
might have made to the realm of essences in engaging a teleological view of man. James’ 
freethinking openness appealed strongly to Lippmann, but Lippmann was never fully 
satisfied with the incompleteness of James’ experimental pluralism. 
James’s influence, though prominent, was contradicted by Lippmann’s confessed 
fascination with Santayana, who fostered in Lippmann the idea that reason exists to 
dominate experience and could assist in the search for reality beyond experiences rooted in 
neo-platonic ‘essences.’ What Lippmann did not find in James in regard to aesthetic 
philosophical judgment, he found in Santayana’s appeal to reason as the guide to moral 
essences beyond human experience. Santayana’s star pupil, Lippmann read his Life of 
Reason, and quickly impressed the old Spaniard with his wit and curiosity. Santayana shook 
                                                          
45William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975) pg. 34 
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him out of the moral relativism of James’ philosophy, condemning it as ‘romantic 
cosmology.’46 Steel notes a letter Lippmann would later pen to friend and art critic Bernard 
Berenson ten years after Harvard: “I love James more than any very great man I ever saw, 
but increasingly I find Santayana inescapable.”47 Lippmann never fully abandoned James, 
and there is more of Santayana’s aestheticism present in his early works than is commonly 
recognized, but for the more directly political prescriptions in Preface, perhaps no one was 
more influential than Graham Wallas. 
In Lippmann final semester at Harvard, Graham Wallas, a leader of the Fabian 
movement, offered a seminar that would form the substance of his next book, The Great 
Society. So impressed was Wallas with Lippmann, that he dedicated this book to his 
student. The content of Wallas’ work included a critique of politics as an essentially 
irrational phenomenon directed not by reasoned weighing of facts, but instinct, prejudice 
and habit.48  Wallas further imparted to Lippmann a buttressing of his impression of a 
complex and unwieldy modernity (first initiated aesthetically in reading Ruskin), and 
skepticism concerning the socialist reform movements, Wallas having disputed with the 
Fabians, and Lippmann previously flirting with socialist inspired reformism. Wallas’ impact 
inculcated in Lippmann an emphasis on human psychology, and human nature as the 
center of politics, as he critiqued those who would prefer to govern by statistics alone. Steel 
quotes Lippmann crediting Wallas as having, “turned back the study of politics back to the 
humane tradition of Plato and Machiavelli—of having made man the center of political 
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investigation.”49 Never mind for now what differences might have been overlooked 
between Plato and Machiavelli; Lippmann’s point was, and would remain, that human 
nature is the center of good political investigation. 
Lippmann left Harvard, ending his position as Santayana’s teaching assistant, to take 
a job as a reporter with a newly started news magazine, the Boston Common. Bored by the 
shallowness of its moderate progressive rhetoric, he reached out to muckraking journalist 
Lincoln Steffens for guidance. Steffens, known for his evangelical socialism, and his work on 
local corruption, The Shame of Cities, was preparing to begin an investigation into the 
practices of big banking and was eager for an apprentice whom he could mold into a 
journalist, and he offered the job to Lippmann. Together they delved into the 
underpinnings of big business. Lippmann did the legwork, pouring over documents and 
interviewing anyone who would speak with him, assembling a dense report describing the 
secret deals made between big banks, and financial houses on Wall Street. Their work 
would help trigger the Pujo Committee investigations, which in turn helped create public 
support for the 16th Amendment, the Clayton Antitrust Act, and the Federal Reserve Act. 
Steffens impressed upon Lippmann more of a method of good, fact based journalism than 
an intellectual legacy, yet Lippmann left his employ confirming the idea that corruption is 
an inescapable part of the system, and with a healthy skepticism about the inherent 
goodness of the common man.50  
The intellectual mind of Lippmann on the eve of his first book is as mixed as the 
tensions between Nature and History that begin to manifest in all his works. The emerging 
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picture is that of an idealistic, reformist, young progressive, as many interpreters have 
charged, but there as a great depth to that idealism, particularly in regard to what he 
expected of humanity. On one hand, the young man was fascinated by Ruskin’s aesthetic 
sensibility, including condemnation of the vulgarity of Renaissance art and expressionism. 
Yet he objects boldly to an elitist work by a professor condemning mass tastes. His religion 
of reason is confronted by James’ emphasis on will and empiricism. This confusion was met 
with his longing for the neo-platonistic aesthetic beauty from Santayana, and Graham 
Wallas’ emphasis on social psychology, which somehow provided a sort of ground on which 
to reconcile the expressly political corollaries of these dissensions. With the final 
experience of corruption in the trenches of Wall Street with Lincoln Steffens, Lippmann had 
no end of unresolved intellectual currents with which he had to contend. These are large 
pending questions, and despite the triumph and boldness with which it was written, 
Lippmann’s first book was only his first attempt to resolve them. 
Lippmann knew that he wanted to write a book, and even penned a letter to Graham 
Wallas informing him of his intention to produce a series of essays aimed at popularizing 
Wallas’ Human Nature in Politics.51 To produce such a work Lippmann had retreated to the 
backwoods of Maine with friend and Harvard alum, Alfred Kuttner. Kuttner, a patient and 
disciple of Freudian psychoanalysis, was resolved to work on his translation of Freud’s On 
the Interpretation of Dreams. In their nightly discussions Lippmann found in Freud a sort of 
hook, a novelty to invigorate his discursive, intellectually eclectic examination of the 
progressive platform. Lippmann saw Freud’s view of the unconscious as an ally in the 
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difficult problem presented by Wallas’ social psychological approach to political and 
cultural life—that reason is insufficient for understanding human actions. In Freud 
Lippmann found not only tools to further Wallas’ approach, but also Freudian slogans to 
explain just how reason might conquer, or ‘sublimate,’ the political destructiveness of the 
emotional/irrational man. 
A Preface to Politics (1913) is traditionally thought of as a progressive tome, 
emblematic of a young Lippmann and a young century, optimism and reform. And while it 
is those things, it is also much more, for a nuanced reading easily finds recourse to both 
Nature and History, to the founders and the progressives, to strands of both progressivism 
and liberalism across the categories of constitutionalism, natural rights, and human nature. 
Lippmann consolidates these varied and disparate elements into a defense of a particular 
vision of human freedom articulated in the mode of philosophical inquiry. Every chapter in 
this study finds that Lippmann’s works all manifest some element of his quixotic desire to 
diagnose the means by which men enjoy the most political freedom. In this work, widely 
thought to be his most fancifully progressive, he continues to insist on democratic freedom 
in his pursuit of a defense of civilization which the modern era so desperately requires.  
In many ways, A Preface to Politics (1913) is a discursive romp through the stable of 
progressive reformism, dealing with the expected issues of voting reform, anti-trust and 
business regulations, muckraking, party politics, and all other manner of corruption in 
political and social life. However, the excited prose signals a startling optimism about 
something new Lippmann is bringing to the progressive catalogue. Though Lippmann’s 
optimism is evident, it shouldn’t be overstated. To understand his method it is important to 
38 
 
note that he also includes various reminders to his reader that the work is nothing more 
than a, “a preliminary sketch for a theory of politics, a preface to thinking. Like all 
speculation about human affairs, it is the result of a grapple with problems as they appear 
in the experience of one man. For though a personal vision may at times assume an 
eloquent and universal language, it is well never to forget that all philosophies are the 
language of particular men.”52 Though the grand tone of the book is difficult to square with 
such a disclaimer, it is nonetheless important to understand that Lippmann’s goal here is to 
sketch a new method of political science, a new ‘philosophy.’ Though he cloyingly 
admonishes his subjectivity, his objective is sweeping, and his method is political-
philosophical. The type and nature of this philosophy emerges in-between undergraduate 
references to a scattered list of favorite philosophers. Part of the task of interpretation is to 
determine the character and nature of this philosophy. 
Taken with his insistence that the world is undergoing massive, and unwieldy 
corporate and industrial reorganizations, it’s not difficult to hear Tocqueville’s sentiments 
in Democracy in America echoed in Lippmann’s introduction: “A new political science is 
needed for a world altogether new.”53 Lippmann understands himself as on the brink of a 
discovery of a new politics. 
The details of this new philosophy emerge in a tightly argued nine chapters. Though 
Steffens’ style of factual presentation is obvious in Lippmann’s construction, the book feels 
oddly unconsummated. Lippmann sticks to his understated goal of developing a ‘preface to 
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thinking,’ but therein never fully illuminates a specific way forward. His central argument 
seems to be that each problem in the ‘machine’ of political life, particularly in the inchoate, 
rapidly industrializing/corporatizing modern world, evokes unique brands of corruption. 
The only means for dealing with these many and varied corruptions is a scientific, inventive 
social psychology which takes human nature as its guiding principle. 
The term social psychology receives somewhat ambiguous usage throughout 
Lippmann’s book. The best source for a concise definition comes instead from Graham 
Wallas’ The Great Society, the book Wallas dedicated to Lippmann and constructed from the 
seminar he gave at Harvard: “The science of social psychology aims at discovering and 
arranging the knowledge which will enable us to forecast, and therefore to influence, the 
conduct of large numbers of human beings organized in society.”54 The type and nature of 
this knowledge comes in the form of a catalogue of human events and their causes which 
together illuminate the disposition of the event’s actors. Wallas continues: “It is further 
convenient to use the term ‘human nature’ as meaning the sum total of the human 
‘dispositions.’”55 Taken thusly there is little to connect this view of human nature with a 
foundation in Nature. Wallas’ view, at least superficially,56 is merely a summation of parts 
of the human psyche, subject to Historical examination, revision, and (perhaps infinite) 
modification. Yet the salient question seems to be what arenas remain open to social 
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psychological inquiry, and what, if any, limits there are to the modification or perfectibility 
of human persons. 
In Lippmann’s case, his view on the fixity of human nature and existence of natural 
rights is not altogether clear in Preface, partly because of the way he treats the irrational. 
Lippmann’s novelty, the twist he imposes on Wallas’ method, is to extend social psychology 
into the realm of the unconscious with the use of Freudian terminology. Lippmann 
introduces Freud’s term, ‘sublimation’ in a discussion on how a ‘boy’s gang’ might better 
spend its energies as a Boy Scout troop. He claims, “In each individual the original 
differences are small. Training and opportunity decide in the main how men's lust shall 
emerge. Left to themselves, or ignorantly tabooed, they break forth in some barbaric or 
morbid form. Only by supplying our passions with civilized interests can we escape their 
destructive force.”57 The goal is clear, but the method is not. Lippmann seems to be arguing 
that a well-ordered inquiry into these ‘ignorant taboos’ and small differences will provide a 
path forward to a better citizen, someone with ‘civilized interests.’ 
The civilized interests by which this civilizing effect is manifest are often 
enumerated, and include the traditional norms of family, school, religion, art and science.58 
However, there is an unexamined relativism implicit in the assumed value of what 
Lippmann expects to be considered civilized interests. Nowhere is there a complete 
discussion of the principle, which is further complicated by the straightforwardly 
relativistic first chapters which seem to collapse the good and bad in a pseudo-Nietzschean 
fashion: “Politics does not exist for the sake of demonstrating the superior righteousness of 
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anybody. It is not a competition in deportment. In fact, before you can begin to think about 
politics at all you have to abandon the notion that there is a war between good men and 
bad men.”59 These opening sentences can be read to suggest that as there is no 
righteousness, there is no right. Lippmann’s faith appears to be invested in a nuanced, 
historical development furnished by scientific method. In his case the scientific method 
applied eschews traditional statistical approaches because he has sensed the depth and 
complexity of human nature, represented as the encounter with the irrational. This 
position only serves to obscure the essential promise Lippmann finds in historical 
development of society, of expected progress in History. 
One of the hallmarks of natural right, of classical political rationalism, that politics is 
pursuit of the question of ‘what is good for the city, for the man?’ further suggests that 
Lippmann has indeed explicitly rejected Nature or natural right as a source and guide for 
political order. However, Lippmann’s point seems to extend beyond a superficial dismissal 
insofar as he goes on to condemn these questions of ‘righteousness’ only in regard to their 
arresting impact on political organization. He claims, “if one half of the people is bent upon 
proving how wicked a man is and the other half is determined to show how good he is, 
neither half will think very much about the nation.”60 It seems that Lippmann is making a 
positive claim about the good of the city, that it is stultified by constant bickering, 
particularly in Congress, over facile claims of the good and evil of an endless litany of 
parsimonious ejaculations.  
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It does not seem to be the case that Lippmann understands himself to be a relativist, 
but rather that he has observed that political culture is easily halted by creeds, taboos and 
dogmas which attach easily to simple pronouncements of what is right and wrong. The real 
issue stems from the great difficulty the average person has in discerning the politically 
salient issues and responses:  
If you stare at a checkerboard you can see it as black on red, or 
red on black, as series of horizontal, vertical or diagonal steps 
which recede or protrude. The longer you look the more 
patterns you can trace, and the more certain it becomes that 
there is no single way of looking at the board. So with political 
issues. There is no obvious cleavage which everyone 
recognizes. Many patterns appear in the national life. The 
"progressives" say the issue is between "Privilege" and the 
"People"; the Socialists, that it is between the "working class" 
and the "master class." An apologist for dynamite told me once 
that society was divided into the weak and the strong, and 
there are people who draw a line between Philistia and 
Bohemia.61 
This sixth paragraph of the twenty-three year old’s first book uses an analogy which would 
re-emerge in various forms throughout his future works, and draws attention to the basis 
of his critique of democratic citizenship on the grounds that most citizens are unprepared 
and incapable of the complexities of political life. But even at this stage Lippmann knows 
that his argument is insufficient—while he has critiqued the inefficiency of the good/bad 
dogma, he does not have a replacement mechanism by which political life is to be 
understood.  
Lippmann reframes the conflict experienced in political life as that between the 
routineer and the inventor, those given to an inflexible machine politics, and those willing 
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to invent and create. Lippmann condemns all who subscribe to a ‘machine conception of 
government,’ including the American Founders and constitution.62 He favors a dynamic 
style of government led by statesman who interpret will and sentiment derived from sound 
political psychology. The proposition is strange, particularly at this early stage of the 
argument when Lippmann has yet to provide a convincing example of such leadership.  
Lippmann struggles throughout the book to define the statesmanship he seeks, 
hinting that it may be ineffable except in practice. He echoes Nietzsche in a description of 
this brand of the ‘inventor’ which opposes the routineer: “It is, I believe, this power of being 
aggressively active towards the world which gives man a miraculous assurance that the 
world is something he can make.”63 Nietzsche’s influence is again apparent. The epigraph of 
the entire book becomes clear: "A God wilt thou create for thyself out of thy seven devils.” It 
is from Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, in the first book, under the subheading “The 
Way of a Creating One.” For all the passages that Lippmann could have chosen from 
Nietzsche, he picked one that highlights both a clarion call and an admonishment to those 
who would follow it.  To create in this fashion is to be alone, and to affirm a value of life 
amidst the nihilism and loneliness of ‘the creating one’ is as much a damning as it is a 
freeing endeavor. There is only a little-ease64 at the hands the seven demons,65 and 
Nietzsche includes in that passage a line which Lippmann does not quote, that it is, 
“Terrible it is to be alone with the judge and avenger of thy own law.” 
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Nietzsche’s place in the 
situation of the foundational ideas of Nature and History, it is clear that Lippmann moves 
away from natural right in embracing this Nietzschean inventor-statesman. Lippmann 
again references Nietzsche in the definition of the inventor as someone capable of 
sublimating the passions in service of civilization, as, “he who has the courage of existence 
will put it triumphantly, crying "yea" as Nietzsche did, and recognizing that all the passions 
of men are the motive powers of a fine life.”66 It seems that the early Lippmann is indeed 
hostile to natural right, and to its foundation in Nature. Yet there remains a difficulty in 
placing him in the historicist/relativist persuasion: his recourse to philosophy. 
Lippmann has charted for himself a truly unique line as a Natural Rights 
progressive. It is clearly facile to claim that any positive assertion about human rights 
belongs to the same category as a natural right foundation in Nature, in essences and 
philosophical reasoning. However, Lippmann’s tie to a foundation in Nature is present 
through his continued appeal to rationalism amidst the strange naturalistic reasoning that 
he is forcing to accompany his ideal of statesmanship. The awkwardness of this 
comportment pits the ‘wisdom of civilization’ against a social naturalism, that is, an anti-
rationalistic method of problem solving that escapes a priori theorizing. Lippmann does not 
seem to have a solution to, nor even see, the problem: his enterprise in Preface builds a 
philosophical statecraft.  
The reader is left with a confusing choice: either take Lippmann at his word and 
accept that there is no foundation to his prescriptions other than an expectation of 
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progress, or to accept that his philosophic enterprise also expresses philosophical 
openness. Both premises seem to be operative. Take for instance Lippmann’s description of 
the inventor in contradistinction to the routineer: “While the routineers see machinery and 
precedents revolving with mankind as puppets, he puts the deliberate, conscious, willing 
individual at the center of his philosophy. This reversal is pregnant with a new outlook for 
statecraft. I hope to show that it alone can keep step with life; it alone is humanly relevant; 
and it alone achieves valuable results.”67 Constant references to this philosophy imply that 
Lippmann expects the scientific method ostensibly grounded in historical development to 
be carried by digestion of experimentation and subsequent improvement at the hands of 
inventors. The inventor more and more resembles a philosopher, as a sort of expert who 
supplants the inevitably routineer-ing politician. After blamelessly drawing attention to the 
way the inventive Woodrow Wilson inescapably descended to routineer status through 
campaigning, Lippmann makes the curious comment: “If a nation's destiny were really 
bound up with the politics reported in newspapers, the impasse would be discouraging. If 
the important sovereignty of a country were in what is called its parliamentary life, then 
the day of Plato's philosopher-kings would be far off indeed. 68 Though he does not claim it 
explicitly, the lesson is appears to be that the ideal society is in fact that ruled by the 
philosopher, and that, perhaps, this is exactly the sort of person the inventor has to 
become. 
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Though Lippmann isn’t blind to the difficulties in this proposition, he suspects that 
this is already partly the function of the government ancillaries of which the bureaucracy is 
composed:  
Certainly nobody expects our politicians to become 
philosophers. When they do they hide the fact. And when 
philosophers try to be politicians they generally cease to be 
philosophers. But the truth is that we overestimate 
enormously the importance of nominations, campaigns, and 
office-holding. If we are discouraged it is because we tend to 
identify statecraft with that official government which is 
merely one of its instruments. Vastly over-advertised, we have 
mistaken an inflated fragment for the real political life of the 
country.69 
The refrain against machinist political culture again is heard. Lippmann’s optimism extends 
in the form of the unnamed trappings of the political organism as philosopher-kings adopt 
a rather more humble role as scientific managers. However, Lippmann insists that they 
retain a philosophical attitude, one that shuns dogma and creed (a fundamental attribute of 
any philosopher unburdened by sophistry), and, critically, that thereby wisdom is left in 
charge of politics. While placing wisdom at the helm of politics is far from securing a 
natural right foundation in Nature, it does temper the creative zeal of the inventor through 
philosophical openness to new ideas and information. What most commenters have seen as 
an exercise in progressive triumphalism can in fact be tempered by Lippmann’s essential 
reliance on reason as the source and structure of philosophical statesmanship which 
advances the progressive cause. This is certainly not to say that his position is without 
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difficulties, but that there is a present tension concerning his treatment of natural right 
between History and Nature. 
This ambiguity continues into the only examples Lippmann attempts to give of his 
experimental, inventive statecraft. In the middle of the book, the Fifth Chapter, “Well 
Meaning but Unmeaning: The Chicago Vice Report,” 70 finally gives an example by which to 
explain and critique social organization. The Vice Commission was tasked with determining 
whether Chicago should continue allowing regulated prostitution in special ‘vice’ districts, 
or to outlaw the districts altogether. The investigation included interviews with local 
community leaders, police, prostitutes, and neighborhood organizations, as well as a 
detailed statistical section. The Commission decided to abolish vice districts altogether, and 
enumerated a list of procedures to end prostitution in Chicago. Lippmann concludes that, 
“the Commission’s method was poor, not its intentions. It was an average body of American 
citizens aroused to action by an obvious evil.”71 To rid itself of vice is a noble goal, but to 
draft measures limited to re-education, and law enforcement amounts to fruitless 
repression of the human impulse toward vice. 
His criticism of the report hinges on two lines which he highlights together: 
"So long as there is lust in the hearts of men it will seek out some method of expression. 
Until the hearts of men are changed we can hope for no absolute annihilation of the Social 
Evil."  
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"Constant and persistent repression of prostitution the immediate method; absolute 
annihilation the ultimate ideal."72 
Lippmann suggests that advancing these two contradictory notions is not an intellectual or 
sematic failing of the Commission, but rather that it is emblematic of the deep ‘confusion of 
mind’ which plagues politics. By dealing with vice as a taboo to be eliminated, they fail to 
engage it was an artifact of human nature, and something which can be sublimated, or 
made right through the substitution of the civilizing of sexual impulse through other means 
and institutions. 
Lippmann’s goal, as he constantly reminds the reader, is to describe a new method 
of politics, not to engage the problems of prostitution. Nonetheless, his off-hand 
prescriptions are hopelessly vague, suggesting that “dance halls” and “social centers” hold 
the key to conquering prostitution.  
His lack of appropriate examples is critical as he condemns the proposals of the 
committee on the basis that their goal is repression instead of substitution. “I am not 
engaged in drawing up the plans for a reconstruction or in telling just what should be done. 
Only the co-operation of expert minds can do that.”73 To his own conscience, this deficiency 
is resolved through his continual appeal to great statesmen who can apprehend and act in 
the massively complex world of economic realities which must be mastered before gradual 
(he does stress that the change is slow and patient) change can occur. Like any progressive 
he emphases economic factors, but also stresses that method is equally critical, that sexual 
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impulse can be civilized if only human nature is properly understood, and if the taboos and 
creeds which support it are abolished. “What stands between Chicago and civilization? No 
one can doubt that to abolish prostitution means to abolish the shun and the dirty alley, to 
stop overwork, underpay, the sweating and the torturing monotony of business, to breathe 
a new life into education, ventilate society with frankness, and fill life with play and art, 
with games, with passions which hold and suffuse the imagination.”74 Frankness about the 
human condition is his cure, but economic reality is only a constituent difficulty of politics 
that do not take human nature for their guide. Thus the typical preoccupations of 
progressive policy are, in Lippmann’s view, unreasonable if their genesis does not rest in an 
appropriate psychology attentive to human nature. 
Lippmann’s method hinges on an understanding of the world as new, with new 
challenges which demand a ‘human politics.’ The emerging philosopher statesmen who 
somehow juggle its complexities are the ones that deliver change through social scientific 
experimentation. It is important to note, however, that Lippmann is no utopian. He claims 
that, “there is no short cut to civilization. We say that the truth will make us free. Yes, but 
that truth is a thousand truths which grow and change. Nor do I see a final state of 
blessedness. The world's end will surely find us still engaged in answering riddles.”75 The 
quest for knowledge to govern does not rest only History in this aspect of Lippmann’s 
thought, even in his ‘Idealistic’ youth. “This changing focus in politics is a tendency at work 
all through our lives. There are many experiments. But the effort is half-conscious; only 
here and there does it rise to a deliberate purpose. To make it an avowed ideal— a thing of 
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will and intelligence— is to hasten its coming, to illumine its blunders, and, by giving it self-
criticism, to convert mistakes into wisdom.”76 There is a mixed heritage of progressive 
idealism, and recourse to an enduring notion of wisdom in Lippmann’s early thinking. 
Wisdom may be circumscribed by the ‘thousand changing truths,’ but the truth/wisdom is 
none the less at the center of Lippmann’s politics. 
 Lippmann’s progressivist reaction is to what he sees as an endlessly evolving and 
changing world. He is an empirical progressivist rather than a fatalistic progressivist. This 
allows him to hold his strange position on natural rights, human nature, and other 
‘constants’ which seem open to change but nonetheless change very little in history are 
impossible to reconcile with a fatalistic progressivist’s expectation of apotheosis through 
government. Change is practical in Preface, for all its high-mindedness. There is no 
utopianism in Lippmann: “That is the great lesson which the Utopias teach by their 
failure— that schemes, however nicely arranged, cannot be imposed upon human beings 
who are interested in other things.”77  
The corollary of the statesmen that gather this wisdom and discern action is that 
they must act. Unfortunately there is no greater hurdle for action than constitutional limits. 
Lippmann is fairly unrestrained in his contempt for the Founders and their “machine” 
conception of politics. Following Woodrow Wilson, Lippmann opens Preface with by 
aligning the Founders with the routineers, suggesting that they “Worked with the 
philosophy of their age,”78  Newton and Montesquieu. Though Lippmann makes a 
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distinction between the conservative and the routineer, and the inventor and the 
progressive, it seems that what distinguishes them is not so much ideology, but approach, 
or the method applied to politics. Conservative, or liberal, the founders’ political science 
was arresting, yet another idol to be smashed en route to a human politics. 
Lippmann argued against constitutionalism itself as a means to govern well. The 
balancing of branches of government seems to him as though the founders “put their faith 
in a scaffold, and it has been part of our national piety to pretend that they succeeded.”79 
Against limited constitutionalism, the direct manifestation of the popular, irrational will 
should come through active political actors: “[Statesmen] must find popular feeling, 
organize it, and make that the motive power of government. If you study the success of 
Roosevelt the point is re-enforced. He is a man of will in whom millions of people have felt 
the embodiment of their own will.”80 Lippmann thus criticizes the machine conception of 
politics he claims the founders (the routineers) orchestrated and rejects their liberalism. 
There is little accord between this view of the constitution as anachronistic, and the 
founder’s political science. 
Yet, in the realm of human nature he finds implicit accord with the founders insofar 
as he pleads for the return to setting human nature at the center of politics: 
In other words, we must put man at the center of politics, even 
though we are densely ignorant both of man and of politics. 
This has always been the method of great political thinkers 
from Plato to Bentham. But one difference we in this age must 
note: they made their political man a dogma— we must leave 
him an hypothesis. That is to say that our task is to temper 
speculation with scientific humility. A paradox there is here, 
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but a paradox of language, and not of fact. Men made bridges 
before there was a science of bridge-building; they cured 
disease before they knew medicine. Art came before aesthetics, 
and righteousness before ethics. Conduct and theory react 
upon each other. Hypothesis is confirmed and modified by 
action, and action is guided by hypothesis. If it is a paradox to 
ask for a human politics before we understand humanity or 
politics, it is what Mr. Chesterton describes as one of those 
paradoxes that sit beside the wells of truth.81 
Although the practical difference between hypothesis and dogma is unclear, there is more 
than a whisper here of a search for an essential understanding of human nature, despite his 
ultimate rejection of the premise of an essential fixity to human nature. Confusingly, even in 
regard to human nature, Lippmann remains antagonistic towards the founders despite a 
deep and obvious kinship between his advocacy for attention to human nature and the 
skepticism of the founders regarding direct democracy. Lippmann practically echoes The 
Federalist when claiming in conclusion, “The one thing that no democrat may assume is 
that the people are all dear good souls, fully competent for their task.”82 He remains as 
critical as the founders of direct democracy, and for much the same reasons. Take for 
instance Madison’s Federalist 51: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The 
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be 
a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses 
of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature?”83 Benjamin Wright attributes this to a lack of understanding on the part of a young 
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Lippmann,84 and there is little reason to disagree, since Lippmann would reverse this 
thinking later in his career. For now, the lesson seems to be that in Preface he holds sincere 
disagreement about the machinist political system of the founders, but also dramatically 
misunderstood and underestimated the importance of human nature in their design. 
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Chapter Three – Drift, Mastery, and Scientific Organization 
 At some level Lippmann understood that Preface, with all its talk of iconoclasms, of 
Nietzschean will and intuitionism rightly understood, was something less than a concrete 
step towards a new politics. It was, as he pointed out throughout the text, and in its 
introduction, merely a sketch of a method of thinking. No sooner had the book been 
published than was Lippmann struck with a notion to write another. His political views had 
grown less inclined towards the socialistic intellectual circles in which he traveled at 
Harvard, and instead began to gravitate more towards the New Nationalism of Theodore 
Roosevelt, to the more mainstream politics of the new American progressivism, and 
particularly to the thought of Herbert Croly. With help from Graham Wallas, who was 
eagerly expecting Lippmann’s sequel85 to Preface, Lippmann retired to Woking, Surrey, to a 
comfortable country Inn, where he wrote the pages that would become Drift and Mastery: 
An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (1914). 
Though Preface had given Lippmann a solid reputation among the intellectually and 
politically interested, he still lacked the sort of readership and influence he ultimately 
desired. However, it was perhaps not simply influence Lippmann sought, but 
understanding. From his diary, dated July 5, 1914, he writes, “A writer on public affairs 
can’t pretend to despise reputation, for reputation is not only flattering to the vanity, it is 
the only way of meeting the people you’ve got to know in order to understand the world.”86 
Lippmann found the answer to this new need in the form of an unexpected invitation to 
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meet with progressive theorist Herbert Croly who intended to recruit him as a founding 
editor to a planned weekly periodical that would become The New Republic.  
Croly had been impressed with Lippmann’s Preface, writing to Judge Learned Hand 
that Lippmann, “has real felling, conviction and knowledge to give a certain assurance, 
almost a certain dignity to his impertinence, and of course the ability to get away with the 
impertinent is almost the best quality a political journalist can have.”87 Croly was as 
suitably impressed by Lippmann’s person as he was by his idealism, and Lippmann leapt at 
the chance to join Croly and Walter Weyl in their new endeavor, especially with Croly’s 
claim that the weekly would be ‘radical without being socialist, pragmatic without being 
doctrinaire.’88 Lippmann’s only quibble was with the addition of the adjective, ‘new,’ to the 
original title, ‘The Republic.’ They changed it after finding “The Republic” to be an already 
existing publication, but not without grumbling from Lippmann of a “positive dislike for 
utopianism.”89 
Some of Croly’s influence was present in Preface, though more emerged as 
Lippmann sought to make his politics more concrete, more attainable in Drift. Their 
primary arenas of confluence were that both Lippmann and Croly advocated, in similar 
fashions, big government control of big business though capable, strong national 
leadership. Both were partly influenced by the observation of the practical politics of Teddy 
Roosevelt, and both shared a certain degree of resignation towards the existence of big 
business and a desire to render it profitable though government interventionism, 
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Lippmann being especially dismayed by the low probability of constructive socialist change 
after his work as a reporter under Steffens.  
Croly’s fame and philosophical influence stem largely from his seminal work, The 
Promise of American Life (1909), a dense, thought-provoking attempt to assimilate elements 
of American political thought into a new, and radical synthesis. It is difficult to overstate 
Croly’s influence among the progressive intelligentsia. His argument in Promise is that what 
restrains the pursuit of a more perfect democracy in America was not simply intractable 
conservatism stultifying new liberals, but a more profound misunderstanding of the 
American regime: both Jeffersonian agrarian individualism and democracy, and 
Hamiltonian nationalism were alone insufficient to realize the promise of American ideals. 
Jefferson refused overtures to expanding national power, and Hamilton feared and rejected 
democracy. Jeffersonian individualism fought the Hamiltonian centralization of power. 
Croly’s solution was to resolve this was to combine the two into a new nationalism: to 
achieve Jeffersonian ends with Hamiltonian means. 
Key to Croly’s argument is that for his purposes the role of government is essentially 
unlimited. This was not the case for either Jefferson or Hamilton. Whatever most 
progressives thought about Jefferson’s arguments for natural rights, they were hitherto 
unable to resolve Hamiltonian centralization of power with free democracy. Croly’s 
emphasis on nationalism and his purposeful forgetting of the founders’ view of the role of 
government took place together: “The Higher American patriotism, on the other hand, 
combines loyalty to historical tradition and precedent with the imaginative projection of an 
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idea of national Promise.”90 Like Lippmann’s Preface, Croly assures the reader that this 
synthesis will benevolently manifest in leaders with pure visions of the national interest. 
The national interest amounts to the redistribution of property through centralized 
government. Jeffersonian ‘equality’ through Hamiltonian ‘government.’ Croly argues that 
property rights are an artifact of the open frontier, and industrial reality dictates that 
future prosperity depends on the “individual subordination and self-denial...and [the] 
necessity of subordinating the satisfaction of individual desires to the fulfillment of a 
natural purpose.” Croly rejects laissez faire economic policy which motivated to some 
extent both Jefferson and Hamilton, further arguing that, “The automatic fulfillment of the 
American national Promise is to be abandoned, if at all, precisely because the traditional 
American confidence in individual freedom has resulted in a morally and socially 
undesirable distribution of wealth.”91 This argument for redistribution moves society 
towards an equitable outcome at the cost of the constitutional mechanisms and natural 
rights protections favored by the founders. 
Croly ignores the importance of enforcing liberty through institutional checks on 
Hamiltonian government, and likewise ignores the construction of Jeffersonian democracy 
and limited government. His purpose reflects animosity toward natural rights doctrine, and 
instead reveals a nationalistic desire to form a democratic community, composed of 
citizens inherently perfectible through proper progressive ‘education’: “Democracy must 
stand or fall on a platform of human perfectibility. If human nature cannot be improved by 
institutions, democracy is at best a more than usually safe form of political organization; 
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and the only interesting inquiry about its future would be: How long will it continue to 
work?”92 The unlimited purpose of Croly’s government is to bring about the unlimited 
perfection of man, to abjure constitutional restraints rather than to enforce constitutional 
mechanisms around a permanent human type. Croly’s work has certainly some degree of 
influence on Lippmann, in both Preface and Drift, but ultimately Lippmann’s views diverge 
foundationally from Croly and other progressives. 
Lippmann’s ‘sequel’ to A Preface to Politics, called Drift and Mastery (1914), retained 
the iconoclastic spirit of its predecessor, but also contained many revisions and new ideas 
such that it is difficult to draw too strong a connection to Preface, a book written just one 
year prior. Nearly all of the secondary literature on Lippmann eagerly lumps these two 
works together, perhaps because of the similarity of some of Lippmann’s themes, but also 
perhaps because of their close chronology. Yet, Drift is a very purposeful response to 
Preface, in particular because Lippmann seems to be sensitive to the obvious lack of 
prescription omitted by the methods of political-emotional catharsis crudely outlined in 
Preface. Where they are similar, Drift continues the themes of rejecting the past with hope 
for the future, and increases the emphasis on the development of the future through 
scientific realism and what Lippmann calls “industrial statesmanship.”  
The book moves Lippmann closer to one of his idols, Teddy Roosevelt, and his 1912 
“Bull Moose” political platform, and includes striking condemnations, not of private 
property in its full scope, but rather private property as a stultifying, sacrosanct tradition. 
Lippmann both claims that the productivity of the economy should not be hampered by 
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government action, and that the time has come for government takeover of basic 
industries, mining operations, railroads, etc.93 The seeming paradox is resolved in 
Lippmann’s mind because of his stark optimism for a scientific/bureaucratic management 
that takes little account of scarcity (except for the often implicit expectation that it will 
decrease sharply), and offers a curious contrast from the later Lippmann who values 
property rights more fully. Lippmann also continues to write passionately and 
paradoxically in the realm of natural rights and philosophy, where it is attractive to try and 
reconcile his bold, almost Nietzschean claims, such as his exhortation to, ‘break up routines, 
make decisions, choose our ends, select [our] means,”94 with his other statements which 
imply great philosophical openness, but there is a danger in trying to compartmentalize 
these issues into a cohesive political philosophy. To understand Drift requires 
circumspective reflection on Lippmann’s movement away from Preface. 
The defining characteristic which offers continuity between Lippmann’s works is 
philosophical openness in pursuit of a politically free, sustainable liberal democracy. The 
introduction to Drift promises a following address to restricted political freedoms and 
questions about the path of liberal democratic order. In early March, 1914 a man named 
Frank Tannenbaum, a leader of the International Workers of the World union, led 
unemployed protesters into New York City churches to demand restitutions for the poor, a 
demand which many happily met. However, the result of this and other activisms was 
continuing agitations from unemployed masses and sharply elevated consciousness in the 
social elite. Lippmann, who spoke in Rutgers Square during the agitations,95 solemnly 
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reports on the anarchist mood months later in Drift, almost exasperatedly cataloguing the 
predictable counter by city administration to crack down on basic freedoms of assembly. 
He makes note of both the inappropriateness of the city’s response, and, importantly, the 
role of the protestors who had no message to give: “They knew what they were against, but 
not what they were for, and their intellectual situation was as uncomfortable as one of 
those bad dreams in which you find yourself half-clothed in a public space.”96 His concern 
for the basic political freedoms is evident, yet implies that the entire situation is a result of 
a deeper problem having to do with liberalism: “Without a tyrant to attack an immature 
democracy is always somewhat bewildered.”97 There are two points to be made here: One, 
that Lippmann attributes the agitations to bewilderment rather than, or at least as much as, 
structural grievances with corporate compensatory systems, and, two, that liberty is not an 
end in itself.  
Lippmann is searching for purpose and how to wield the democratic sword, a 
replacement for the tyrants democracy has overthrown. He explicitly aligns the foundation 
of his thinking with Progress, claiming that: “The adjective ‘progressive’ is what we like, 
and the word ‘new,’ be it the New Nationalism of Roosevelt, the New Freedom of Wilson, or 
the New Socialism of the syndicalists.”98 He takes it for granted that the newness of the 
world implies change; it is his empirical/observational progressivism that suggests new 
methods are needed to achieve new ends—that “the battle for [progressives], in short, does 
not lie against crusted prejudice, but against the chaos of a new freedom.”99 Lippmann 
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concludes that to live with meaning, radicals now need to confront the weaknesses of 
democracy with some “vision for the future.” He claims that this book will be some 
approximation of his vision of that future. 
Key to understanding the work is understanding the ‘modern condition’ of man. 
Fortunately, it is on this issue Lippmann writes most authoritatively: 
All of us are immigrants spiritually. We are all of us immigrants 
in the industrial world, and we have no authority to lean upon. 
We are an uprooted people, newly arrived, and nouveau riche. 
As a nation we have all the vulgarity that goes with that, all the 
scattering of soul. The modern man is not yet settled in his 
world. It is strange to him, terrifying, alluring, and 
incomprehensibly big. The evidence is everywhere: the 
amusements of the city; the jokes that pass for jokes; the blare 
that stands for beauty, the folksongs of Broadway, the feeble 
and apologetic pulpits, the cruel standards of success, raucous 
purity. We make love to ragtime and we die to it. We are blown 
hither and thither like litter before the wind. Our days are 
lumps of undigested experience. You have only to study what 
newspapers regard as news to see how we are torn and 
twisted by the irrelevant: in frenzy about issues that do not 
concern us, bored with those that do. Is it a wild mistake to say 
that the absence of central authority has disorganized our 
souls, that our souls are like Peer Gynt's onion, in that they lack 
a kernel?100 
Lippmann offers deep questions about human place and purpose, and dares to offer some 
hope about how these conditions, this drift, can be ameliorated, or mastered. His attempt to 
offer a vision of how to proceed and master this restlessness of the new democratic age is 
critically informed by the implications of a word so ‘incomprehensibly big.’  
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The first part of his ‘vision’ seems to be introduced in his first chapter, much as he 
had in Preface, by calling into question the capacity of citizens to participate in democracy. 
He points out that even unfounded accusations in politics have the same practical 
consequence as true claims, and cites the exploitation of the “Big Business” bogey as the, 
“material for the feverish fantasy of illiterate thousands thrown out of kilter by the rack 
and strain of the modern world.”101 He calls into question the muckrakers, but not their 
motives. Muckrakers express the concerns of the bewildered and the downtrodden, 
exposing their unknown grievances. For Lippmann, former aide to Lincoln Steffens, to 
suggest that the muckrakers were insufficiently helpful in pursuit of this new order also 
suggests how critically he saw the need for positive prescription in the wake of the 
comparatively unhelpful Preface. In the light of his discussion of the restless anarchists, the 
muckrakers seem little better than the agitators themselves, especially if they bring a sort 
of chaos, albeit an enlightened one.  
The great promise of the muckraking enterprise is that it continues to expand, and 
itself thrives on, the demand of citizens for good governance: “when men’s vision of 
government enlarged, then the cost of corruption and inefficiency rose: for they meant a 
blighting of the whole possibility of the state. There has always been corruption in 
American politics, but it didn’t worry people very much, so long as the sphere of the 
government was narrowly limited.”102  With the (appropriately, in his mind) expanding 
government, the concomitant expression of good government is a mixed blessing: more 
agitations, more response. The key for Lippmann is that a positive vision of the future is 
                                                          
101 Drift, Ch. 1 
102 Drift, Ch. 1 
63 
 
needed to quell the present troubles. While this may on one hand seem to be a most solid 
grounding for Lippmann’s thought in the value of Progress, it may in fact be quite the 
opposite. While he is perhaps soundly animated by the observation that the distinctiveness 
and rapidity of the world’s changes demand a new and unique response from government, 
he is also attempting to explain a definite program for that change. It remains to be seen 
whether a more fatalistic form of Progress would sustain the sort of exercise that 
Lippmann believes integral to sustainable liberal democratic forms. 
 The demand for greater competence and honesty in government filters through to a 
greater demand for competence and honesty in business. This demand is what Lippmann 
diagnoses as the cause of the elevation of consciousness in the working classes, and the 
commercial-government model is the entry point for his ‘vision’ of the promise of future 
industry. Lippmann begins this way because this is the key to his prescriptive impulse in 
Drift, and he needs to lay the philosophical groundwork for supporting the sort of 
industrial statesmanship which he hopes will process the inchoate nationalization of the 
great industries. Lippmann carefully explains that it is not commercial activity in general, 
but ‘profit motive’ that he and the new progressive world have called in to question. He 
notes that when radium was a suspected cancer cure, it was subject to ubiquitous calls for 
the government to seize and ration it, thus demonstrating that man is naturally suspicious 
of the profit motive, and that there is reason to doubt the simple laissez-faire notion that 
profit-seeking can justly organize a complex commercial society.  
Lippmann’s future argument for the public management of great industries depends 
on the distrust of profiteering as well as suggesting, in principle, that competent 
64 
 
management holds a vague, though great, promise for the spread of generalized well-being. 
However, Lippmann also takes care to distance himself from those who would arrest all 
commercial and industrial activity in the name of idealism: “I am not speaking in chorus 
with those sentimentalists who regard industry as sordid. They merely inherit an ancient 
and parasitic contempt for labor. I do not say for one instant that money is the root of evil, 
that rich men are less honest than poor, or any equivalent nonsense.”103 This is one source 
of continuity with the late Lippmann, whom many know from his defense of freedom of 
commercial activity in The Good Society and his later writings. He has always recognized 
that the civil market society depends on political freedoms as a condition of its wealth 
creation, and was always hesitant to limit that enterprise. What he does emphasize is a 
product of his faith in a new scientific realism, of an emerging capacity to centrally manage 
large industries in the public interest. He continues, “I am simply trying to point out that 
there is in everyday life a widespread rebellion against the profit motive. That rebellion is 
not an attack on the creation of wealth. It is, on the contrary, a discovery that private 
commercialism is an antiquated, feeble mean, and unimaginative way of dealing with the 
possibilities of modern industry.’104 At this stage, Lippmann’s expectation is little more 
than a hunch, and his drive to be prescriptive causes him to overstate this optimism in 
various ways, just as his intellectual honesty prevents him from fully enumerating precisely 
what industrial statesmanship looks like in practice. 
The corollary question to Lippmann’s ambiguous but limited syndicalism is the 
question of private property. For varied reasons, progressives tend to be dismissive of 
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private property, often rejecting the premise of private possession in a modern state, or the 
natural rights doctrine which supports it, or rejecting it on behalf of a competing rights 
claim grounded in equality. The argument from the last option usually implies that some 
concentration of wealth is protected by the right of the individual to ownership, and that 
property should be confiscated in some measure to end cyclical and unequal distribution of 
wealth. Consider Croly, “Americans who talk in this way seem blind to the fact that under a 
legal system that holds private property sacred there may be equal rights, but there cannot 
possibly be any equal opportunities for exercising such rights.”105 For Croly and most other 
progressives, while there may be a sort of equality under the law, there is no effective 
equality without some form of redistributive compensation for complex modern 
mechanisms.  
Croly and others did not fear to tread over private property rights in pursuit of 
effective equality. And while Lippmann is attempting to articulate some grounding for the 
manufacture of more effective equality and freedoms upon which liberal democracy 
thrives, he makes his case in the language of natural rights doctrine. Croly and others made 
appeals to equality, but as a principle tied to the expectation of redistributive policy, linking 
it through that expectation to a foundation in History. Lippmann confronts the natural 
rights background of private property to suggest that it is insufficient to its glorified past: 
“Compare [the stockholder] with the farmer who owns his land, the homesteader or the 
prospector, compare him with anyone who has a real sense of possession and you will find, 
I think, that the modern shareholder is a very feeble representation of the institution of 
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private property.”106 Often prone to impertinence, Lippmann abjures any glibness in this 
discussion, illuminating an understanding of the right of private property as something 
attached to individual rights grounded in Nature, in the natural order that comes through 
labor and ownership. He points out that while other forms of ownership depended very 
much on the sort of person who owned and maintained his property, any part of human 
nature is omitted in the facelessness of stock holding. 
 The collectivism Lippmann proposes is supposed to remain in only the staple 
industries and “public service corporations” such as railroads, leaving competitive business 
and most agriculture to operate on the more traditional model of private property. By 
accentuating the aspect of private property that qualifies ownership, Lippmann hopes to 
reorient the question of collectivizing under public trust many industries: if private 
corporate ownership is impugned, then there is more to be gained, or at least nothing is to 
be lost, in terms of property rights, through transfer to overt public ownership. Like other 
progressives, Lippmann’s prescriptions are influenced by the expectation that scientific 
bureaucratic management will improve the efficiency of some industries: “The real 
problem of collectivism is the difficulty of combining popular control with administrative 
power.”107 However, without an exaggerated optimism in the efficiency of state-run 
industries, it is not clear Lippmann would not have endorsed such a recommendation, even 
in his early work.  Thus the question of this industrial statesmanship is essentially a 
practical issue, rather than a moral or class based advocacy. While Lippmann is not blind to 
the mounting challenges of balancing the public and the private, he also pacifies himself, 
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and the reader with occasional references to triumphs of supposed public collectivism, 
such as the Panama Canal. 
 The other great limitation to the possibility of collectivism also curiously points 
Lippmann to a fixity in human nature that seems more grounded in Nature than History. 
Croly, social Darwinists, and other progressives typically expected to ameliorate the 
theoretical limits of human socialist association by seeking a degree of change in the 
aspects human nature which limit collective actions and ownership. Not so for Lippmann, 
who does advocate a new approach for a new age, but is nevertheless adamant that 
significant change is unworkable: “It lies at the root of most theoretical objection to 
socialism in the famous "human nature" argument. Far from being a trivial question, as 
socialist debaters like to pretend, it is the hardest nut they have to crack.”108 He suggests 
that the syndicalists who are inclined to nationalize most, or all forms of commercial 
activity, are themselves insufficiently prepared to deal with the exigencies of the modern 
world because of their repeated overtures to unworkable systems: “They are proposing a 
reconstruction of human society, and in all honesty, they cannot dodge the question as to 
whether man as we know him is capable of what they ask.”109 Lippmann looks instead to 
the historical distrust of the profit-motive, especially by the unemployed and 
disenfranchised, and, combined with his discussion of rising consciousness, thereby adds 
urgency to the development of new ‘progressive’ modes and orders of organizing 
commercialism and labor. 
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 Much of Lippmann’s economic discussion hinges on the notion democracy is 
imperiled, that we ‘drift’ where we have no clear strategy to combating the future 
challenges of the industrial age. He argues that democracy itself depends on the presence of 
labor unions insofar as they were the most available politically supportable means by 
which consumers could press their demands on the industrial system. Strong unions were 
a necessary component of the emergent democracy: “It seems to me simply that the effort 
to build up unions is as much the work of pioneers, as the extension of civilization into the 
wilderness. The unions are the first feeble effort to conquer the industrial jungle for 
democratic life. They may not succeed, but if they don't their failure will be a tragedy for 
civilization, a loss of cooperative effort, a baulking of energy, and the fixing in American life 
of a class-structure.”110 The discussion of property and ownership served to raise the 
question of unearned wealth in an industrialized society, and the corollary response for the 
labor union is to create a mechanism by which these demands can be brought to the fore.  
Labor is a curious issue for Lippmann. His argument is a full-throated endorsement 
of unions, even going so far as to justify the physical ‘clubbing’ of scabs, “Far from being the 
independent, liberty-loving soul he is sometimes painted, the scab is a traitor to the 
economic foundations of democracy. ... The clubbing of scabs is not a pretty thing. The 
importation of scabs is an uglier one.”111 This new frontier initiated by the labor movement 
seems appropriately violent, justified by the metaphor. Yet Lippmann’s aim still appears to 
be stability and freedom. He attempts to provide context for his support of unions though 
appeals to constitutional rights as well as necessities of democratic progress: “They have 
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won the very things the lack of which makes rebellion necessary. For if men are ground 
down in poverty, if the rights of assemblage and free speech are denied them, if their 
protests are ineffective and despised, then rebellion is the only possible way out. But when 
there is something like a democracy where wrong is not a matter of life and death, but of 
better and worse, then the preliminaries of civilization have been achieved, and more 
deliberate tactics become possible.”112 It seems as though Lippmann views the unions as a 
sort of release valve for the growing consciousness of the working class and their 
increasing demands. However violent the situation is, it is buttressed through the context 
of democratic institutions as well as the vague sense of civility that follows from the 
amelioration of the first, basic threats of scarcity. 
The implicit appeal to institutions is odd because of Lippmann’s continued (from 
Preface) challenges to the American constitution. However, it appears that he continues to 
denounce the founders and the constitution on the basis of a general suspicion of old 
modes and orders for a new and modern world. Nowhere does Lippmann fully enumerate 
the features of American constitutionalism and subject them to the scrutiny of the new 
world, sufficiently content to lambast the routineer tendencies of those who would glorify 
the past without addressing modern needs. He continues the critique by rearticulating his 
support of masterful politicians, the coming industrial statesman (presumably men like 
Teddy Roosevelt) against the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson. While Lippmann does 
recognize Wilson’s progressive rhetoric, ultimately Lippmann argues that Wilson is a 
contradiction: a man who recognizes a brand new, shifting economic landscape, but who 
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tries to apply unworkable 19th century policies. Lippmann argues that simple trust-busting 
only makes way for incremental solutions: “That is the push and force of this New 
Freedom, a freedom for the little profiteer, but no freedom for the nation from the 
narrowness, the poor incentives, the limited vision of small competitors, no freedom from 
clamorous advertisement, from wasteful selling, from duplication of plants, from 
unnecessary enterprise, from the chaos, the welter, the strategy of industrial war.”113 
Wilson is for Lippmann something of an unwitting ally to the old forces, offering nothing 
unique or preferable because of his unwillingness to nationalize various industries through 
scientific management. 
Despite the repeated antagonism to constitutional form in favor of active political 
figures, Lippmann’s true quibble with constitutional democracy is not in actuality a 
discussion of institutional norms or their value. In fact, there is a great consensus at the 
heart of Lippmann’s fears about mastering the democratic century and the aim of the 
founders: capacity for self-government. Both the founders and Lippmann envision systems 
that rise or fall based on the capacity of citizens. “A republic, if you can keep it,” Ben 
Franklin is said to have quipped to an interrogatory woman after leaving the constitutional 
convention. Lippmann is perhaps more pessimistic: “Men will do almost anything but 
govern themselves. They don't want the responsibility. In the main, they are looking for a 
benevolent guardian, be it a ‘good man in office’ or a perfect constitution, or the evolution 
of nature. They want to be taken in charge. If they have to think for themselves they turn 
either to the past or to a distant future: but they manage to escape the real effort of the 
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imagination which is to weave a dream into the turning present.”114 Lippmann thus 
identifies the two central problems of self-government: do people actually want to rule 
themselves, and can they? His unwillingness to trust in the ‘good man’ or in a constitutional 
order, or ‘evolution of nature’ rejects the social Darwinism and apotheosis seeking 
behavior typified by some progressives, the limited capacity of even his favorite political 
actors to maintain vast institutions, and a form of constitutionalism based strictly on social 
contract theory, of the typical balancing of the liberal arrangements. He continues, “But no 
one of these substitutes for self-government is really satisfactory, and the result is that a 
state of chronic rebellion appears. That is our present situation. The most hopeful thing 
about it is that through the confusion we can come to some closer understanding of why 
the modem man lacks stability, why his soul is scattered. We may, perhaps, be able to see a 
little better just what self-government implies.”115 What then is the solution? 
Lippmann is again brought closer to the founders than even he realized. Recall that 
the founders’ liberalism tended to be predicated on a either a Christian or classical 
rationalism, political psychology, or some amalgam thereof, which amounted to a sort of 
natural rights doctrine which was the basis of a more balanced, and perhaps more 
sustainable liberalism. Lippmann’s search for sustainability brings him to a similar 
precipice of natural rights doctrine, but he couches his prescriptions in terms of 
philosophical openness. Where in Preface he placed much emphasis on the relativism of 
Nietzsche, and thereby put himself in the untenable position of waiting on the ubermensch 
for sustainable political order, his condition of ‘mastery’ refocuses this idea around a more 
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humble philosophical openness in Drift. The central problem of the book is how to 
introduce, as he says of his definition of ‘mastery,’ “the substitution of conscious intention 
for unconscious striving.”116 He claims that the entire enterprise of civilization, much less 
liberal democracy, “is just this constant effort to introduce plan where there has been clash, 
and purpose into jungles of disordered growth. But to shape the world nearer to the heart’s 
desire requires a knowledge of the heart’s desire and of the world.” 117 He nearly suggests 
the Delphic injunction. For Lippmann politics ultimately rest on knowledge, no matter the 
institutional form. Know thyself, know thy political order. Lippmann is an avatar for 
philosophical openness. He roundly rejects romanticism from cultural conservatives and 
reactionaries, criticizing his former teacher, Irving Babbitt, and all forms utopianism from 
progressives. Philosophical openness is the middle ground between his search for 
sustainable liberalism and his seemingly endless optimism in the continued observable 
progressivism of his age: “This is what morality meant to the Greeks in their best period, an 
estimate of what was valuable, not a code of what should be forbidden. It is this task that 
morality must resume, for with the reappearance of a deliberate worldliness, it means 
again a searching for the sources of earthly happiness. In some men this quest may lead to 
luminous passion.”118 While it cannot be gainsaid that he intentionally or fully substitutes a 
progressive faith in process and future for the calm of natural rights and tradition, he is 
concurrently replacing the dogmatic corollaries of tradition with a sort of technical 
philosophy which is linked necessarily to a sort of philosophical openness. He still believes 
that the cohesion of the American political order depends on looking to the future, but that 
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faith is represented though the management of science, an endeavor he will go to great 
lengths to correctly orient in regard to democratic impulses.  
Lippmann’s final chapter, “Fact and Fancy,” is a startling aberration from the rest of 
the book. The half-conscious reader would likely have to look up and wonder if he had not 
drifted into a different work. Every prescriptive inclination Lippmann offers depends on 
some version of the scientific approach, and it is in his final chapter where he decides to 
harshly interrogate the sort of scientific realism which is relentlessly trusted by other 
progressives. He warns of scientists who, “seduced by a method of thought, the rigorous, 
classifying method where each color is all one tone…come to regard...method as more 
important than the blendings and interweavings of reality.”119 In a continuation of his 
concern for open philosophical inquiry, Lippmann worries about “scientific bigots,” who 
may seek to “annihilate all that they cannot weigh.”120 This scientist is prone to the 
romanticism of the measurable world, and “like any dreamer he gives up the search for 
truth in order to coddle himself in his simple, private universe. The hardness of such a 
rationalist is on the surface only: at bottom there is a weakness which clings to stiff and 
solid frames of thought because the subtlety of life is distressing.”121 Lippmann invokes 
James’ religious pluralism and psychic investigations as an example of falsely lampooned 
research, and Santayana to offer a case for the aesthetic authority of tradition. 
The concern in the metanarrative of his vision for democratic political order 
doubtlessly involves the role of authority: sensing a lack of will and direction (aka Drift), 
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science inserts that authority for direction and stability (Mastery). No sooner had he made 
the case for a new authority than he feels the need to investigate its flaws. Critically, his 
version of scientific mastery differs from Croly and other progressives insofar as he 
recognizes that humans are the ultimate authors of the momentum and character of this 
new authority, buttressing modern science with philosophical openness which is sensitive 
to the human person. Science is therefore grounded in the natural world and the human 
interpreters of it. “If we try to ignore the desire that moves our thought, if we try in short to 
be ‘absolutely objective,’ we succeed only in accumulating useless facts, or we become the 
unconscious victims of our wishes. If thinking didn't serve desire, it would be the most 
useless occupation in the world.”122 There is no internal mechanism which drives science 
towards an end in History. Lippmann starkly confronts its limitation and finds its promise 
in the human endeavor to understand Nature. 
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Chapter Four – Public Opinion and the Tyranny of the Masses: A Democratic Critique 
The First World War was an eventful and formative time for Walter Lippmann. His 
political philosophy, already fomenting concerns about the capacities and requirements of 
democratic citizenship, was shaken further by his experience as a propagandist, and his 
hope and idealism on behalf of the American war effort lapsed into pessimistic realism 
about international diplomacy. The essential feature of his political philosophy in this 
tumultuous time is the development of his critique of knowledge and the capacity of the 
democratic citizen. Though the focus of this chapter is on the democratic critiques of 
Lippmann’s most famous book, Public Opinion (1922), and its sequel, The Phantom Public 
(1925), Lippmann also penned two significant works about the war and politics, The Stakes 
of Diplomacy (1915), and The Political Scene: An Essay on the Victory of 1918 (1919), as well 
as the theoretical precursor to Opinion, and Phantom, Liberty and the News (1920). Overall, 
the war years treated Lippmann about as well as anyone. In addition to this period of 
prolific writing, he married his first wife, Faye Albertson in 1917, and gained influence 
within the Wilson administration, particularly with Wilson’s advisor Colonel Edward 
House, which put him in a position to help draft Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and later, on a 
day’s notice, prepare an interpretation of the Fourteen Points for House in the seminal 
peace talks between America and her European Allies before the Paris Peace Conference. 
By the end of the war Lippmann had gained a great appreciation for the complexity of 
international affairs and public opinion, and an even greater distrust of undirected 
democratic action and policy. 
Lippmann’s former antagonism to Wilson in Drift began to wane in the years leading 
up to American involvement in the war. Teddy Roosevelt had begun to fall out of favor with 
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the New Republic crowd over an editorial which offered light criticism to Roosevelt for 
criticizing Wilson’s deficient response to the German invasion of Belgium when he had 
himself remained silent on the issue, and further questioning Roosevelt’s strengthening ties 
to more conservative members of the GOP. Roosevelt was, as Croly predicted, 
disproportionately furious with the New Republic. Lippmann, began to gravitate to Wilson, 
whom he described as the “most freely speculative mind we’ve had in Washington, and as 
disinterested as a man could wish. If only so many people didn’t make it their chief 
business to distort his phrases.”123 Putting aside Lippmann’s freewheeling interpretation of 
Wilson in Drift, he certainly had a point that Wilson was prone to laborious grammatical 
construction. Teddy Roosevelt himself once called Wilson a “byzantine logothete supported 
by flub-dubs, molly-coddles, and flapdoodle pacifists.”124 Regardless of whatever 
misunderstanding may have divided Wilson and Lippmann in the past, Wilson did prove to 
be a friend to the progressive cause, passing favorable child labor laws, work day and farm 
bill legislation. Perhaps most importantly, Wilson and the editors of the New Republic, 
especially Lippmann, were unified in support of the Supreme Court nomination of Louis 
Bandies. The New Republic worked fervently to ensure his nomination, and by the 
beginning of American involvement in the war Lippmann and Croly were meeting weekly 
with Colonel House, which helped secure the New Republic a reputation as the preeminent 
insider’s journal. 
As the war in Europe began, Lippmann and the other editors at the New Republic 
initially prevaricated, undecided on which approach the United States should take to 
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dealing with the issue. Besides the aforementioned break with Teddy Roosevelt, Lippmann 
was as of yet unsure if Wilson, or anyone, really understood the matter properly. Prior to 
The Stakes of Diplomacy, Lippmann hadn’t addressed foreign policy in any great detail, 
however, with the war as the preeminent issue of the day, he turned to the subject with 
many of the same critiques of idle, ineffectual reformism which he had characterized as 
“drift” in his previous work. Though Lippmann’s work on foreign affairs is not the primary 
subject of inquiry of this work, his views on diplomacy are informed by his emerging 
distrust of the public. He opens Stakes with the declaration, “this book is primarily an 
analysis of that popular gullibility which makes democracy the victim of its diplomacy. It 
attempts to show how patriotism and idealism are subtly entangled in imperialist politics, 
how they are unconsciously exploited for purposes which rarely appear on the surface of 
public opinion.”125 The 1915 book already heralds the democratic critique to be solidified 
in Opinion, but is marked and distinguished by a frank realism characterized by Lippmann’s 
anger toward the utopian politics of the pacifists and early proponents of any sort of ‘world 
government.’ Furthermore, Lippmann’s positive dislike of utopianism is difficult to square 
with what appears to be an unabashed optimism in the expansion of democratic politics 
through war. A survey of The Stakes of Diplomacy will show Lippmann’s early views on 
diplomacy and war to be plausibly consonant with some of the high rhetoric he and The 
New Republic would later seem to embrace because Lippmann, for a time at least, held the 
view that ‘making the world safe for democracy’ did in fact further the more realist 
objectives laid out in Stakes. 
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In Stakes, Lippmann was especially disdainful of the pacifists, arguing that their 
opinions were essentially useless: “The reason for this attitude towards pacifism is that the 
world is not helped much by being told every morning that two and two are four. It is not 
helped by being told to love men as brothers. Men have been told that for ages, and their 
invariable retort is: ‘I would gladly love him if only he weren't so cussed.’”126 Insightfully, 
Lippmann argues that every war is justified to its people in terms of defensiveness or 
essential national interest. Thus the pacifist position is utterly irrelevant to the very real 
problems of both peace and war because all nations were fighting for their perceived 
interests. 
The actual stakes of the current diplomacy were, in Lippmann’s mind, the 
undeveloped nations and the prestige battles to control them. In a vividly matter-of-fact 
paragraph he starkly enumerates the stakes of the current conflict:  
Austria began the contest to secure her position as a great 
Power in the Balkans; Russia entered it to thwart this 
ambition; France was engaged because German diplomatic 
supremacy would reduce France to a "second-class power," 
which means a power that holds world power on sufferance ; 
England could not afford to see France "crushed " or Belgium 
annexed because British imperialism cannot alone cope with 
the vigor of Germany ; Germany felt herself " encircled," which 
meant that wherever she went — to Morocco, Asia Minor, or 
China — there a coalition was ready to thwart her.127 
Lippmann clearly held no illusions about the nature of the war as an economic/political 
instrument, and was in response critical of those who would use it as a moral crusade, 
stating at one point, “No nation risks war for the sake of abstract justice in some corner of 
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the world.”128 The real issue was which nation was going to lead the gentle imperialism of 
the undeveloped world, and in this regard Lippmann felt there was little practical room for 
America to remain isolationist. Because Lippmann would later advocate that it was in 
America’s enlightened self-interest to become involved in the war, and it isn’t clear 
whether he can be said to have remained above the temptation to moralize on behalf of a 
democratic crusade. 
 Part of the confusion concerning Lippmann’s wartime democratic moralism is the 
way he viewed the role of the democratic citizen. The contribution of Stakes to Lippmann’s 
view of democracy is tied up in how the conditions of foreign affairs affect the practical 
conditions of domestic affairs, “A victory for liberal democracy, the resurrection of a weak 
people, makes life safer and prosperity more certain in all the regions where men work.”129 
For Lippmann, there does seem to be an implicit link between the victory of liberal 
democracy and prosperity. Though this may often be assumed by liberal democrats, 
Lippmann’s early analysis prefigures more recent democratic peace theory as he suggests 
that consciousness of foreign affairs in democracies also serves to insulate against the 
‘submissive tendencies’ required by autocracies. This insight is especially important for 
evaluating Lippmann’s later, seemingly paradoxical enthusiasm for the war effort on behalf 
of liberal values and democracy. By this account, Lippmann wasn’t torn between his 
original, modest and self-interested foreign policy advocating intervention on behalf of 
preserving the ‘Atlantic community’ against German encroachment and his ardent fervor 
following Wilson’s War Address to Congress. Rather, the positions were intrinsically linked 
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through the sort of gentle imperialism he expected of American leadership in the peace 
process and ensuing governorship of undeveloped state actors. Consequently, the 
culmination of Stakes is a complex and nuanced argument for balance between the 
democratic patriotism which is required for vitality in national actors on the international 
stage and internationalists who understand the value of diplomacy as guarantor of peace in 
contentious international disputes. This balance ultimately rests on the stewardship of 
individuals of their own patriotism: “It is always possible that men will lose sight of the 
ends and become fanatic about the means. There is no guarantee against this insidious 
danger. Only constant criticism and candid discussion can guard against it.”130 As he will 
argue, time and time again, it is the patience and virtue of the individual upon which rest 
the conditions of peace and justice.    
 Stakes was by no means the end of the development of Lippmann’s view of public 
opinion and knowledge in liberal democracy. He was deeply influenced by his role as head 
of Wilson’s “The Inquiry,” a study group established to prepare materials for the peace 
process to follow the war. Lippmann found this work essential to the role and exercise of 
American power in the war effort, specifically in securing a profitable peace buttressed by 
the liberal democratic tenets he believed guaranteed prosperity. Lippmann would 
eventually leave his immediate position within the Inquiry for a role as a propagandist in 
1918. He was commissioned as a captain in military intelligence and assigned to General 
Pershing’s staff in France, where he prepared propaganda leaflets for German soldiers, 
served as official liaison to the Inquiry, and was an unofficial advisor to Colonel House. 
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Later writing in the New Republic Lippmann would say that “one of the genuine calamities 
of our part in the war was the character of American propaganda in Europe. ... It was run as 
if an imp had devised it to thwart every purpose Mr. Wilson was supposed to entertain.”131 
Despite Lippmann’s defense here of Wilson, Lippmann’s association with the Wilson-
appointed head of the Commission on Public Information, George Creel, began to further 
erode Lippmann’s optimism for genuine political participation. Lippmann had previously 
butted heads with Creel in a New Republic article concerning Creel’s insensitivity to civil 
rights and free speech issues, but their antagonisms reached a height upon Creel’s 
censorship of socialist leaning publications in 1918. Lippmann, who argued that the chief 
challenge of American ‘propaganda’ would be controlling untruthful, rather subversive 
information, was horrified by Creel’s belligerent censorship and furious when Wilson 
seemed unwilling to restrain Creel. 
 The entire experience with propaganda and democracy raised deep questions which 
Lippmann would not resolve until he furthered his investigation in Liberty and the News, 
and extrapolated the theory in Public Opinion and The Phantom Public. However, the other 
side to his disillusionment with Wilson was what Lippmann saw as a failure to win the 
peace, one of the chief reasons he outlined in Stakes for American involvement in the war. 
Lippmann himself did not take part in the Paris Peace Conference: House had fallen out of 
favor with Wilson, who had decided to conduct the negotiations personally. Lippmann 
instead returned to America where he waited on news and rumor, growing more 
despairing in the face of mounting bad news. In 1919 when he published a collection of 
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essays under the title, The Political Scene, Lippmann had fully broken from Wilsonianism. 
As previously mentioned, it was not entirely because his belief in the viability of the idea of 
war on behalf of expanding democratic ideals became untenable, rather he was distressed 
by the inability to reconcile the philosophy behind the war aims with the practicalities of 
peace. 
 In The Political Scene Lippmann is critical of the Fourteen Points132, particularly 
where they were prone to abstract generalizations and the world that existed before the 
war. A familiar refrain from Preface and Drift, Wilson and the others seemed most guilty of 
routineer policies and an incomprehensible failure to anticipate the vacuum of power that 
would exist in the world and for peoples once run by authoritarian regimes: “And until we 
master the fact that the empires of Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Sultan and Czar were the 
foundations of law and order in Europe before 1914, we shall not understand either the 
meaning of their destruction, or the consequences of our own victories.”133 Further, 
because the Wilson doctrine lacked a clear vision of what was in our national interest, we 
were bound to a defense of the status quo, a situation made especially untenable by the 
borders being drawn around Europe that Lippmann thought were doomed to breed 
revanchist sentiment, especially in Germany. Lippmann also refused the naive suggestion 
common to the peacemakers that the war was solely the province of greedy elites, that the 
masses had no appetite for war, “It assumes as its working theory that democratic faith in 
regard to the causes of war, which says that aggression is the work of a minority; that the 
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masses in no nation have anything to gain by conquest, and that the masses would refuse 
such wars if they had a chance to examine their pretexts, and put pressure upon their 
governments. This faith may be unfounded. It may be that there is a universal pugnacity 
which requires war for its satisfaction, and the League may in the course of time fail to keep 
the peace.”134 Lippmann stresses that there is cause for hope that the Fourteenth Point, the 
League of Nations, might yet embody the hoped for ideals of democratic statesmanship, but 
he was skeptical if its operators refused to deal directly with human nature, specifically the 
nature of humans who had for so long been under autocratic rule.  
 Lippmann’s views on diplomacy in the war years do not clearly place him in either 
the liberal camp of nature or in that of the Progressive idealist with faith in the future and 
history. His nuanced definitions of the Stakes of Diplomacy offer a complicated picture of 
the requirements of a moderated nationalism and patriotism with respect to international 
affairs. He supports a nascent idea of the democratic peace theory, fully expecting that 
liberal democracies would protect nations from avoidable wars, hopefully in the context of 
some League of Nations framework, but he also continues to invoke recourse to human 
nature, and ground this argument not in the inevitableness of History, but rather imploring 
to raise the quality of democracies and democrats to achieve those ends. Yet, he saw 
presciently the fatal nature of the Paris Peace Conference and Treaty of Versailles, and 
combined with the indictment of free speech by his propaganda work, Lippmann grew 
cynical of the entire experience, remarking that the war was “an anti-climax in a dreary, 
savorless world.”135 
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 Lippmann was not alone in his cynicism. Many progressives had expected that the 
idealism of the democratic war effort would carry domestic reformism. Lippmann himself 
concludes Scene with the hope that, “we who have gone to war to insure democracy in the 
world will have raised an aspiration here that will not end with the overthrow of the 
Prussian autocracy. We shall turn with fresh interests to our own tyrannies — to our 
Colorado mines, our autocratic steel industries, our sweatshops, and our slums.”136 Yet, 
despite this optimism, or perhaps because this optimism went largely unrequited, many 
felt that the age of progressivism had come to pass. Herbert Croly wrote in the New 
Republic that “the chief distinguishing aspect of the Presidential campaign of 1920 is the 
eclipse of liberalism or progressivism as an effective force in American politics.”137 For 
many, the distasteful idealism surrounding ‘the war to end all wars’ became bound up with 
the idealism of the progressive movement generally, a result of the great destruction of the 
war and the end of the obvious practical progress of the industrial era. 
 For his part, Lippmann turned his criticism to the world of journalism. In light of the 
wartime propaganda and censorship to which he was privy, the chief threat to sustainable 
liberalism now seemed to be the failure of truth in reporting. He argued that a democracy’s 
health depends of its access to an accurate picture of the events which surround it, 
particularly in a world becoming more modern, more complex, and more obscured. Other 
critics sensitive to the problem of free speech sought to remove government interference, 
thus expecting unhindered speech to resolve the issue. Lippmann, however, was more 
troubled by the assumption of knowledge so prevalent in the polite opinion-mongering of 
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sincere journalists. As Lippmann had once warned about George Creel, the struggle of 
censorship is not so much bound in the careful construction of favorable news, but the 
battle against untruth. He went so far as to claim that, “There can be no higher law in 
journalism than to tell the truth and shame the devil.”138  
Lippmann had little doubt about the sincerity of journalists, but his appeal in his 
book, Liberty and the News, was simply to make an acknowledgment that it was human 
nature to give unconscious bias to one’s predilections. The chapter, originally an article in 
the New Republic, A Test of the News, chronicles the New York Times’s coverage of the 
Russian Revolution. Lippmann and his fellow New Republic editor, Charles Merz, 
demonstrate that the Times’s coverage was dramatically influenced by reporters who saw 
the Russian communist revolutionaries as a sort of boogeymen. Their failure to see truth 
resulted in their absurd assurances, offered on ninety one occasions, that the Bolshevik 
regime was on the verge of collapse.  
Lippmann condemned the proliferation of unexamined doxastic reporting, but had 
little to offer as remedy, other than to point to some hope that the schools of journalism 
could inculcate a love of the truth, and imbue it with a sort of moral imperative: “reporting 
is a post of peculiar honor. Observation must precede every other activity, and; the public 
observer (that is, the reporter) is a man of critical value. No amount of money or effort 
spent in fitting the right men for this work could possibly be wasted, for the health of 
society depends upon the quality of the information it receives.”139 He acknowledges the 
naiveté of his position in part, but also is clear that he fails to see a better way forward than 
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to emphasize the truth in reporting, and to train journalists of such quality that they will 
drive out the unserious panderers of opinion. In a way, it seems as though he is calling for 
the philosophers to purge the sophists though the excellence of their journalism. He 
concludes by stating that “We shall advance when we have learned humility; when we have 
learned to seek the truth, to reveal it and publish it; when we care more for that than for 
the privilege of arguing about ideas in a fog of uncertainty.”140 
Public Opinion takes up the general theme outlined in Liberty, pressing the central 
concern for liberal democracy: if consent is the measure by which liberalism judges 
legitimate and popular sovereignty, what is the value of consent which is easily 
manipulated by the complexities of the modern word? The corollary suggests the concern 
that democracy may simply not be a viable form of political organization since the source of 
its information depends so strongly on the truthfulness of the reports of the outside world 
which keep public opinion informed. Lippmann’s thought has evolved from Preface and 
Drift, where the primary concerns were the organization of society through masterful 
statesman and scientific management, to a more fundamental inquiry into the basis of all 
government: the knowledge upon which decisions are made. Opinion is a searching attempt 
to critique the basic assumption of democracy, that the people possess the knowledge to 
rule themselves. Lippmann’s general solution is to institute ‘intelligence bureaus,’ which he 
defines as  “specialized private agencies which attempt to give technical summaries of the 
work of various branches of the government.”141 The imposition of intelligence bureaus, no 
matter how vaguely described, demonstrates a counter-intuitive faith in the average 
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democrat: where Preface and Drift largely dealt with organizing mass sentiment, Opinion 
offers a means by which that sentiment, rearticulated as public opinion, can be informed. It 
is misleading, though logical, that to diagnose the need for and nature of truth-seeking 
information services, Lippmann must levy an incisive attack against the capacities of the 
average democrat, and dismantle the icons of self-government and consent.  
It is no coincidence that Lippmann’s epigraph for Opinion is taken from Plato’s 
Republic. The famous allegory of the cave describes a cave where men are bound in chains 
such that they are forced to look only at a great wall before them, seeing only shadows of 
objects reflected from firelight. They suppose the shadows to be real and discuss them 
together as though they are. Lippmann’s recourse to classical philosophy is interesting, and 
it does reinforce his dramatic point that people, journalists, and political actors respond 
only the “pictures in their head” rather than real events. His mounting cynicism reflected 
the chaos of wartime propaganda and misinformation, but also his own practical 
investigations from Liberty which helped confirm his suspicion that newspapers were 
unable to be unbiased, even concerning, or perhaps especially concerning, critical issues of 
political importance. Conscious distortion and manipulation of these channels were widely 
practiced and curiously irremediable given the mounting complexity of the modern world 
where biases, publicity, propaganda, advertising, and all kinds of special interests are 
present, but often concealed. 
Lippmann opens Opinion with a characteristically imaginative, and incisive analogy 
of his own: he asks his reader to imagine that there is an island inhabited by Englishmen, 
Frenchmen, and Germans, in the year 1914. The island receives its mail every sixty days via 
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steamship. Imagine their surprise when upon that steamship’s arrival in mid-September 
they should learn that, not only are they at war with one another, but that they have been 
at war for weeks without their knowledge!142 Lippmann argues that no matter the interval, 
six days, six hours, six weeks, this was the situation all over Europe before the war, and, 
further, that this is only one example of the typical, dramatic misinformation that results of 
the exigencies and fragility of information in the modern world. The people on the island 
had (incorrectly) treated each other cordially because of a false “picture in their heads” of 
the world they inhabit. 
Lippmann takes care in drawing out the consequences of these pictures in our 
heads, arguing that, “it is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-
environment. To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response. But because it is 
behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where 
the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates.”143 This 
dissonance creates the problem that our actions are not in fact responses to the world 
around us, but the world as we perceive it. There is the immediate platonic question of the 
inherent lack of freedom of operating in shadows, but also the consequence for democracy, 
which depends on consent for legitimacy, and good representation for leadership. Without 
informed consent, what is democratic legitimacy? How can representatives lead if their 
information is inaccurate? Lippmann’s concern for the sustainability of a liberal democracy 
is manifest in his central remedy: “I argue that representative government, either in what is 
ordinarily called politics, or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the 
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basis of election, unless there is an independent, expert organization for making the unseen 
facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions.”144 Lippmann’s trust of experts is 
not so much distrust of the citizenry at large as it is rather acceptance of their limitation. 
The limitations however, carry over to the elites who are supposed to represent them.  
To characterize Opinion as simply a movement to trust elites is a misrepresentation 
of the development of Lippmann’s thought because it ignores Lippmann’s distrust of the 
representatives themselves. His remedy calls as much for their supplementation as it does 
for the supplementation of the average citizen:  “I attempt, therefore, to argue that the 
serious acceptance of the principle that personal representation must be supplemented by 
representation of the unseen facts would alone permit a satisfactory decentralization, and 
allow us to escape from the intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire 
a competent opinion about all public affairs.”145 The challenge of representative 
government is to accurately represent the facts to the decision makers, and to the voters 
who elect the decision makers. This is a movement to a more democratic system of affairs 
than in either Drift or Preface insofar as it seeks to make democratic elections more 
authentic, more consequential. It is not a break from his earlier thought so much as it is a 
reorganization, and an attempt at better representation. To be anti-democratic, as any 
superficial reading of ‘elitism’ might suggest, Lippmann would try to eliminate the 
influence of the demos rather than educate it. For all the gloom of the post war era, 
Lippmann is surprisingly sanguine about democratic capacities, provided of course they 
are properly informed.  
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Lippmann then turns to some recounting of the difficulties the average citizen faces 
in determining the facts of the world around him. He reflects on battlefield reports 
organized favorably as propaganda generated by censorship of omission rather than 
straightforwardly untruthful, “Without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strict 
sense of the word is impossible. In order to conduct a propaganda there must be some 
barrier between the public and the event. Access to the real environment must be limited, 
before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable.”146 The 
point which Lippmann teases out is novel, and as problematic as it is obvious: benign 
organization of news is as effectively censorious as deliberate misinformation. Given the 
preoccupation we have with our own affairs, our preconceived ideas, and how little “time 
and attention”147 we have to give to the discernment of fact from fiction, the modern world 
is a rather grim environment for truth. 
The central argument of the book is bound up in Lippmann’s term for the methods 
people develop to deal with news, events and ideas in their own lives. He argues that 
people in modern societies are increasingly dependent on ‘stereotypes,’ perhaps the most 
famous of Lippmann’s popularized terms,148 which is defined as a simplification and 
reification of information applied to various sorts of people, groups, events, or ideas. 
Stereotypes operate in both in the culture generally and in individuals, and they serve as a 
sort of shorthand for busy, confused, or disinterested citizens.  Lippmann’s great strength 
                                                          
146 Opinion, Ch. 2 
147 The title of Chapter Three 
148 He borrowed ‘stereotype’ from his Art Historian friend, Bernard Berenson, whom he quotes later on: 
"what with the almost numberless shapes assumed by an object. … What with our insensitiveness and 
inattention, things scarcely would have for us features and outlines so determined and clear that we could 
recall them at will, but for the stereotyped shapes art has lent them." 
91 
 
as a thinker is to bridge the divide between his new political philosophy of modern public 
opinion and what many would call common sense behind some notion such as, ‘people see 
what they want to see.’ Lippmann refines that common sense in one of the most precise 
definitions in Opinion: “For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define 
first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out 
what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have 
picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.”149 Shaped undoubtedly by his 
experience with the peace process in Paris, Lippmann recalls how leaders were unwilling 
to negotiate in terms of the world as it was and would be, but rather as it had been. The 
political consequence to stereotypes is analogous to lack of prudence or vision in 
statesmen. The intelligence bureaus Lippmann proposes are a sort of clunky external 
supplement to the modern statesman. 
Lippmann labors over delineating the full consequences of using stereotypes, not 
the least of which is that stereotypes derived from culture are themselves icons (a refining 
of his use of ‘taboo, creed, and routine’ from his earlier work) which provide a measure of 
security for the culture which employs them. Therefore attacking a stereotype is often 
defensively rejected by polite society, causing benign, harmful, and even superficially 
beneficial stereotypes to persist from generation to generation. One of the benign, possibly 
beneficial stereotypes he mentions, “progress,” is of particular interest: “The stereotype 
represented by such words as ‘progress’ and ‘perfection’ was composed fundamentally of 
mechanical inventions. And mechanical it has remained, on the whole, to this day. In 
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America more than anywhere else, the spectacle of mechanical progress has made so deep 
an impression, that it has suffused the whole moral code. An American will endure almost 
any insult except the charge that he is not progressive.”150 Lippmann takes great care to 
distinguish the empirical progress of the mechanical world, which implies constant change, 
with the progress of Herbert Spencer, “progress toward perfection.”151 Lippmann seems 
skeptical of the latter, pointing out that the two notions, ‘progress as unalterable change’, 
and ‘progress as evolution toward perfectibility,’ are entwined together in the popular 
mind, with unclear consequences. It does not seem that Lippmann is working toward a 
systematic theory of what ‘progress’ is, but rather he is appropriating Tocqueville’s 
observation of “self-interest well understood.” 
Remarkably, Lippmann does not quote Tocqueville until much later on, Chapter 
XVII, in a part of the Opinion titled, “the Image of Democracy,” however, Chapter XII, “Self-
Interest Reconsidered,” is a homage to Tocqueville, and, his discussion in Chapter VIII 
borrows quite directly from Tocqueville concerning the use of the word ‘progress.’ 
Lippmann says that,  
Certainly the American version of progress has fitted an 
extraordinary range of facts in the economic situation and in 
human nature. It turned an unusual amount of pugnacity, 
acquisitiveness, and lust of power into productive work. Nor 
has it, until more recently perhaps, seriously frustrated the 
active nature of the active members of the community. They 
have made a civilization which provides them who made it 
with what they feel to be ample satisfaction in work, mating 
and play, and the rush of their victory over mountains, 
wildernesses, distance, and human competition has even done 
duty for that part of religious feeling which is a sense of 
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communion with the purpose of the universe. The pattern has 
been a success so nearly perfect in the sequence of ideals, 
practice, and results, that any challenge to it is called un-
American.152 
There is no quotation nor is there any allusion to Tocqueville here, and yet, this is parsed 
almost directly from Democracy in America. It is beyond the scope of this essay to delve 
deeply into the great work of Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, though 
Lippmann does encapsulate Tocqueville’s observation concerning the American notion of 
the indefinite perfectibility of man. 
 Lippmann argues here that the notion of progress moderates acquisitiveness and 
lust for power into productive work without destroying the essential features of 
community which are great boons to human flourishing, particularly religious sentiment, 
and a general sense of purpose. Tocqueville’s rather more elaborate theory of the notion of 
progress is bound in the doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of man. Democracy is 
written from the point of view of a French Aristocrat, a generation after the terror, 
understandably preoccupied with the means by which the American democracy is 
seemingly capable of sustaining itself against the excesses of the chief attribute of 
democracy: the equalizing of conditions. Tocqueville does not argue that the purpose of 
democracy can be the health of the soul and is confounded by the fact that democracy 
trends toward materialism in a directly irremediable rush. The possibility for maintenance 
of the soul (analogous to Lippmann’s comparatively trite, ‘communion with the purpose of 
the universe’) is sustained partly in America through the doctrine of the indefinite 
perfectibility of man because the notion pushes back men’s taste for material satisfactions. 
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In a democracy, indefinite perfectibility describes a limit to human action: “as castes 
disappear, as classes get closer to each other, as men are mixed tumultuously, and their 
usages customs, and laws vary, as new facts come up, as new truths are brought to light, as 
old opinions disappear and others take their place, the image of an idea and always fugitive 
perfection is presented to the human mind.”153  
Fugitive perfection at once torments men, but also moves their object of action back. 
“His reverses make him see that no one can flatter himself with having discovered the 
absolute good; his successes inflame him to pursue it without respite.”154 The indefinite 
perfectibility of man suggests to men that there is a great goal which it is in their interest to 
pursue. This bolsters pride and resists the materialism suggested by democratic ages, and 
encourages the democrat to make great things to advance the progress he senses. “Thus, 
always seeking, falling, righting himself, often disappointed, never discouraged, he tends 
ceaselessly toward the immense greatness that he glimpses confusedly at the end of the 
long course that humanity must still traverse.”155 Though ‘glimpsed confusedly’, the object 
of human actions is gracefully pushed back by the idea of the indefinite perfectibility of 
man: “When men have become accustomed to foreseeing from very far what should 
happen to them here below, and to nourishing themselves on hopes for it, it becomes 
difficult for them always to arrest their spirits at the precise boundaries of life, and they are 
very ready to cross these limits to cast their regard beyond.”156 
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 The similarity of the arguments is obvious, but Lippmann is not straightforwardly 
arguing that progress is a stereotype which possesses all of the capacities for sustaining 
democratic order for which Tocqueville was perhaps searching. In a very curious passage 
Lippmann defines the stereotypes of regimes, including that of “progress,” perhaps in a 
“cycle” of governments:  
The progressive stereotype, powerful to incite work, almost 
completely obliterates the attempt to decide what work and 
why that work. Laissez-faire, a blessed release from stupid 
officialdom, assumes that men will move by spontaneous 
combustion towards a pre-established harmony. Collectivism, 
an antidote to ruthless selfishness, seems, in the Marxian mind, 
to suppose an economic determinism towards efficiency and 
wisdom on the part of socialist officials. Strong government, 
imperialism at home and abroad, at its best deeply conscious of 
the price of disorder, relies at last on the notion that all that 
matters to the governed will be known by the governors. In 
each theory there is a spot of blind automatism.157 
There are many interesting implications of each of these stereotypes, particularly if they 
are supposed to follow one another in the manner Lippmann expressed, but for now, the 
most salient stereotype, progress, is importantly identified as a will to work with no cause 
behind it. Lippmann’s endorsement of progress as the principle behind a particular regime 
type is explicitly moderated in this passage. Like in Drift where he identifies the limits of 
science without direction, he expands the trouble of progress without cause or clear sight 
of to what we progress. Especially with his brief on progress as confounded change and 
evolution, chaos and Darwin/Spencer, it cannot be read as anything other than a continued 
rejection of fatalistic progressivism. Importantly, it is also the first time Lippmann steps 
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away from the empirical progressivism which sustained much of his hope for the 
expanding capability of bureaucratic/scientific management and the expectation of a 
momentously declining scarcity which characterized his early work. 
 The immediate corollary is seen in Lippmann’s view of human nature in these 
Tocqueville inspired chapters. In Chapter XII, “Self Interest Reconsidered,” Lippmann 
seems to be identifying interests strongly with Madison in Federalist no. 10, rather than the 
sort of economic determinism essential to socialist theory. He and Madison both seem to 
agree that men are divided by their relation to property, with a sort of light probability to 
align their opinions in relation to their property. The socialists rely on “false determinism” 
of a proletariat mobilized against the bourgeois.158 Because the proletariat must be 
constantly organized to produce the expected revolution, Lippmann finds that sort of 
determinism, that movement in History, laughable. Lippmann’s point is that no matter 
what sort of economic materialism you expect from a class of property holders, it is 
impossible to fully predict their interests. It amounts to an argument that human nature is 
inherently diverse and unpredictable. While he still holds out against a strict appeal to 
Nature behind human nature worth exploration, he also holds a hard line against economic 
determinism, soundly rejecting any notion of human nature which is to be evolved through 
historical process.  
It is on the surface difficult to see what Lippmann’s title shares with Tocqueville’s. 
Tocqueville’s notion of self-interest well understood is that Americans successfully 
combine their self-interest with the interest of the larger community, and Lippmann just 
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argued that there is a lack of determinism in the way humans develop interests. There is 
optimism in this part of his argument because it also suggests that men can choose their 
own goals based on their interests: “He can find no ground for abandoning his highest 
hopes and relaxing his conscious effort unless he chooses to regard the unknown as the 
unknowable, unless he elects to believe that what no one knows no one will know, and that 
what someone has not yet learned no one will ever be able to teach.”159 Assuming that 
Lippmann did in fact have Tocqueville in mind when writing and titling this chapter, it can 
be assumed that Lippmann was seeking a remedy for the fragmenting of society, partially 
through the inadequacies of public opinion. The situation is opened, though also 
complicated, by the extreme diversity of interests men can plausibly assume so far 
divorced from, primarily, economic determinism. Tocqueville seems to share this mix of 
optimism and distress in his chapter on self-interest: “No power on earth can prevent the 
increasing equality of conditions from inclining the human mind to seek out what is useful 
or from leading every member of the community to be wrapped up in himself. It must 
therefore be expected that personal interest will become more than ever the principal if not 
the sole spring of men's actions; but it remains to be seen how each man will understand 
his personal interest.”160 The essential question for Tocqueville involves the equalizing of 
conditions, and how that will affect the development of democratic community: “If the 
members of a community, as they become more equal, become more ignorant and coarse, it 
is difficult to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their selfishness may lead them; and 
no one can foretell into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves lest 
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they should have to sacrifice something of their own well-being to the prosperity of their 
fellow creatures.”161 Tocqueville’s chapters connect with Lippmann’s in the shared object 
of concern in determining interest. If they remain “ignorant and coarse,” these dire 
consequences follow. Lippmann may as well say, ‘if public opinion remains uninformed.’ 
The title appears in homage to Tocqueville because it drives the essential concern of 
Lippmann’s entire book: informing public opinion. 
It is no surprise then that the next part of the book is “The Making of a Common 
Will.” The pending concern is the response to the difficulties of managing interest 
described in the struggle to inform public opinion. If there is no reliable determinism 
issued by the constraints of the material world to the variability of human nature, what 
hope is there for developing some sort of common will by which a democracy should be 
sustained? Lippmann’s answer seems to be a radical reconsidering of the way we deal with 
information in the modern age. He first considers the nature of public opinion and the 
approaches others have taken to making use of symbols and generalizations in order to 
generate mass action. He quotes Sir Robert Peel, and Gustave LeBon, suggesting that some 
people approach the manipulation of opinion as either chaos or low character, as “drift and 
incoherence.” The other option seems the be that because there do appear, from time to 
time, certain motivations and aims within a body public, there must be something “over 
and above the inhabitants of a nation.” Proponents of this view, “invoke a collective soul, a 
national mind, a spirit of the age which imposes order upon random opinion. An oversoul 
seems to be needed, for the emotions and ideas in the members of a group do not disclose 
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anything so simple and so crystalline as the formula which those same individuals will 
accept as a true statement of their Public Opinion.”162 Lippmann is suspiciously unclear 
that he is invoking a third way, something in between the ‘oversoul’ and chaotic ‘drift,’ but 
that appears to be his goal, nonetheless. 
Unfortunately his new theory is not neatly delineated. He descends into a discussion 
of the uses leaders make of symbols. He approvingly cites Alexander Hamilton, who, as a 
son of the West Indies, was not given to the particular interstate quarrels which arrested 
other founding fathers, and could instead embrace and promote the symbol of the “union” 
to great effect. Lippmann argues that the public interacts with the symbols created by the 
leaders by simply responding affirmatively or negatively to proposals. Good leaders are 
able to interpret the value and need behind certain symbols for the public good. However, 
leaders themselves are often prone to falsely assuming that there is something like 
‘thought’ behind public opinion: “Leaders often pretend that they have merely uncovered a 
program which existed in the minds of their public. When they believe it, they are usually 
deceiving themselves. Programs do not invent themselves synchronously in a multitude of 
minds. That is not because a multitude of minds is necessarily inferior to that of the leaders, 
but because thought is the function of an organism, and a mass is not an organism.”163 The 
importance of this point cannot be overstated, especially for the purposes of contrast with 
democratic theorists such as John Dewey, who had a completely contradictory notion of the 
possibility of a sort of community intelligence in public opinion. Lippmann is suggesting a 
focus on the individual against public opinion. Opinion is often treated superficially as an 
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anti-democratic text, but delving into Lippmann’s nuance paints a more complicated 
picture. Lippmann’s focus is to acknowledge the realities of public opinion while rejecting 
the notion that it is merely a collective, mysterious force. Mysterious forces are not 
democratic. Eclectic will and sentiment interpreted by strong leaders was the modus 
operandi prescribed in Preface.  Here Lippmann seems to have retained some of the theory 
that led him to that prescription while simultaneously reversing the recommendation: 
instead of leaders interpreting will and sentiment of a collective body, leaders offer 
symbols to individuals who interact with various stereotypes and produce some mass 
action as a result. To some degree the leaders are the ones who manufacture opinions, but 
this manufacture is essentially grounded in the response of the public. This position 
surprisingly reorients the onus of political participation back on the individual: however 
lacking individuals may be in dealing with the confusing array of information necessary to 
act in participatory self-government, they are themselves the only ones capable of the sort 
of thought that sustains democracy against the drift of undirected collective action. It also 
points towards his proposal to establish intelligence bureaus which offer a means by which 
that sentiment, rearticulated as public opinion, can be informed constructively. 
Lippmann invokes a new phrase, “the manufacture of consent.” Lippmann is subject 
to a superficial criticism for suggesting that public opinion is a force to be manipulated; 
after all, if a democracy depends on the consent of the governed, manufacturing that 
consent should corrupt the connection between the citizens and the government. This 
complaint is easily answered with attention to the only alternative: the chaotic 
manufacture of consent. Lippmann does not neatly articulate the point, but at the heart of 
his argument is the implicit rejection of a dichotomy between unregulated consent and 
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manufactured consent. Rather, as he struggles to explain, the manipulation and 
manufacture of consent is unavoidable in the modern state, leaving the choice between 
some attempt to lobby on behalf of truth and resignation to the George Creels of the world. 
As was common to the progressive mind, and common to Lippmann’s approach to political 
philosophy, he sees the problem in terms of the new world of complexity and mass culture. 
In the past, forms of demagoguery had directly manipulated passions and ideas. In the 
great giddy whirling of the modern age the impact of this style of manipulation has 
advanced: “But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because 
it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological 
research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has 
turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of 
economic power.”164  
Part of the aim of Opinion is to begin to understand the depth and power of the force 
of public opinion and how it is shaped by the modern world. As was previously examined, 
public opinion is not just an intractable force, above and within a democracy, but operative 
in individuals, individuals prone to persuasion as much as humans ever were. To maintain 
political freedom within democracy depends on understanding how this persuasion is 
effected:  “Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become 
a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to 
understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of 
how to create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political 
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premise.”165 Lippmann has hinted throughout that the goal is to eliminate untruth, the 
pictures in the heads of those participating in politics.   
Lippmann’s focus then is set upon how best this could happen in the liberal 
democratic state, which he views as deficient in attempting to account for public opinion: 
“Yet democracies, if we are to judge by the oldest and most powerful of them, have made a 
mystery out of public opinion.”166 He obliquely references America as the oldest and most 
powerful democracy, and his critique is a continuation of his observation that there was a 
hubris associated with the rise of democracy: that the liberal democratic state had done 
away with the evils and susceptibility of classical demagoguery, and that instead the 
average citizen had it within himself to participate in self- government. He claims, “just as 
Aristotle had to insist that the slave was a slave by nature, the democrats had to insist that 
the free man was a legislator and administrator by nature. They could not stop to explain 
that a human soul might not yet have, or indeed might never have, this technical 
equipment, and that nevertheless it had an inalienable right not to be used as the unwilling 
instrument of other men.”167 Putting aside his reading of Aristotle, he sees the democrat 
suspended and arrested by the central dogma of the omnicompetent citizen. To sustain 
liberal democracy he must complete the critique of this view in order to open a discussion 
of a way forward with the intelligence bureaus. 
His critique of the founders and view of constitutionalism is a mix of praise and 
disdain. On one hand Lippmann has clearly abandoned his facile view of the founders as 
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mechanistic routineers. He sees them instead as appropriately cautious initiators of 
representative safeguards against the democratic masses. Speaking generally of the 
founders, he says, “The collisions and failures of concave democracy, where men 
spontaneously managed all their own affairs, were before their eyes. The problem as they 
saw it, was to restore government as against democracy.”168 Lippmann sees the founders’ 
view of representation is a means to ensure national aims supersede local vicissitudes. 
Limited as this understanding is, it does point towards Lippmann’s evolving understanding 
of the founders as observers of human nature, which he must admit for the first time they 
took into account. However, it is upon the central point of their observation of human 
nature which they failed. He attributes to Jefferson primarily the false notion of the 
omnicompetent citizen: “Jefferson thought the political faculties were deposited by God in 
farmers and planters, and sometimes spoke as if they were found in all the people. The 
main premise was the same: to govern was an instinct that appeared, according to your 
social preferences, in one man or a chosen few, in all males, or only in males who were 
white and twenty-one, perhaps even in all men and all women.”169 The source of 
Lippmann’s antagonism is that in their optimism concerning human nature, the founders 
were anti-democratic. This is a difficult point to understand, and many, if not most, 
Lippmann commentators miss it. By subscribing to a view that the democratic capacities 
were inscribed within human hearts, the founders robbed democrats of a truly effective 
means by which they could actually see their character reflected in self-government. This 
state of affairs has only become more and more calamitous with the increasing technical 
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capacity to manipulate opinion through unscrupulous and underprepared media. So while 
the founders and Lippmann disagree (at least in Lippmann’s current understanding) on the 
capacity of human nature, they are both appealing to it as a standard for making decisions 
about what constitutes good governance. 
 Lippmann concludes the book by insisting that the stake of self-government is the 
extent to which the citizen can be relied upon to choose good government against the ‘self-
centered’ opinions which stem from the pictures in their heads. “For the traditional 
democrat risked the dignity of man on one very precarious assumption, that he would 
exhibit that dignity instinctively in wise laws and good government. Voters did not do that, 
and so the democrat was forever being made to look a little silly by tough-minded men.”170 
The new democrat, it seems, is not forced to bind his hopes for self-government on the 
mistaken impression that he is naturally capable of it. Lippmann lays the seeds for his 
coming works on economics in a remarkable passage: “The criteria which you then apply to 
government are whether it is producing a certain minimum of health, of decent housing, of 
material necessities, of education, of freedom, of pleasures, of beauty, not simply whether 
at the sacrifice of all these things, it vibrates to the self-centered opinions that happen to be 
floating around in men's minds.”171 The capacity for truth and self-government is linked to 
a sort of baseline of material well-being. Opinion is not in this regard an anti-democratic 
text, on the contrary, the condition Lippmann estimates for self-government and 
sustainable liberal democracy is the manifestation of the heart of democracy: the 
equalizing of material conditions. The inherent equality of man is the foundation of his 
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capacity to transcend the dull limitations of the pictures in his head. Democracy as the 
driving manifestation of the equalizing of conditions is therefore a precondition for truth.  
Still, Lippmann resists the temptation to draw this conclusion too casually. He 
proceeds to enumerate the reasons why it is so critical for some form of his proposed 
intelligence bureaus to come to pass: “It is because they are compelled to act without a 
reliable picture of the world, that governments, schools, newspapers and churches make 
such small headway against the more obvious failings of democracy, against violent 
prejudice, apathy, preference for the curious trivial as against the dull important, and the 
hunger for sideshows and three legged calves.”172 The curious position the modern 
democrat finds himself in, is one such that simply seeking truth through conventional 
means, merely having a passion or love of the truth is insufficient. Democratic theory must 
catch up to democratic practice, and the first remedy is intelligence bureaus that will 
organize the information necessary for people and institutions, from schools to 
newspapers, to make use of in articulating for themselves a genuine form of self-
government. Only through some form similar to this can liberal democracy be sustained. 
Lippmann’s description of the nature of the intelligence bureaus remains 
frustratingly discursive given their centrality to his theory. The most precise definition is 
given in Liberty as  “specialized private agencies which attempt to give technical summaries 
of the work of various branches of the government.”173 In many ways he is foretelling the 
think-tank, and could perhaps even have in mind (though he does not mention it) The 
Institute for Government Research, which would later become The Brookings Institution. 
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However, concerning the nature of Lippmann’s political philosophy, it is more important to 
consider the theory behind this move, and hopefully to resolve any pending concerns that 
he is somehow an anti-democrat.  
The remaining theoretical issue concerning public opinion and democracy can be 
detailed by sketching Lippmann’s conversation with John Dewey. Lippmann concludes 
Opinion emphasizing that political truth ultimately rests in the people who participate in 
politics: “No electoral device, no manipulation of areas, no change in the system of 
property, goes to the root of the matter. You cannot take more political wisdom out of 
human beings than there is in them. “174 No matter how well constructed the intelligence 
bureaus, and the secondary institutions which make use of them in dispensing the pictures 
inside the heads of citizens, there is no fundamental elimination of the problem of truth for 
democratic society. We are left in a sort of metaxic condition, left seeking truth, but, with 
the problem properly diagnosed, finally seeking after it in a productive way: “When men 
act on the principle of intelligence they go out to find the facts and to make their wisdom. 
When they ignore it, they go inside themselves and find only what is there. They elaborate 
their prejudice, instead of increasing their knowledge.”175 
 Throughout the 1920s Lippmann’s arguments put him in conversation, directly and 
indirectly with democratic philosopher John Dewey, offering particularly fruitful discussion 
in regard to the role of natural rights in each of their philosophies. Dewey’s work 
Reconstruction in Philosophy, published in 1920, had an immensely important influence on 
American political and philosophical thought. Speaking generally, Dewey’s aim was to 
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reorient philosophy such that it could enter into and solve the problems of the social 
sphere: “When it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality, 
philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions, … it 
will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men’s ideas as to the social and 
moral strife of their own day. Its aim is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for 
dealing with these conflicts.”176 His work is a sustained critique of natural rights theory, 
and an argument for a faith in progress177 which is aloof from empirical examination.  
The strong point of the appeal to fixed principles transcending 
experience, to dogmas incapable of experimental verification, 
the strong point of reliance upon a priori canons of truth and 
standards of morals in opposition to dependence upon fruits 
and consequences in experience, has been the unimaginative 
conception of experience which professed philosophic 
empiricists have entertained and taught. A philosophic 
reconstruction which should relieve men of having to choose 
between an impoverished and truncated experience on one 
hand and an artificial and impotent reason on the other would 
relieve human effort from the heaviest intellectual burden it 
has to carry. It would destroy the division of men of good will 
into two hostile camps. It would permit the co-operation of 
those who respect the past and the institutionally established 
with those who are interested in establishing a freer and 
happier future.178 
Dewey both seems to reject fixed principles, and promulgate a blithe satisfaction in the 
result: cooperation and a happier future.179 
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Dewey was very satisfied with the structure of Lippmann’s Opinion, which he 
reviewed in The New Republic, and is particularly impressed by the portion of the work 
where Lippmann critiqued the shortcomings of democracy. However, Dewey was more 
skeptical of Lippmann’s constructive solution, the intelligence bureaus. Acknowledging that 
such an institution would be obviously welcome to any state of political affairs, he criticizes 
Lippmann for overstating the measure of political affairs: “But his argument seems to me to 
exaggerate the importance of politics and political action, and also to evade the problem of 
how the latter is to be effectively directed by organized intelligence unless there is an 
accompanying direct enlightenment of popular opinion, as well as an ex post facto indirect 
instruction.”180 Traced into Lippmann’s response, The Phantom Public, and Dewey’s 
counter, The Public and its Problems, it becomes clear that the center of their dispute is 
differing opinions on the nature of truth itself. 
Phantom deepens significantly Lippmann’s critique of the omnicompetent citizen, to 
the point where Lippmann often feels as though he is belaboring what has already been 
made rather obvious. Nothing changes much from Opinion to Phantom, and Lippmann 
struggles generally to argue how public opinion can be enlightened simply through 
exposure to truth seeking and a communicating to all a broad recognition that truth is 
ultimately penultimate. Dewey’s critique from The New Republic seems to haunt Lippmann, 
however, who concludes the book rather resignedly:  
I have no legislative program to offer, no new institutions to 
propose. There are, I believe, immense confusions in the 
current theory of democracy which frustrate and pervert its 
action. I have attacked certain of the confusions with 
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conviction except that a false philosophy tends to stereotype 
thought against the lessons of experience. I do not know what 
the lessons will be when we have learned to think of public 
opinion as it is, and not as the fictitious powers we have 
assumed it to be. It is enough if with Bentham we know that 
“the perplexity of ambiguous discourse...distracts and eludes 
the apprehension, stimulates and inflames the passions.181 
Dewey’s critique amounted essentially to two points: that the intelligence bureaus were 
insufficient for sufficiently illuminating public discourse through an educational paradigm, 
and that Lippmann makes a mistake in the general enterprise of looking to uncover truth. 
Lippmann, in Phantom, reemphasizes the need to seek a particular truth, arithmetically, not 
existentially working to eliminate untruth though the efforts of individuals freed of their 
chains in Plato’s cave. Dewey had already voiced his doubts of the very notion of truth in 
his Reconstruction in Philosophy. In The Public and Its Problems Dewey articulates the 
replacement for objective truth as a sort of efficient truth elaborated through 
communication between citizens: “Without such communication the public will remain 
shadowy and formless…Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the 
Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community.”182 
Dewey rejects the notion of truth advocated by Lippmann, which is more easily aligned 
with a natural rights foundation, and endorses a more specifically progressivist faith in 
History, in the apotheosis of the Great Society (a term borrowed by both Lippmann and 
Dewey from Graham Wallas) in the Great Community.  By appropriating the term in The 
Public and Its Problems Dewey is jabbing Lippmann’s reliance on and love for his former 
mentor, Wallas. 
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 Lippmann’s acquiescence in the end of Phantom stems from the inescapable 
patience and ineffability of his overarching argument. Still skeptical of the doctrine of 
natural rights as a cloak for political idealisms, he nonetheless sides with some notion of 
objective truth against the pseudo-environments democratic citizens are prone to 
constructing for themselves. Opinion structures many of Lippmann’s major themes: in three 
decades he would find himself writing in Essays in the Public Philosophy an argument for 
the rearticulating of the ‘traditions of civility,’ a sort of broad educational system based on 
great works that would instruct people to be good citizens—to teach them to expunge the 
pictures in their heads.  For now, the lack of a legislative program leads him to pay more 
attention in his next work, A Preface to Morals, to the character of the individual’s minds 
who inhabit a democracy and, in the subsequent economic works, The Method of Freedom, 
The New Imperative, and The Good Society, the material conditions necessary to facilitate 
the individual’s pursuit of truth.  
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Chapter Five – Solving Society: The Disinterested Humanist 
To Lippmann, the next decade was a chaotic time of social upheaval and frenetic 
change amidst attempts by a lost generation to deal with the fallout of the Great War. For 
Lippmann personally, however, the twenties were largely a time of success and stability. 
Amidst editorial conflict, and a sense that his efforts at the New Republic were leading 
nowhere, he was lured away to the New York World.  The World offered him a wider 
audience and a larger salary, and by 1924 he had taken over the editorial lead upon the 
death of Frank Cobb. It was an odd fit for Lippmann, for though the paper had begun to take 
on respectability as a legitimate news source under the direction of Joseph Pulitzer’s son, 
Ralph Pulitzer, its crusading tenor contrasted with Lippmann’s contemplative style. 
Lippmann would write for the paper for over nine years and draft over twelve hundred 
editorials, a majority of them on foreign affairs.183 
Over the decade Lippmann would become a journalistic celebrity, writing a monthly 
column for Vanity Fair, and other regular work for various periodicals including The 
Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Affairs, Harper’s Magazine, the Saturday Review of Literature.  He 
even continued writing for the New Republic when time allowed, including a series of 
articles critical of Intelligence Quotient tests wherein he argued that they were an 
ineffective gauge of human capacities and could lead to a sort of implicit caste system. In 
this busy schedule not only did he publish Opinion (1922), Phantom (1925), and A Preface 
to Morals (1929),184 but also two smaller books, Men of Destiny (1928) and American 
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Inquisitors (1928). Destiny was a collection of his works from many of the aforementioned 
periodicals, the most interesting of which is an essay called, ‘Second Best Statesmen.” 
Lippmann was suspicious that reason had become an empty shibboleth after the failures of 
optimism and organization of the previous decade. His deepening concern over the tyranny 
of the uninformed masses led him to attempt to reconcile this love of reason with its actual 
operation on political matters. Too often, he found, reason was employed to serve the cult 
of ‘interests’ where men employed reason in their own particular service, rather than on 
behalf of what was objectively right: “reason was an apologist and an advocate rather than 
a counsellor and a judge.”185 Lippmann specifically damns the “sophists” who conflate the 
meaning of interest as the feeling of concern with the fact of actually being concerned with 
an issue, and thereby exploit the masses for whatever gain they see fit. The true statesman, 
it seems, is hindered by a facet of democracy which leaves him frustrated, for the 
excellence of his character and intentions is not only confronted by the practical 
contingencies of social/political life, but also by “a certain moralized and highfalutin doubt 
about whether it is not undemocratic, unpleasantly superior, and almost sinful to do what 
they feel to be the first rate thing.” Lippmann was no elitist, but he was quickly becoming 
aware of the danger democracy posed to excellence. Reason was the current problem, but 
also the solution: “It is as if the intellect of mankind had conspired against itself and had 
lamed its right arm the eternal war of light against darkness. It is the business of criticism 
to destroy this cult of the second best.”186 
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His concern over the tyranny of the masses was predominant in Phantom, and in 
Destiny his solution seemed to be philosophic criticism on behalf of the good against the 
cult of the ‘second best.’ In Inquisitors, a publication from a series of lectures delivered at 
Virginia University in 1927, he assumes the role of Socrates, whom Lippmann puts in 
conversation with William Jennings Bryan, Thomas Jefferson, and an unnamed ‘teacher.’187 
If the dialogues were not humorous, they would be abhorrently self-indulgent. Yet there is 
in them a great sincerity, and a working out of the ideas arresting Lippmann concerning 
faith, reason, and authority. The use of the dialogue (and of Socrates) points to Lippmann’s 
ultimate conclusion that there is no easy answer to the general problem represented by the 
conflict of faith and reason, and the locus of authority in the political realm. Socrates often 
admonishes his interlocutors to reexamine their ‘foundational principles,’ and Lippmann 
concludes in translation of his Socrates’ teaching: “In our age the power of majorities tends 
to become arbitrary and absolute. And therefore it may well be that to limit the power of 
majorities, to dispute their moral authority, to deflect their impact, to dissolve their force, is 
now the most important task of those who care for liberty.”188 The lectures were given in 
the context of the Scopes case which had intellectually perplexed Lippmann as a conflict 
between not only science and religion, but the deeper questions of authority implied by 
democratic capacities and self- government. His reluctant conclusion, echoing his inability 
to produce a ‘legislative’ answer at the end of Phantom, led him to become a partisan of 
liberty as a check on all tyrannical sovereigns, be they religious authorities in Tennessee, or 
concentrated power structures in Washington. 
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Morals reflects primarily Lippmann’s mounting need to defend reason insofar as he 
had lost faith in the ability of reason to govern democratic society and restrain the masses. 
Ronald Steel echoes the sentiments of other interpreters of Lippmann at this stage in his 
career by stating that he was, “coming to look upon the public as a Great Beast to be tamed 
rather than a force that could be educated.”189 This is partially correct, yet misses the 
essential point that Lippmann made contra Dewey, that for all its seeming mysticism and 
intractability, the force of public opinion consisted of the confused and nefariously 
malleable notions of individuals. Morals offers almost no political theory, and is accordingly 
concerned with the state of the souls of democrats, only venturing into the realm of politics 
when discussing how a statesman ought to manage orienting this new class of disinterested 
humanists towards an authoritative ‘good.’ 
Morals was written beginning in the year 1925, shortly after the publication of 
Phantom. By the summer of 1927, Ronald Steel writes that Morals had ‘taken over 
[Lippmann’s] life.” Lippmann kept to a grueling writing schedule, rising at five in the 
morning and working on the book before breakfast,  he would write his editorial for the 
World after breakfast, go into the office for a busy day of meetings and editing, return home 
for supper, and work on the book until midnight.190 All of his work was set to the backdrop 
of rising tensions in Mexico, the Sacco and Vanzetti affair, and the failing health of his 
father. Lippmann finished the first draft in the summer of 1927 and revised edits for nearly 
a year before sending the manuscript to his publisher. 
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Lippmann spent himself admirably in what was an intellectually draining exercise. 
Morals reflected the dilemma of the lost generation, and lost progressive reformers. Many 
had wilted, become disillusioned after the war, retreating into academic bastions, apathy, 
or mysticism. Lippmann was similarly disillusioned by the lost promise of progressivism, 
the trials of the prohibition era, the failure at Versailles, union organizations and union 
busting, and the general frenetic chaos of the decade. Lippmann dutifully set himself to the 
task of treating the age, and despite the thoroughly unpolitical nature of Morals, Lippmann 
nonetheless is attempting to present a way of life which offers consistency with the 
quandary of the world he observed. What Lippmann had sensed in his critiques of mass 
culture and concern for liberty was precisely the problem of liberal democracy: a vacuum 
of authority. Yet he was unable to address it through legislative means. His only recourse 
was to turn towards the self, in a sense retreating from politics in order to tend to the 
divided souls of democrats.  
The predicament of liberalism generally is bound up in the retreat of aristocratic 
mores, and the principle of political freedom expressed through political freedom from all 
restraints, particularly the warring authorities of the state and the church. Lippmann’s 
great concern for sustainable liberalism reflects this central problematic as his diagnosis 
seems to mirror the conditions of liberalism’s crisis. In his first chapter he claims that “the 
modern man who has ceased to believe, without ceasing to be credulous, hangs, as it were, 
between heaven and earth, and is at rest nowhere. There is no theory of the meaning and 
value of events which he is compelled to accept, but he is none the less compelled to accept 
the events. There is no moral authority to which he must turn now, but there is coercion in 
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opinions fashions and fads.”191 This is the ‘problem of unbelief.’ Lippmann is acutely aware 
what has been lost specifically by the increasing secularization of society, by the ostensible 
battle between religion and reason. Yet, he does not unambiguously take the position that 
there has been some great progress in this development. Rather, he is deeply concerned by 
the continued oppression of the human person by the mechanisms of the modern world. He 
continues, “[Man] can believe what he chooses about this civilization. He cannot, however, 
escape the compulsion of modern events. They compel his body and his senses as 
ruthlessly as ever did king or priest...They have all the force of natural events, but not their 
majesty, all the tyrannical power of ancient institutions, but none of their moral 
certainty...But they do not convince him that they have that dignity which inheres in that 
which is necessary and in the nature of things” 192 Two important things happen in this 
construction of the problem: Lippmann argues that the modern man is primarily 
disadvantaged because he lacks political freedom, a freedom which is no less arrested by a 
lack of purpose than by physical tyrannies, and, two, that however terrible these calamities 
are which visit themselves upon modern man, no tyranny ultimately must affect him 
essentially, for these events, “they do not compel his mind.”193 Lippmann’s solution is 
implicit in his premise: to provide for more political freedom, men must train their minds. 
To secure liberalism and give it direction, the minds of individuals must be mastered in 
such a way which safeguards them against the vicissitudes of modern events, particularly 
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the deleterious consequences of tyrannical majorities and the potentially disastrous effects 
of public opinion on mass politics. 
Lacking a clear authority, and unwilling to return to the authority of the church or to 
that of the state, Lippmann sought a new way: “When men can no longer be theists, they 
must, if they are civilized, become humanists.”194 The church’s authority was crushed by 
the scientific method, and the secular state which had begat the Great War and failed to 
arrest the emerging, decadent (more importantly, directionless) life of the twenties, had 
failed to secure any real purpose through its institutions. Lippmann exhorts his readers to 
adopt an enlightened ‘disinterestedness’ from political affairs, constraining their emotional 
response to the stimuli of their environments. There isn’t so much a general philosophy, 
but an expanded role for virtue and general civility in their daily conduct. The mature man, 
“would take the world as it comes, and within himself remain quite unperturbed. When he 
acted, he would know that he was only testing a hypothesis, and if he failed he would know 
that he had made a mistake...For the aspect of life which implicated his soul would be his 
understanding of life, and to the understanding, defeat is no less than victory. It would be 
no effort therefore, for him to be tolerant, and no annoyance to be skeptical.”195 Lippmann’s 
humanist is an ascetic, a calculator and ballast of disinterest against a world of agitation.  
“He would face pain with fortitude, for he would have put it away from the inner chambers 
of his soul. Fear would not haunt him, for he would be without compulsion to seize 
anything and without anxiety as to its fate.” The disinterested humanist fulfills Lippmann 
concerns about public opinion by retreating from the political area in order to strengthen 
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it. How much harm can be done by the tyranny of the masses or by the force of public 
opinion against men grounded dispassionately in an ascetic humanism? 
Ronald Steel notes that, “The book was perfectly attuned to its times, codifying the 
anxieties of a generation that had grown tired of its binge and was ready for a little 
renunciation.”196 The book was an instant commercial success, a best seller and was chosen 
by the Book of the Month Club. In its first year it had gone through six editions and was 
eventually translated into over a dozen languages.197 The irony that the demanding 
program outlined for the ascetic humanist was Lippmann’s greatest commercial success is 
indicative of Lippmann’s character both as a public philosopher and as a democrat. His 
style and prose made the book accessible to all, thus inducting the common man into the 
society of civility which Lippmann thought was the only cure for the ails of democracy. H.L. 
Mencken would be content to lambaste the ‘booboisie” in his critique of democracy, but 
Lippmann’s specific attempt to civilize them is a practice in optimism, and though his 
ascetic outlook at this stage of his career presents certain philosophical lacunas, his overall 
paradigm places high demands on the practice of virtue in the common man. 
Though the book was also warmly received by critics, not everyone shared 
Lippmann’s high religion of disinterested humanism. Among the dissenters was 
Lippmann’s former teacher, George Santayana. In a review of Morals, Santayana wrote that 
Lippmann’s view was, “an epilogue to all possible moralities and all possible religions.” And 
that from the vantage point of the detached humanist, “the pure intellect is divorced as far 
as possible from the service of the will – divorced therefore, from affairs and from morality; 
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and love is divorced as far as possible from human objects, and becomes an impersonal and 
universalized delight in being.”198 By insisting that the human adopt an inhuman position, 
Lippmann was ending the search for morality which Santayana thought brought such 
aesthetic value to a morally relativistic world. Lippmann had misunderstood his former 
mentor’s embrace of moral relativism acutely, and failed to see the consequences of his 
withdrawal to dispassionate reason, namely, that the ungrounded man is no longer a man. 
Lippmann’s sensitivity to this critique was highlighted in his sharp response to Santayana, 
and is revealed throughout Morals in his loose attempts to ground his universalistic 
rationalism in an ambiguous and idealized from of virtue. 
At stake in Morals, in the scope of interpreting Lippmann’s intellectual movement is 
the degree to which his disinterested humanism is essentially relativistic. While his appeals 
are often to Historical contingency as the basis of ethical attitudes, there are obvious 
refrains and an ultimate appeal to ground rationalism in human virtue. However, it is 
difficult to say whether that virtue is grounded in an appeal to Nature or to History, as the 
contingent morality is ambiguously bound up in the notion of ‘man’ as disinterested 
spectator. Importantly this disinterested humanist is a response to the threats of mass 
politics to sustainable liberalism, but it also sets the theoretical framework for the 
conclusion of Lippmann’s political philosophy in Essays in the Public Philosophy. For now it 
must be shown that there is this ambiguity about the grounding of natural rights in the 
appeal to Nature and History, and that, to the extent that Lippmann does explore political 
life in Morals, he links the freedom of the mind with political freedom, thereby accepting 
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individual responsibility as the paramount consideration for sustaining a liberal 
democracy. 
In Part One of Morals, Lippmann diagnoses the milieu of modern liberalism and 
finds it arrested by its great successes. The destruction of barriers to freedom has resulted 
in more problems than solutions. Lippmann draws a quotation from Thomas Henry 
Huxley’s Address on University Education: “a man's worst difficulties begin when he is able 
to do as he likes.”199 Recall this issue from the birth of liberalism: once the obstacles to 
freedom are eradicated, towards what goal should society direct itself? Lippmann has 
identified a crucial problem, and remains unsatisfied with the delinquent truth behind the 
experimental pluralism of Jamesian pragmatism which leaves no authentic room for 
revelation and belief, and the delinquent truth of Santayana’s aesthetic approach which 
would effectively relegate truth to a means to an end. For Lippmann, truth is an end in and 
of itself: “When Mr. Santayana says that ‘matters of religion should never be matters of 
controversy’ because ‘we never argue with a lover about his test, nor condemn him if we 
are just, for knowing so human a passion,’ he expresses an ultimate unbelief.”200 In neither 
James nor Santayana does Lippmann find a reasonable alternative to the authorities of the 
church and the state. The pluralist pragmatism of James offers no solace to a believer who 
knows God is made in his own image, and Santayana’s aestheticism similarly fills an 
emotive need for a fatuous personal satisfaction. With the authority of revelation destroyed 
by the scientific method, and neither James, Santayana, nor Dewey and his collectivist-
relativism able to offer a satisfactory scientific alternative for the deep questions which 
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interrogate men, Lippmann is forced to articulate a ‘new’ method of truth-seeking 
humanism for the modern age. There is a deep logic which underwrites this premise: a 
prima-facie need for authority, for truth. Implicit in his principle is the position that there is 
a natural truth-seeking instinct which demands satisfaction. 
Part Two is Lippmann’s attempt to roughly sketch the major elements of his 
humanist alternative. He attempts to build from the inescapable need for an authority, 
acknowledging that “the popular faith does not prove the existence of its objects, but only 
the presence of a desire that such objects should exist.” Lippmann understands as a part of 
his experience and repeated instructions in his earlier works to make man the center of 
politics. What is emerging in Morals is the constituent elements of that man-centered 
psychology and interpretation of human experience that is plausibly consistent with an 
articulation of natural rights doctrine. He continues, “The popular religion, in short, rests 
on a theory which if true, is an extension of physics and of history: the humanistic view 
rests on human psychology and an interpretation of human experience. It follows, then, 
that in exploring the modern problem it is necessary consciously and clearly to make a 
choice between these diametrically opposite points of view.”201 Lippmann himself places 
the choice between psychology/interpretation of experience and history. This pushes back 
against the relativistic inclinations of his humanism by grounding his psychology in the 
nature of man and experience. It is curious, however, that he associates the historical view 
with that of the church. He claims that there has been a great emancipation for the modern 
man in the wake of the retreating dogmas of the church, for which the replacement of those 
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dogmas with the search for truth is the source of our present difficulty. This is perhaps 
partially resolved in that some of the great religious leaders were also teachers of elements 
of this valuable humanism. Of all the sources he cites as early teachers of this emergent 
modern humanism, among Confucius, Spinoza, Buddha, and Jesus, he writes that they have 
placed a greater emphasis not on the character of commandment and obedience, but on the 
education and discipline of the human will. “Such beliefs as they had about God were not in 
the nature of oaths of allegiance to a superior; their concern was not to placate the will of 
God but to alter the will of man...because it is intrinsically good for man.”202 Though 
Lippmann believes we have eclipsed the capacity for revelatory authority, he finds in 
religious expression some essential constitutive elements of his humanism, which set the 
foundation for the appropriately disinterested man. 
In Part III, Lippmann moves to show the benefits of the practice of disinterested 
humanism. The driving force of his argument, that neither the system of ‘naïve capitalism’ 
nor collectivist socialism is capable of producing meaning, would not be out of place in 
even his first two books of political philosophy, Preface, and Drift. “The early doctrine of 
laissez-faire was utopian because it assumed that unregenerate men were destined 
somehow to muddle their way to a harmonious result. The early socialism was utopian 
because it assumed that these same unregenerate men, once the laws of property had been 
altered, would somehow muddle their way to a harmonious result. Both ignored the insight 
of high religion that unregenerate men can only muddle into muddle.”203 Lippmann 
continues to argue that the acquisitive dogma promoting simple pursuit of individual 
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interests leads nowhere, least of all to a utopian land of plenty. Likewise he remains 
disdainful of socialists who idealize man despite premising their theories on the faults 
inherent in the acquisitive traits of man. Lippmann has yet to abandon his own utopian 
dreams which turn toward the well managed society. Instead of the industrial 
statesmanship of Drift, Lippmann seems to hope that his disinterested humanism will 
moderate the acquisitive instinct in men of business into objective executive actions and 
prudent risk management. The capitalist gives way to a host of Weberian managers and 
bureaucrats (stoic and calculating, of course). Lippmann hopes that in the future “we shall 
discern the ideals of our industry in the necessities of industry itself.”204 Lippmann is not 
fully utopian, of course, for all the hopes of a well-managed industrial society lie in the 
excellence of the dispassionate humanists whose mastery of self is far from vouchsafed. 
The important takeaway is that Lippmann has moved the standards of economic affairs 
from centralized authorities to the individual authorities of executives and managers who 
have been elevated by their ‘high religion.’ Utopian, yes. But there is also a great theoretical 
consonance with Lippmann’s delicate embrace of private enterprise as an element of 
successful economic associations in his late work. 
To the small extent which Lippmann is expressly political in Morals, it is fair to say 
he extends many of the boons he foresees in the humanist executive to the statesman. The 
key principle to his thought is the introduction of the necessity of decentralization to the 
management of political affairs. No commenter has pointed to this explicitly, and Lippmann 
himself does not emphasize it, but it is the key to his limited political reflections in Morals, 
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and generative of much of his thought in The Good Society, and Essays in the Public 
Philosophy. He foresees that the power structure of modern government lacks the coercive 
structure of the authoritarian ancien regimes, and that “the crucial difference between 
modern politics and that to which mankind has been accustomed is that the power to act 
and to compel obedience is almost never sufficiently centralized nowadays to be exercised 
by one will. The power is distributed and qualified so that power is exerted not by 
command but by interaction.”205 Decentralized authority is not only contingently the 
contemporary modus operandi of, but a necessary condition for sustainable liberalism. 
Lippmann argues that the government cannot direct affairs through centralized authority 
without losing the force of that authority, for it must remain invested in the communities 
made up by individuals: “The prime business of government, therefore, Is not to direct the 
affairs of the community, but to harmonize the direction which the community gives to its 
affairs.”206 Ordering from on high through the great leadership of masterful men is doomed 
to failure unless the great men become more like serious men of practical virtue who are 
invested in their societies. Thus his new favored statesmanship “consists in giving the 
people not what they want but what they will learn to want. It requires the courage which 
is possible only in a mind that is detached from the agitations of the moment. It requires 
the insight which comes only from an objective and discerning knowledge of facts, and a 
high and imperturbable disinterestedness.”207 Far from the interpreters of will and 
sentiment of A Preface to Politics and the commanding industrial statesmen of Drift, the 
statesman of Morals is one who needs the objective information so prized in Opinion, but 
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primarily to lead modestly by elevating individuals in their high religion of disinterested 
humanism to the proper political action. 
From the perspective of a meta-analysis, Lippmann’s recommendations look 
simplistic at best, ironically utopian at worst. However, a final examination to exonerate his 
position from a ultimate, damning relativism shows his prescriptions in Morals to be rather 
more humble than the pomposity of a ‘high religion’ of disinterestedness might seem to 
suggest. For instance, the task of the moralist in the unbelieving world is not a grand 
systematizing articulation of the good. Lippmann begins his final chapter by critiquing the 
old ecclesiastical orders for overemphasizing morals in the vein of sanction and reward. 
The new moralist must adapt to the circumstances of his new world: “The disesteem into 
which moralists have fallen is due at bottom to their failure to see that in an age like this 
one the function of the moralist is not to exhort men to be good but to elucidate what the 
good is.”208 That there is a good is a given, but Lippmann also stresses that the authoritative 
force of any moral code depends on confluence with the disposition of the society in which 
they live. Yet, morals do not appear to be historically contingent; Lippmann merely 
expresses the practical nature and problem of relating truth to historical circumstances, a 
far cry from an essentially relativist position. It does seem to be an enduring truth observed 
by his humanism that civilization requires self-knowledge of its ideals, which is the central 
problem of a liberal society set adrift seeking an authority. “There must exist in the form of 
clearly available ideas an understanding of what the fulfillment of the promise of that 
civilization might mean, an imaginative conception of the good at which it might, and if it is 
                                                          
208Morals, Ch. 15 
126 
 
to flourish, at which it must aim.  That knowledge, though no one has it perfectly, and 
though relatively few have it at all, is the principle of all order and certainty in the life of 
that people. By it they can clarify the practical conduct of life in some measure, and add 
immeasurably to its dignity.”209 Lippmann is humbly suggesting that there is a penultimate 
quality to any ‘truth’ sought after by the humanist teachers and statesmen of a society, 
though there are great benefits to the act of seeking and promulgating it. 
Lippmann concludes by rejecting the possibility of revealed authority and dogma, 
event channeled through ecclesiastical authorities. His argument is that the way forward is 
in some measure easier without the baggage of traditional attempts to understand God: 
“The ideal way of life for men who must make their own terms with experience and find 
their own happiness has been stated again and again. It is that only the regenerate, the 
disinterested, the mature, can make use of freedom.210 Lippmann is effectively arguing for 
the rebirth of virtues essential to the good life, though he does it closed and against the 
encumbrances of tradition and experience with the authority of revealed truth and dogma. 
It is unfortunate that the last words of Lippmann’ great searching book are his most 
fatuous: “Since nothing gnawed at his vitals, neither doubt nor ambition, nor frustration, 
nor fear, he would move easily through life. And so whether he saw the thing as comedy, or 
high tragedy, or plain farce, he would affirm that it is what it is, and the wise man can enjoy 
it.”211 Lippmann’s reach exceeds his grasp, and the essential point of Santayana’s critique 
rings true: Lippmann’s dispassionate rationalism robs humans of their humanity. The 
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disinterested man may balance and master his passions as far as he is able, and in this 
humanism Lippmann may momentarily think he has found a way to balance the dangerous 
lack of authority and the dangerous alternatives of church and secular state by investing 
intellectual resources in the minds of individuals, but his thought would not rest there. His 
final books, The Method of Freedom, The New Imperative, The Good Society, and Essays in the 
Public Philosophy, would (especially among the first three) seek to guarantee the material 
security of the individual though natural rights and compensated economies, and (in 
Essays, primarily) Lippmann struggled to reconcile the claims of tradition expressed as 
natural law as the final indispensable piece of a sustainable liberalism. 
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Chapter Six – Economics, Material Well-Being, and The Good Society 
 Despite the great success of Lippmann’s Morals, by the end of the 1920s the World 
was on the verge of collapse. The paper was running a great deficit, and Joseph Pulitzer’s 
youngest son, Herbert, had assumed control of the paper from his brother Ralph in an 
effort to eliminate the financial ‘burden’ to which he felt the paper was subjecting him. 
Lippmann had done great work for the paper, but it was always a bit of an awkward fit with 
his intellectualism at odds with the crusading tone of the paper, not to mention much of the 
readership. Upset with massive cuts and restructuring, as well as having grown weary of 
the nature of his journalistic enterprise at the World, Lippmann told Herbert Pulitzer that 
he planned to leave when his contract concluded. In a curious letter to his friend, the art 
critic Bernard Berenson, Lippmann wrote that, “I have never taken newspaper work very 
seriously. It is to me a livelihood, a means of practical influence, and a laboratory for testing 
theories. I am not at all worried about myself, and would like to wind up my term on the 
World in a pleasant way and see that my own staff was provided for.”212 Shortly afterwards, 
Herbert told Lippmann in confidence that he was planning to sell the paper to the Scripps-
Howard chain. Lippmann would stay on until the sale in part to lobby for extended 
compensation for his staff before setting out to seek a new avenue of ‘influence.’ 
 He fielded many offers, including the presidency of the University of North Carolina, 
an office for which he felt unqualified, and many other journalistic opportunities. He was 
most intrigued, however, by an offer to write for the Herald Tribune, a conservative paper 
run by Ogden and Helen Reid. From the outside, it seemed to be a strange offer, for while 
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Lippmann had moved away from some of the more radical/progressive opinions of his 
youth, he was still firmly a liberal, and fresh off the editorial board of one of the nation’s 
largest Democratic papers. The Reids, however, were so impressed by Lippmann’s caliber 
as an analyst that they were entirely unconcerned with his political affiliation and made 
their pitch on the basis of Lippmann’s complete intellectual freedom: “It doesn’t matter that 
you’ve been running a Democratic paper, and we’re a Republican one,” Ogden Reid told 
him.  “We want the Democratic circulation of the World. Come and write Democratic 
editorials for us and sign them. Take any position you wish. We would never try and 
restrict you.”213  
 The Reids’ offer of editorial freedom clearly appealed more to Lippmann and his 
search for a ‘laboratory to test theories’ than Adolph Ochs’ offer that Lippmann could run 
the Times Washington office, a position more suited to a daily executive journalist. 
Lippmann wanted to pursue intellectual analysis, and his perspicacity would carry his new 
column in the Tribune, called, “Today and Tomorrow,” to great fame and wide readership. 
His column would eventually run in all the major newspapers in the United States for 
thirty-six years. Ronald Steele observes that, “Lippmann commanded a loyal and powerful 
constituency, some ten million of the most politically active and articulate people in 
America. Many of these people literally did not know what they ought to think about the 
issues of the day until they read what Walter Lippmann had said about them.”214 The calm 
and stability of his position there allowed Lippmann a vantage point from which to work 
                                                          
213 Steel, 275 
214 Steel, xvii 
130 
 
out the ideas that were he felt were the most pressing to the republic and of the most 
interest to his readers. 
 Despite the stability of Lippmann’s professional position, the Wall Street crash of 
1929 would follow just a few months after the publication of Morals and become the 
preeminent issue for most Americans. Lippmann held a mixed opinion of Hoover; though 
the president was keen on many of the principles which Lippmann admired, Lippmann 
thought his temperamental leadership ultimately doomed any small opportunities for 
remediation which lay open to him. Lippmann supported Newton Baker for the Democratic 
nomination against Franklin Roosevelt, fearing that FDR’s affability and lack of concrete 
policy left too much ambiguity concerning which course of action he would take once he 
became president. After a hotly contested convention, and a biting editorial against FDR 
which FDR never forgot, Lippmann ultimately endorsed him in the general election against 
Hoover. His new relationship with Reid was strained over yet more biting editorials against 
Hoover, which had become unsettling to the conservative readership of the paper. He 
embraced FDR and would be cautiously won over for the early designs of the New Deal, 
which offered in some respects a sharp distinction from the disinterested statesmanship 
Lippmann favored in Morals. However, the second key to that work, and to Opinion, and 
Phantom before it, was that there must be a baseline of material security before one could 
pursue disinterested humanism. The crisis of the depression had brought that insight 
tragically to light and motivated Lippmann’s support for the initial activity of FDR and the 
New Deal programs. 
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 The collapse of the markets brought to Lippmann great intellectual turmoil. Ever 
concerned with the influence of tyrannical majorities, he was also wary of the over-
encroachment of the executive branch. However, the situation had grown so dire in his 
view that he would state that “The danger we have to fear is not that Congress will give 
Franklin D. Roosevelt too much power, but that it will deny him the powers he needs.”215  
Emergency situations called for emergency actions. Lippmann backed most of FDR’s early 
New Deal reform packages (though not always without reservation), peaking in 1933 in his 
endorsement of FDR’s plan to move off of the gold standard. All the measures undertaken 
by FDR were circumscribed by domestic prices which were intractable insofar as the U.S. 
currency was tied to the international value of gold. Lippmann’s Wall Street contacts urged 
him to editorialize against the gold standard, and he adopted their view in an early column 
of “Today and Tomorrow.” After the move from the gold standard, the international 
economic community was thrown into a panic as world delegates met in London to work 
on an agreement concerning international stabilization of currency. Lippmann covered the 
conference and the fallout after FDR announced that the US would reject any and all 
international stabilization measures. It was at the conference Lippmann also found time to 
renew his friendship with Maynard Keynes. 
 Lippmann valued Keynes’ friendship highly, and combined with Lippmann’s 
budding interest (not only of necessity) in economics, Keynes was particularly influential 
upon him. Some of Keynes’ general theories on economics had been known for a few years, 
following the publication of his Treatise on Money, which investigated the relationship 
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between saving and investment. Keynes argued that where there was more savings in the 
economy than there was investment, recession or depression would occur, and he 
advocated general spending and deterrence to savings. During a long lunch Keynes detailed 
his forthcoming book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, to an 
impressionable Lippmann.216 Keynes separated the classical economic link between the 
price of labor and employment, and instead emphasized the impact of spending on 
employment. Keynes argued that there is by the nature of the market economy an 
unacceptable level of unemployment and underinvestment, absent active administrative 
measures. Practically, this new insight dissuaded Lippmann from any lingering desire he 
had for enforced balanced budget initiatives, for Keynes had plainly convinced him of the 
potential effectiveness of countercyclical spending. Philosophically, Lippmann would 
connect this new insight to an existing belief that political freedom, as well as the life of the 
truth seeking philosopher/humanist, depends on a base level of material well-being. If the 
modern economy had in its DNA underemployment, was it not simply just to enact 
remediation procedures to save the common man from the gears of the economic machine? 
The notion played well with Lippmann’s ever-present sense of a new world in need of new 
solutions and his natural distrust of the large modern mechanisms of marginalization.  
 It was perhaps for this reason that Lippmann was so happy to support the early 
reforms of the New Deal. To those that sense discontinuity in Lippmann’s own thought 
before and after his break with the second wave of New Deal reforms, it bears mentioning 
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that even in the midst of his enthusiasm for the New Deal, Lippmann was already warning 
against it:  
These experiments have their roots in the desire for recovery 
rather than in a popular enthusiasm for the ideal of an 
authoritarian state and a planned economy. They are, 
therefore, practical expedients rather than revolutionary 
processes. But it is possible that the dislocation may not yield 
to the expedients, thus compelling resort to more drastic ones. 
It is possible that the expedients may themselves deepen the 
dislocation by inhibiting the free enterprise upon which an 
essential part of recovery depends. It is possible that the 
expedients will seem admirable and equally possible that they 
will seem detestable.217 
Lippmann was clearly still concerned about these expedients transgressing into the realm 
of authoritarianism, but many of the collectivist controls which could insinuate the US 
down that pass were also in his view plainly necessary. Much of Lippmann’s thought in this 
period is a struggle to reconcile these ideas, and in the spring of 1934 Lippmann delivered 
the Godkin Lectures at Harvard which would later be published as his book, The Method of 
Freedom (1935). The book took a largely laudatory view of the New Deal, and elaborated 
Lippmann’s conversations with Keynes into a new theory of “free collectivism.” 
 Lippmann was looking for an explanation of the logic behind a third way between 
laissez-faire and collectivism. His conversations with Keynes and the drama of the 
depression had led him to enthusiastically endorse FDR’s New Deal, and many 
commentators point to Method and The New Imperative as signs of Lippmann’s 
inconsistency, but the philosophical logic behind his embrace of modest collectivism would 
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be the same reason for his later split with FDR. The forward for Method is particularly 
telling, and Lippmann sketches out his theory which indicated that his cautious embrace of 
elements of collectivism were the same as his reasons for avoiding it previously. He is 
adamant that his notion of “free collectivism” is consistent with the views of the Lecture’s 
namesake, Edwin Lawrence Godkin, a defender of laissez-faire, the gold standard, and free 
trade. “The things I have to say would have been meaningless while Godkin was still alive. 
At the time of his death in 1902 the issues with which we have to deal were in the making 
but they had not been precipitated. In the past twenty years, in the two decades since the 
beginning of the Great War, they have been precipitated. Yet I confidently believe that 
while the principles set forth in these lectures depart radically from the liberal programs 
which Godkin expounded so eloquently, they are nevertheless consistent with the spiritual 
purposes of which those programs were the transient expression.”218 In essence Lippmann 
is saying that the moderated collectivism represented by New Deal, and by other nations in 
response to the changing economic atmosphere after the war and depression, could be 
theoretically continuations of the promises of freedom and equality guaranteed by laissez-
faire policies in the previous centuries. As in every one of his books of political philosophy, 
Lippmann believed he was enumerating a response for a modern, unique problem which 
required fresh thinking. He tells us, “Purposes and ends embodying a conception of the 
good life and of what makes for dignity in human existence are older than all our working 
principles and will survive them. And, therefore, he who would be loyal to the end must in 
changing circumstances be prepared to alter the means; even the gods on Olympus took 
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diverse shapes when they walked the earth.”219 What remained was to find how a new 
method of economic situation can best provide for freedom, the good life and human 
dignity. The aims are the same between Method, Imperative, and Good, as they have been 
throughout his career in search of political freedom.  It is the method which has to change 
to provide that freedom: “I do not believe that liberty is, as we have been told on high 
authority, a corpse. But neither do I believe it can live only or live forever in the body it 
inhabited during the Nineteenth Century. And it is in the conviction that freedom is finding 
a new incarnation in a new body of principles that these lectures have been written.”220 
 In part one, Lippmann explains the conditions under which laissez -faire died, and 
why it is impossible to move forward without conscious acknowledgment of the situation. 
He picks up the same themes he expressed in Opinion, arguing that the great equalizing of 
conditions manifested and promised by the democratic state can only be fulfilled and 
stabilized through external action. While in Opinion it had been intelligence bureaus, now, 
influenced by Keynes, he argues that the economy must be managed by expert knowledge 
in times of crisis. The old style, neutral state, “leaves out of account the rise of democracy 
with all that that involves in the way of resistance and activity on the part of the masses of 
the people. As long as democracy was unconscious of its power, it was possible to let hard 
times be the purge of previous mistakes. But with democracy become active, there can no 
longer be a fatalistic acceptance of the purge.”221 Boom and bust cycles have become 
unacceptable as the modern economy has become so powerful that the state must protect 
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the standard of life against the economic forces which stand outside the purview of the 
common man who lives in civil society. Lippmann, with Weimar Germany and the Nazis in 
mind, cautions that the failure to secure the basic necessities of life through a compensated 
economy would greatly threaten liberty, “as we can see in all of Europe east of the 
Rhine.”222 
 In Part Two, having shown that the neutral state of laissez -faire has passed, 
Lippmann defines Free Collectivism by juxtaposing it to the planned and autocratic 
collectivisms of the socialist and communist world. Free Collectivism “is collectivist 
because it acknowledges the obligation of the state for the standard of life and the 
operation of the economic order as a whole. It is free because it preserves within very wide 
limits the liberty of private transactions. Its object is not to direct individual enterprise and 
choice according to an official plan but to put them and keep them in a working 
equilibrium. Its method is to redress the balance of private actions by compensating public 
actions.”223 Lippmann seems to have Keynesian central banking concepts primarily in mind 
when discussing the mechanisms of collectivist control in a private, unplanned economy, 
but is nonetheless open to further developments in the field. He is only attempting to 
establish the principle against that of unfettered capitalism and the strictly planned 
economy.  The planned economy cannot operate in a state given to liberty, for it is in its 
internal mechanics an economy for planned scarcity. Even at the height of his admiration 
for economic control, Lippmann is adamant that prosperity rests with the consumer-driven 
market of free enterprise. 
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 In Part Three Lippmann attempts to reconcile his recommendations for a 
compensated economy with the standard practice of democracy through representative 
government. For all the great, though surmountable technical challenges of the economic 
balancing tools the government should employ, the greatest threat to those actions are 
from transient majorities and special interest groups. Lippmann lauds the founders with 
glowing language, who “foresaw clearly all the real difficulties of political democracy, and 
the Constitution is undoubtedly the greatest attempt ever made consciously by men to 
render popular rule safe for the nation as a whole, the local community, and the 
individual.”224 It is striking that Lippmann congratulates the founders for their prescience 
and their ideals of limited government unabashedly in his endorsement of a massive 
expansion of collectivist control. Yet, Lippmann still believed that a modest expansion of 
these controls would be reconcilable with the principles of the founders if these essential 
premises of democratic government are revisited in order to rebalance the executive and 
legislative authority needed to operate economic controls. The precise controls, looking 
backwards, put one in mind of the modern Federal Reserve System, though Lippmann does 
not once mention it directly. If there is a general principle to his theory, it is that executive 
authority should increase in times of crisis and recede once the crisis has passed. This 
could help explain some of his eventual turn against the New Deal, which he never 
endorsed as a social reform, but rather a necessary remedy and experiment. However, it is 
not overall clear what precisely Lippmann has in mind to establish this constitutional 
balance on behalf of limited government. For now, it is important to note that he has 
embraced the founders’ principles of constitutionalism, and though he also plainly thinks 
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that the founders simply never considered the problems of the modern economy, their 
methods would yield a similar result as that which he has in mind.  
 Lippmann’s theory depended in large part on his reading of Aristotle, whom he 
quotes and references multiple times in the last few sections of Method: “The best political 
community is formed by citizens of the middle class,” followed by another extended 
quotation from Book IV, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics which elaborates the same point. 
Lippmann states clearly that the greatest threat to free government is “proletarian 
insecurity” and that the only remedy is to seek a balance between security and freedom in 
the stability of the middle class. Since Keynes had convinced him the nature of the market 
economy resulted in a level of unemployment and underinvestment without active 
administrative measures, the principle of the stable middle seemed impossible without his 
new free collectivism. Following this principle he advocates that the government guarantee 
a right to work and protect private property as the “foundation of liberty.” Lippmann 
rejects a natural right to property, but also maintains that it is the essential ground of 
liberty because “Men cannot be made free by laws unless they are in fact free because no 
man can buy and no man can coerce them.”225 Method concludes on this note, with 
optimism for the procedure of crisis management through free collectivism, and a tension 
between property and work as essential features of liberty, but not themselves natural 
rights.  
 The New Imperative (1935) was a collection of two essays written in the spring of 
1935. Lippmann advances mostly the same ideas he did in Method, notably finding that the 
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Hoover and Roosevelt administrations had largely the same attitude towards recovery, 
thus demonstrating that the principle of a free collectivism was already widely accepted 
and that its advancement depended on this recognition. He also reopened the issue of 
laissez-faire, and curiously advanced it as an attractive option with no practicality at this 
time. The laissez-faire system had the same utopian defects as the syndicalist/socialist 
utopias he critiqued in his early works. In the modern world he would claim laissez-faire 
economics lost its practicality and its authority, “because those who preach this gospel do 
not practice it.”226 He then repeats his refrain from Drift and Method in particular, about big 
business, industrial cartels and stock holding as poor imitation of truly free markets 
expressive of the ideal of private property. He concludes by arguing that individual liberty 
was in fact compatible with active government mediation of the economy. Lippmann would 
rest assured that government intervention in the economic realm did not constitute 
intervention in the intellectual ream. 
 It wasn’t long after the spring of 1935 that Lippmann began to weary of some of the 
New Deal programs initiated by FDR. He had always reserved a great deal of criticism for 
some of the overreaching of the National Recovery Administration, but it was not until 
Roosevelt announced his court-packing plan in 1937 that Lippmann turned fully against 
the administration. In Lippmann’s view the time of emergency had passed, and the 
programs failing to get through the courts now were reform acts rather than emergency 
actions. All along Lippmann had consistently advocated for emergency actions (in various 
forms), while warning against the inclination to overreach after the situation had passed. 
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His work in Imperative and Method did argue for the expansion of executive control into the 
management of the compensated economy, but this expansion was both tied to (admittedly 
ambiguous and idealized) constitutional mechanisms, which were offered as morally 
necessary and practically effective given the intricacy of the modern economy.  
 It is important to bear in mind for the forthcoming discussion of Good, the logical 
point Lippmann reached with Keynes that justice requires some compensatory mechanism 
for modern economics. For however much a partisan of liberty Lippmann becomes, two 
major themes of continuity with Method and Imperative exist: one, that the model of free 
collectivism is refined rather than completely abandoned, and two, that what progressives 
and some liberals see as a retreat to free market moralism, comes only with heavy 
qualifications through familiar repudiations of past dogmas of laissez-faire. To the former, 
his explicit rejection of New Deal style programs is tempered by a call, repeated from 
Method and Imperative,  for money spent, not on direct public assistance, but on public 
works, education and heath as both “relief and remedy.”227  To the latter, Lippmann 
emphasizes what he sees as a false dichotomy between individual rights/laissez faire and 
progressive statism/collectivism.  He envisions property rights as managed extensively 
through a court system that depends on common law jurisprudence. 
The more substantive reasons for Lippmann’s reversal on the New Deal are 
consistent with his overriding preoccupation with a stable liberal democracy, and it is a 
change in his philosophy only so far as he bases his argument against Roosevelt’s overreach 
in constitutional merits. Where early in his career the court was simply a cloak for self-
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interested actors to protect their property, it had now become an essential part of the 
regime of liberty guaranteed through the separation of powers. Even at the height of 
Lippmann’s enthusiasm for the New Deal he was lauding the founders for the separation of 
powers as a principle of self-government. When news of the court-packing plan was 
announced, Lippmann’s core belief in the necessity of the separation of powers doctrine 
and firm conviction that the time of grave emergency had passed, led him to explode in 
vitriol against the plan, calling it, “a bloodless coup d’etat which strikes a deadly blow at the 
vital center of constitutional democracy.”228 He was shaken by the attempt to arrogate 
power to the executive, and the overreach was likely a source of much of his motivation to 
write The Good Society (1937). 
Good serves two main purposes: to enumerate the features of liberalism and to 
denounce collectivism. Lippmann’s exuberance in the latter aim, and comprehensiveness in 
the former, were artifacts of his decaying optimism in the affairs of government. However, 
it is important to understand that this decay of optimism is neither motivated nor manifest 
in the often cited turn towards neoliberal economics, ‘natural law,’ or free markets of old 
style liberalism. Rather, the tone of Good is impacted by Lippmann’s continuing conviction 
that the old style laissez-faire economics must, for moral and practical reasons, be a part of 
the compensated system, and that, as a result, the compensated economy must be directed 
by executive functions which place the entire governmental system, the stability of the 
liberal democracy, into constant peril. His final two books are attempts to address that peril 
by describing the horrors of collectivism, particularly in response to the unexpected toll 
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(unexpected to Lippmann) the expanded centralized government was having on 
intellectual freedom. 
In the acknowledgments of Good, for editions after 1937, Lippmann claims to have 
begun the book in 1933,229 thus refuting any commentator who would seek to diagnose a 
sharp break in his thinking on Roosevelt and the New Deal. As has been indicated, 
Lippmann was already keenly aware the inherent dangers collectivism posed to liberty, 
while simultaneously respecting a need to compensate for those caught in the machinery of 
an economic system dependent on underemployment. Yet he also felt a great need to 
reconcile his growing distrust of collectivism as a threat to intellectual security with 
Keynesian methods of economic control that seemed to him to be so necessary. It is 
therefore difficult to diagnose a hard break between Method and Imperative with Good, 
particularly when Lippmann acknowledges a debt to Hayek and Mises as well as Keynes 
within the same sentence.  
Lippmann’s introduction is equally revealing, for he comments unusually directly on 
his first two books, Drift and Preface, saying that he had assumed that “in a regime of 
personal liberty each nation could, by the increasing exercise of popular sovereignty, create 
for itself gradually a spaciously planned and intelligently directed social order.”230 The war, 
he claims, robbed him of this simple belief that organization would produce the free and 
just society for which he had hoped, and that he now believes that the world’s difficulties 
are “inherently unsolvable.” He may have grown disillusioned, but it is not so clear that he 
was ever wrought with despair over the situation of liberalism. He continues by arguing 
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that the liberal vision was “devoid of any meaning whatsoever,” and, in continuity with his 
early works, diagnoses part of the derailment with the laissez-faire old style capitalism of 
the 19th century unadjusted for modern needs. He hopes to rearticulate the vision for the 
modern world, and preserve the dignity and purpose of liberalism. The revelation that is 
truly unique to Lippmann’s body of thought is not then a pivoting and balancing of 
economic positions or disillusionment with scientific bureaucracy/management, but the 
recognition of the need for a creed at the center of the wayward liberalism in order to 
regain its lost promise. 
In Book I of Good, Lippmann seeks this creed by returning to the basis of the liberal 
paradigm—human flourishing depends on human freedom. In his observation there is a 
sort of false choice between old style capitalism on one hand and mounting collectivist 
totalitarianisms on the other. Liberalism, if its foundation can be reclaimed, offers an 
alternative to them both. Lippmann identifies the method of liberalism in a way that is 
present, but underemphasized in his earlier works: “For more than two thousand years, 
since western men first began to think about the social order, the main preoccupation of 
political thinking has been to find a law which would be superior to arbitrary power.”231 
The tradition of western civilization has supplied the reasoning behind the restrictions on 
arbitrary power, and the modern state, with its limitless faith that it would ‘providentially’ 
move towards apotheosis by any means necessary, was becoming increasingly hostile to 
the liberty on which liberalism depends. Lippmann’s empirical progressivism was 
shattered by the Great War, and while the depression had led him to conclude the necessity 
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of some collectivist controls, the seeming inexorability of FDR’s power after the crisis had 
passed, along with the ‘barbarians at the gates’ in Europe, cemented a new observation: 
that fatalistic/providential authoritarianisms could not be restrained except through the 
western tradition, which was itself spawned to emancipate men from arbitrary regimes. 
The new observation for Lippmann was that arbitrary power was a greater threat to 
human flourishing and liberal democracy than the concern that a government would fail 
realize its capacity to serve its citizens. Where in his early works the concern was ‘when 
shall we end drift and achieve mastery?’ he now perceives the complexity of the answer.  
This clear rejection of fatalistic progressivism inherent in the collectivist regimes 
does not necessarily mean that Lippmann makes his appeal to Nature concomitantly with 
the appeal to western tradition. However, he does seem to argue that the collectivist 
regimes which threaten human flourishing with arbitrary power are often set against the 
traditions of western civilization, the purpose of which has always been to find justification 
for the exercise of power. Lippmann says, 
Men, have sought it in custom, in the dictates of reason, in 
religious revelation, endeavoring always to set up some check 
upon the exercise of force. This is the meaning of the long 
debate about Natural Law. This is the meaning of a thousand 
years of struggle to bring the sovereign under a constitution, to 
establish for the individual and for voluntary associations of 
men rights which they can enforce against kings, barons, 
magnates, majorities, and mobs. This is the meaning of the 
struggle to separate the church from the state, to emancipate 
conscience, learning, the arts, education, and commerce from 
the inquisitor, the censor, the monopolist, the policeman, and 
the hangman.232 
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This seems to suggest that there is a pragmatic reason to rearticulate the basis of liberalism 
as the resistance to arbitrary power and its dismantling. Similar to the humanism of Morals, 
reason guides Lippmann’s search for sustainable liberalism to a legitimate option for the 
operation of philosophy in the public sphere; unlike Morals Lippmann has, through reason, 
found legitimacy specifically in tradition to push back against the foundationless rhetoric 
which supports collectivist and authoritarian regimes. There is some instrumentality to his 
adoption of custom and religious revelation as bulwarks against arbitrary rule, but the long 
history of debate and practice has formed these arenas of civility as foundations and made 
them more supported than the directionless alternative: “The burden of proof is upon 
those who would reject the ecumenical tradition of the western world. It is for them to 
show that their cult of the Providential State is in truth the new revelation they think it is, 
and that it is not, as a few still believe, the gigantic heresy of an apostate generation.”233 It 
remains ambiguous if Lippmann has found a solid foundation in Nature, though it is clear 
he has lost faith in a foundationless Historical method to provide value and direction 
necessary to protect liberalism. 
 Another feature Lippmann has carried with him through all of his works is that the 
modern world, or industrial revolution, has precipitated a great change upon the nature of 
human organization. He does not abandon this principle in Good, or later in Essays. In fact, 
in Good, a central piece of his argument denouncing authoritarian collectivist regimes is 
that the sheer complexity of the market economy which does so much to enhance the 
effective, material freedom of its constituents, is fundamentally compromised by the 
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attempt to plan human activity. “Directive laws, by their nature static and inert, are 
technically suited to the highly dynamic character of the industrial revolution.”234 This is a 
key point. In Book II Lippmann argues that as a general principle the planned economy 
seeks to make its plan manifest—the plans of the people are therefore overridden or 
ignored. Only a perfectly benevolent despotism makes freedom compatible with the 
planned economy, and the planners of a collectivist society will always hope against reason 
that their despots will be just.  “Thus, by a kind of tragic irony, the search for security and a 
rational society, if it seeks salvation through political authority, ends in the most irrational 
form of government imaginable in the dictatorship of casual oligarchs, who have no 
hereditary title, no constitutional origin or responsibility, who cannot be replaced except 
by violence.”235 The collectivists’ resignation to hope for progress through benevolent 
despotism is to also ignore that they have no plan, no recourse for selecting or replacing 
the despot, thus, “The reformers who are staking their hopes on good despots, because they 
are so eager to plan the future, leave unplanned that on which all their hopes depend.”236 
 In Book III, Lippmann further elaborates the principles of the regime of peace, the 
government of laws rather than the government by commands. He fully embraces the 
American founders, going so far as to call them geniuses, but curiously, this should not 
necessarily be looked upon as a sharp divergence from his earlier contempt for the 
founders’ methods. Lippmann’s frustration with the founders’ mechanistic constitution was 
primarily because he found it to be a cloak to retard society and secure vested interests and 
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privileges of the propertied classes. The ‘Herbert Spencerians’ and others had used the law 
to pervert the intent of the law such that it would protect property derived from the 
corporate capitalism of the 19th century. This perversion is at the expense of Adam Smith 
and other classical liberals’ ideal of an “obvious system of simple and natural liberty.” 
Interpreted correctly, Lippmann seems to think that returning to the foundations of the 
founders’ prescriptions and particularly their reliance on natural law can undo the very 
evils with which he had identified them earlier in his career. 
 Lippmann argues that the founders’ prescience lay in their perception that the 
political problem of their age was not only the one that faced the new liberals of the old 
world, to seek protection against arbitrary power, but rather, having achieved roughly that 
freedom, their problem was how to organize the power of the masses. Lippmann identifies 
the founders’ position with his position in Phantom (which he cites at the end of this 
quotation): “And since it was obvious that no mass of men can as a mass make more than 
the simplest decisions of yes and no and is physically incapable of administering its affairs, 
the practical question was how a government could be made to represent the people.”237 In 
fact, Lippmann still declares some of the mechanical nature of the constitution to be 
“defective”238, but this doesn’t negate the deep wisdom of their system of checks and 
balances which guarantees as far as the document is able, the rule of law instead of the 
arbitrary law of commands, and protects the true will of the people against the ‘arithmetic’ 
calculation of the tally of votes belonging to individuals who are easily beguiled by 
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demagoguery. Lippmann notes that Madison would be unsurprised by Hitler, and that it 
was against leaders such as him that the founders set up their system of elaborate 
representation. 
 Book IV delves more deeply into the nature of the law and the common law 
foundation of the constitution of the founders. Lippmann makes the case that the checks 
and balances of the constitution are inherent in the development of the common law 
tradition, and particularly in the English struggle since the Magna Carta to check the 
privileges of the King and of arbitrary power. “Constitutional restraints and bills of rights, 
the whole apparatus of responsible government and of an independent judiciary, the 
conception of due process of law in courts, in legislatures, among executives, are but the 
rough approximations by which men have sought to exorcise the devil of arbitrariness in 
human relations.”239 Without these approximations, Lippmann argues, men have no appeal 
against arbitrariness, no recourse from the immediate situation. This seems to incline him 
to a grounding in Nature, for he also says that, “Among a people which does not try to obey 
this higher law, no constitution is worth the paper it is written on: though they have all the 
forms of liberty, they will not enjoy its substance.”240 Effectively the positive law is tied to a 
larger ideal of precedential consideration as a part of a body of law tied to serious 
reasoning about the nature of things. Lippmann senses criticism and responds 
preemptively, “To those who ask where this higher law is to be found, the answer is that it 
is a progressive discovery of men striving to civilize themselves, and that its scope and 
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implications are a gradual revelation that is by no means completed.”241 He situates law, 
and therefore his constitutionalism as an unfolding, from Hammurabi to the human rights 
doctrine he began to explore in Morals, in pursuit of greater liberty within a constructive, 
stable government. This does not appear to be an appeal to process, for Lippmann also 
seems to sense the inherent fragility of the unfolding of common law, thus repudiating any 
sort of historicism or relativism in the law as reaching its own apotheosis. 
 The pursuit of good law and of good institutions is tied to Lippmann’s conception of 
man. Consistent through all his works is an insistence that man be placed at the center of 
politics. In Good Lippmann’s consistency on this principle leads him to argue that because 
of man’s inherent drive for liberty and freedom, because of an ‘energy’ within us that 
pushes us forward with an image of man with inviolable rights and duties, we must order 
politics around civility and dignity. To stabilize a liberal democratic regime, to render it 
profitable against the collectivist totalitarian regimes budding in Europe, and nascently 
present in some of FDR’s excesses, modern liberalism must re-interrogate its foundations 
around this common drive:   
Its essence is an energy, however we choose to describe it, 
which causes men to assert their humanity, and on occasion to 
die rather than to renounce it. This is the energy the seers 
discerned when they discovered the soul of man. It is this 
energy which has moved men to rise above themselves, to feel 
a divine discontent with their condition, to invent, to labor, to 
reason with one another, to imagine the good life and to desire 
it. This energy must be mighty. For it has overcome the inertia 
of the primordial savage. Against this mighty energy the 
heresies of an epoch will not prevail. For the will to be free is 
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perpetually renewed in every individual who uses his faculties 
and affirms his manhood.242 
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Chapter Seven – Making Liberalism Sustainable: The Public Philosophy 
The years surrounding the Second World War were predictably busy for Walter 
Lippmann. Still bearing scars from his struggle navigating the personal and political divide 
between realism and Wilsonian idealism, Lippmann’s position as one of America’s 
preeminent political commentators again thrust him into the spotlight of civic discourse. In 
the thirties, he walked a fine line, seeking to make a case for at least some limited American 
involvement without alienating the strong isolationist sentiment that was prominent in in 
the country at the time. However, with the fall of France, Lippmann was forced to make 
more explicit the degree to which American security depended on British independence 
and Anglo-American control of the Atlantic.243 If the British naval power was destroyed or 
captured by the Germans, Lippmann argued that for the first time in American history we 
would be threatened at home. Remarkably, Lippmann’s policy prescriptions still displayed 
a strong consistency to his pre-WWI concerns, particularly in defense of the Atlantic 
corridor. Ronald Steel notes that Lippmann recycled some of his rhetoric from that time in 
a 6/15/40 “Today and Tomorrow” article,244 and went further, arguing that the lesson from 
the previous war was that our interest lay in thwarting unlimited German submarine 
warfare and keeping the Atlantic corridor safe. To this end Lippmann labored tirelessly, 
even enlisting General Pershing and others to support circumvention of the Neutrality Acts, 
which forbade weapons sales to Axis or Allied powers. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Lippmann 
was also noticeably less worried about the Japanese threat except the extent to which our 
navy would be threatened by a war in two oceans. 
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Yet, none of his policies for keeping America safe and out of the war would prove 
effective enough to accomplish their aims. Anticipating the conflict to come, in an address 
to a reunion of his Harvard class, Lippmann foresaw that, “We shall turn from the soft vices 
in which a civilization decays...we shall return to the stern virtues by which a civilization is 
made, we shall do this because, at long last, we know that we must, because finally we 
begin to see that the hard way is the only enduring way.” The soft mores of the civilization 
that took its stability for granted were about to be tested. In late 1941 we would write that, 
“The modern skeptical world has been taught for some 200 years a conception of human 
nature in which the reality of evil, so well-known to the ages of faith, has been discounted. 
Almost all of us grew up in an environment of such easy optimism that we can scarcely 
know what is meant, though our ancestors knew it well, by the satanic will. We shall have 
to recover this forgotten but essential truth—along with many others we lost when, 
thinking we were enlightened and advanced, we were merely shallow and blind.”245 
Lippmann was not perhaps a pessimist in the sense of America’s hope for victory in the 
coming conflicts, yet in the midst of post-depression listlessness, the recovery of the human 
spirit required to endure those wars seemed far from vouchsafed.   
By the end of the war Lippmann had emerged as the outstanding American foreign 
affairs expert. In 1943 he would write U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, where he 
repudiated a growing idealist belief in world government, and instead grounded policy in 
national interest and balanced alliances. The dissolving of wartime alliances after WWI he 
argued had led to the inability to check German power which began WWII. It expressed 
                                                          
245 Today and Tomorrow, October 30th, 1941 
153 
 
primarily realism and national interest in foreign affairs, though Lippmann would modify 
his thesis slightly in his next work, U.S. War Aims (1943). Writing in the shadow of the failed 
peace accords of WWI, Lippmann acknowledges that the lack of shared values between the 
US and the Soviet Union would prevent the sort of cooperation between nations for which 
he argued a year prior. Instead he favored conceding a sphere of influence of the Soviet 
Union in Eastern Europe (with parallel spheres for the US in the Western hemisphere), and 
arguing against limitless interventionism. Lippmann saw lingering Wilsonianism as the 
greatest threat to secure this new peace, and instead argued that by tying together national 
interest with stabilizing alliances, international relations could maintain moral perspective 
on international conduct. Lippmann’s brand of realpolitik attempted to save morality 
against moralism by limiting the assumptions of intervention though the balance of 
national interest in the coming cold war. And though Lippmann was sharply critical of 
interventionists, Wilsonians, and other globalists in the first 5 years after the war, he would 
accept the general consensus behind the US cold war strategy between 1950-65, while 
often arguing and critiquing some ways in which it was implemented.246 
Though Lippmann gained even more fame and respect for his writings on foreign 
affairs, it was the domestic situation which continued to drive the development of his 
political philosophy. Lippmann’s refutation of this ungrounded liberal democracy began 
the entire project of Essays in the Public Philosophy (1955). He opens the work under the 
subheading “my reason for writing this book” with the comment, “During the fateful 
summer of 1938 I began writing a book in an effort to come to terms in my own mind and 
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heart with the mounting disorder in our Western society.”247 Like so many progressives 
before him, his reliance on the observable progress of the world was halted with the first 
World War, and the depths of the possible evil seen in the Second World War not only 
reinforced his suspicion of ‘progress,’ but forced him to reconsider the foundation of a 
secularism unchained from the vocabulary necessary to condemn such evil. To this end, 
Lippmann advocated two lines of reasoning in Essays: One that the totalitarian cataclysms 
of the past century had to do with executive weakness and ineffectualness in constitutional 
government; and two, increasingly secular societies lacked a common language, the 
traditions of civility, to bind them together, and through which laws could command with 
authority and legitimacy. The problems are linked, Lippmann would argue, through the 
inability of the modern masses to “believe in intangible realities”248 thus stripping 
executive authority of wisdom and veneration needed to balance with the more 
representational legislature. The difficult argument would depend on the fraught 
rearticulation of the natural law doctrine for modern society. 
 For these reasons, Lippmann’s mature work of political philosophy is undeniably 
Essays in the Public Philosophy (1955), his great attempt to recover a place for natural law 
doctrine within a society struggling with postmodernity and purposelessness. Whatever 
vicissitudes Lippmann’s thought underwent, he always remained preeminently concerned 
with the problem of freedom in the modern world. Essays is no different. It is a 
crystallization of the issues with which he struggled through his career and the riddle at the 
heart of politics: human nature. Political freedom, as he had established in Morals had to be 
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more than simply unencumbered movement, and yet was also tied to the material well-
being of the individual. After struggling to balance the issues in Method to Good, he 
concluded that to extend political freedom in both the realm of the mind and the soul, and 
the material well-being of the citizen, the maximization of this effect, of freedom would 
come through public philosophy. Where collectivist sentiments of Method and Imperative 
led in some sense to a logical conclusion in the extremes of the authoritarianisms of the 
20th century, the trick it seemed was to provide for legitimate authority without 
succumbing to totalitarian impulses engendered by proletarian insecurity, whether that 
insecurity be of directionless liberalism, or economic scarcity. While Good had elaborated 
the beginning of a liberalism which remained committed to the rebuttal of unrestrained 
laissez-faire, and authority issued through constitutional law instead of command, 
Lippmann clearly remained unsettled by his concluding prescription to seek out the energy 
“which causes men to assert their humanity.” 249 His notes for Essays, which began about 
the time Good was published and his pessimism peaked, reflected the paralysis of 
democracies in the face of totalitarianism, and included scrawling such as, “the deracinated 
masses...A civilization must have a religion...Communism and Nazism are religions of 
proletarianized masses...Laws which lead to monopoly and proletarianism destroy law and 
are a method of civilized suicide.”250 He was in search of a ‘religion’ that could serve the 
modern needs of liberalism and extend political freedom to as many, as effectively, and as 
securely as possible. It is for this end that he sought out the fundamental tenets of the 
public philosophy through the natural law tradition. 
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Part of Lippmann’s central thesis in Essays, is that the founders who established our 
free and democratic political institutions “adhered to a public philosophy.” “Though there 
have been many schools in this philosophy, there are fundamental principles common to all 
of them: that, in Cicero’s words, ‘law is the bond of civil society,’ and … that these laws can 
be developed and refined by rational discussion, and that the highest laws are those upon 
which all rational men of good will, when fully informed, will tend to agree.”251 Lippmann 
contends that our modern democracies stand radically divorced from this foundation, and 
that apart from this public philosophy, liberal democracy “is not an intelligible form of 
government”. He sees an inherent inconsistency between the rejection of reason’s ability to 
uncover the natural law, and the belief that men in a condition of freedom are capable of 
self-governance. In the founders Lippmann saw a constitutionalism established on the 
basis of the balance of authority vs. authoritarianism. Unlike Diderot, and the Jacobin 
heretics who wished essentially to abolish government, “Jefferson and his colleagues, on 
the other hand, were interested in government. They were in rebellion because they were 
being denied the rights of representation and of participation which they, like other 
subjects of the same King, would have enjoyed had they lived in England. The Americans 
were in rebellion against the ‘usurpations’ of George III, not against authority as such but, 
against the abuse of authority.”252 The founders rebelled in order to take control of 
government, not to “deny or subvert ... the moral foundations of [its] authority.”253 In so 
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doing, the founders were exemplary planners, rebels, and liberals whose pursuit of political 
freedom was grounded in Nature in their declaration of independence.  
Despite his linking the founders with the natural law tradition and effective public 
philosophy, Lippmann still had issues with the modern balance of the authority of the 
executive in their constitutional order. The problem arises due to the very nature of mass 
politics, the center of Opinion and Phantom, and the difficulty in representing the will of the 
people without precipitating the tyranny of the majority. Lippmann sets up his discussion 
of executive power by declaring an emergency “when elected assemblies and mass 
opinions become decisive in the state, when there are no statesmen to resist the inclination 
of the voters and there are only politicians to excite and to exploit them.” 254  As a result, in 
the modern state “There is then a general tendency to be drawn downward, as by the force 
of gravity, towards insolvency, towards the insecurity of factionalism, towards the erosion 
of liberty, and towards hyperbolic wars.”255 The only response is to reevaluate the 
foundations of popular government, particularly in the management of executive authority 
as a balance to exaggerated legislative representation. 
Lippmann warns that democratic states are in particular danger of the 
devitalization of executive authority because the electoral process routinely refreshes their 
dependency on their constituency. He therefore argues that in America “the constitutional 
mechanisms have never themselves been sufficient to protect the executive.”256 A 
representative body is justly responsible to its constituency, and helps revitalize the proper 
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role for popular sovereignty and consent of the governed. However, the executive, 
Lippmann argues, should not be an agent of the people, but rather an agent of the laws. 
“For while the executive is in honor bound not to consider himself  as the agent of his 
electors, the representative is expected to be, within the limits of reason, and the general 
public interest, their agent.”257 Because of the very nature of the electoral process 
representation is confused with governing. Lippmann says explicitly that he attributes the 
“democratic disasters of the twentieth century to a derangement of these primary 
functions.”258 This is largely consistent with the track of Lippmann’s view of executive 
power throughout his career, though instead of the early trope of masterful men who are 
able to transcend petty legal hurdles and realities, Lippmann has linked well-constructed 
executive power to a need to reexamine the constitutional order on which a strong 
executive depends. He makes one practical argument, that the exigencies of war and 
reconstruction have expanded the power of the purse which is in legislative control 
(perhaps rightly so, perhaps not), but he also makes a linked argument: “The other 
development which has acted to enfeeble the executive power is the growing incapacity of 
the large majority of the democratic peoples to believe in intangible realities.”259 Lippmann 
argues that the legislative and the executive must balance each other, but only points to the 
capacity of the masses to believe in intangible realities as the possible solution. It is a 
frustrating lacuna. However, Lippmann’s point is that secularization has stripped the 
executive of the prestige it needs in order to govern the people according not to their 
desires and passions, but their needs. This is not so far a departure from Morals, where he 
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argued that statesmanship “consists in giving the people not what they want but what they 
will learn to want. It requires the courage which is possible only in a mind that is detached 
from the agitations of the moment. It requires the insight which comes only from an 
objective and discerning knowledge of facts, and a high and imperturbable 
disinterestedness.”260  But Lippmann’s thought has developed, and he detects that the 
mechanism by which the necessary balance between the legislative and executive, between 
representation and statesmanship, is upset is the secularization of ‘men’s minds.’ 
In reflection one could suggest that a certain degree of reverence for the 
Constitution and founding principles could furnish a facsimile of the majesty required for 
good executive governorship, but that is not the direction Lippmann takes. In fact, he seems 
to hold the practical concerns of balancing the legislative and executive in abeyance, 
suggesting by moving forward to a delineation of the natural law, public philosophy, and 
traditions of civility that somehow de-secularizing men’s minds is the only way to revitalize 
the executive in a responsible way. It is probable that for readers not predisposed against 
the very concept of natural rights, this is the most frustrating intellectual gap in Lippmann’s 
Essays. Still, his logic is theoretically sound, if not wholly convincing, and his subject matter 
does not position itself to easy exegesis. 
In addressing natural law, Lippmann retained one element common to the 
progressive mind: he saw in the modern world a new and unmet challenge to the old order 
of natural law. “The school of natural law has not been able to cope with the pluralism of 
the later modern age—with the pluralism which has resulted from the industrial revolution 
                                                          
260 Morals, Ch. 13 
160 
 
and from the enfranchisement and the emancipation of the masses of the people.”261 The 
mature Lippmann, however, instead of rebelling against the tradition, cites that very 
rebellion as the cause for our inability to cope with modernity’s new challenges. Because 
we have lost the means of rational inquiry into the structure of natural law, we have lost 
the ability to adapt the foundational idea of nature to a changing society. As a result, we 
must seek in the natural law a new understanding for a world at the brink of relativism and 
postmodernity. 
Perhaps the most crucial section of Essays, is Chapter 9, “The Renewal of the Public 
Philosophy,” and its first subheading, “The Capacity to Believe.” Lippmann was not the only 
thinker who had become sensitive to the questions of postmodern relativism. The political 
theorist, Leo Strauss, was one of these to whom Lippmann had turned for explication of 
natural law/natural right.262 Strauss identified as the chief characteristic of this new 
modernism as that which “explicitly condemns to oblivion the notion of eternity.”263 By 
rejecting the seriousness of the theoretical question of natural rights philosophy, the 
American public was left foundationless, adrift among nihilism and relativism. Strauss and 
Lippmann both thought it crucial to seek the revitalization of natural right because, as 
Strauss said, “the more we cultivate nihilism the less are we able to be loyal members of 
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society.”264 At a critical point in Essays Lippmann quotes Strauss’ Natural Right and History 
indirectly, saying, “Yet when we have demonstrated the need for the public philosophy, 
how do we prove that the need can be satisfied?” The nature of the indirect quote leaves 
some ambiguity, but refers to page six of Strauss’ introduction to that work wherein 
Strauss discusses the temptation to escape the rhetorical obscurantism of the relativists 
who reject the concept of natural right, warning that “our aversion to fanatical 
obscurantism must not lead us to embrace natural right in a spirit of fanatical 
obscurantism. Let us beware of the danger of pursuing a Socratic goal with the means, and 
the temper of Thrasymachus. Certainly the seriousness of the need of natural right does not 
prove that the need can be satisfied.”265  To the question of instrumentality (does 
Lippmann believe that there is such a thing as natural right to be uncovered, or is it merely 
a useful device for the masses?), this quotation speaks volumes. Having read Strauss’ 
argument, and presumably understood it, Lippmann would have understood the futility of 
engaging ‘natural right’ through any form of sophistry. Indeed, Lippmann seems rather to 
have embraced Strauss’ admonition and advocacy for philosophic openness, finding great 
consonance with Strauss’ claim that, “The gravity of the issue imposes upon us the duty of a 
detached, theoretical, impartial discussion.”266  
Where Strauss sought to revitalize the theoretical question of natural right, 
Lippmann was more actively engaged in producing a means by which it could be renewed 
in the public sphere. To that end, Lippmann offers two examples of natural rights in 
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practice: Property, and Freedom of Speech. Lippmann’s discussion of property relies 
heavily on a discussion of William Blackstone and his Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
Lippmann repeats his argument from Drift that stock holding and other forms of artificial 
private property are unsupportable within the tradition of property rights, yet instead of 
dismissing the notion as pragmatically undesirable, he examines the common law to show 
that the public philosophy, aligned with the ends of civilization, commanded both a respect 
for property rights and a refusal to make them absolute and above the needs of a particular 
society. The discussion is valuable because it forces Lippmann to refine further his idea of 
the natural law: “When we speak of these principles as natural laws, we must be careful. 
They are not scientific ‘laws’ like the laws of the motions of the heavenly bodies. They do 
not describe human behavior as it is. They prescribe what it should be. They do not enable 
us to predict what men will actually do. They are the principles of right behavior in the 
good society, governed by the Western traditions of civility.”267 Reason, he continues, is 
grounded in examination of the nature of things, and there are therefore obvious limits on 
the consensus of reason. And further, though there could be a plurality of principles 
devised by seeking the natural law, without seeking laws as they “should be” society itself 
cannot be ordered around “freedom and the good life.”268 
In the case of Speech, Lippmann’s argument is very similar: free speech needs to be 
respected in order to have a flourishing society, ‘free and good,’ but the rights of free 
speech are also not absolute. The authoritarianisms of communism and fascism exist to 
propagate their own dogmas, and censorship in liberal society can only, and should, be 
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delineated by the degree to which speech adheres to the principles of liberalism and the 
public philosophy (the two seem to have become linked): “The borderline between sedition 
and radical reform is between the denial and the acceptance of the sovereign principle of 
the public philosophy: that we live in a rational order in which by sincere inquiry and 
rational debate we can distinguish the true and the false, the right and the wrong.”269 
Inherent in the public philosophy then is a need for positive affirmation of the values of 
liberalism’s underlying assumptions, along with a recognition that “tolerance of all 
opinions leads to intolerance.”270 Though Lippmann does illuminate a reasonable 
procedure for establishing a connection between freedom of speech and the values of 
public philosophy as open debate in pursuit of truth, engaging censorship and allowing 
debate seem left to the prudence of authority. 
These examples highlight the role of prudence in establishing and maintaining 
liberal order. This has the effect of redoubling the emphasis and importance of good 
executive function in a liberal society. Unfortunately, Lippmann left this reasoning 
somewhat scattered after making the initial point about executive authority being linked to 
public philosophy/the will to believe. Lippmann puts himself in a position where he must 
elaborate the practice of statesmanship in a general way, while remaining consonant with 
the demands of a liberal society’s reliance on natural rights and with the revered executive 
restrained by prudence. The remaining chapters are a gloss on the sort of statesmanship 
implied by a liberalism dependent upon liberal society. 
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Confusingly, Lippmann makes an attempt to equate the classical rationalism of 
Aristotle with the pragmatism of James and Pierce.  From James he argues that in the 
natural ‘flux’ of things, "things are off their balance. Whatever equilibrium our finite 
experiences attain to are but provisional . . . everything is in ... a surrounding world of other 
things."271272 Lippmann seems to be undoing the arguments he made for grounding a 
version of natural rights in reason, but instead suggesting that they are determine by 
historical contingency: “Words like liberty, equality, fraternity, justice, have various 
meanings which reflect the variability of the flux of things. The different meanings are 
rather like different clothes, each good for a season, for certain weather and for a time of 
day, none good for all times.”273 Yet, on the next page, Lippmann is quoting Aristotle, 
insisting that the appropriate application of reason appeal to the “nature of things.” 
Lippmann’s marriage of experimental pluralism and classical political rationalism is ill 
advised and not well thought out, but it appears to be the case that he takes from his 
pragmatist roots not the historicity of essential virtues, but rather the spirit of 
experimentation and modulation within and for particular societies. This is a far cry from a 
conventionalist sophistry, however, because Lippmann constantly reiterates that the ‘good 
society’ depends on the standards and limits within certain conceptions of these virtues. 
Essentially, though different meanings of ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ might be predominately 
effective in a given time or place, he also insists upon hard limits to the extent of those 
different interpretation.  
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Lippmann attempts to settle any philosophical disquiet by exploring the role of the 
executive who must make these judgments through the Aristotelian approach to 
statesmanship and politics. In the good society, judgments which reflect statesmanship are 
not based on strict understanding of a set of rigid laws, but rather reflect the principle that 
social conditions are inextricably linked to the state of men’s souls by employing similarly 
diverse methods to achieve fixed ends. The Jamesian pluralist method can be considered in 
part consonant with this approach.274 Yet, Lippmann does not in the end embrace James, 
but rather Aristotle in his approach for the application of natural law by appealing to the 
Aristotelian virtue of prudence: “In this actual world of diversity and change, how do we 
find the right rule? We shall not find it, says Aristotle, if we look for more ’clearness’ than 
‘the subject matter admits of.’ Matters concerned with conduct and what is good for us 
have no fixity, and, he added, ‘the agents themselves must in each case consider what is 
appropriate to the occasion.’”275 The rule, Lippmann continues, to which these agents 
appeal is always ‘the nature of things’. Consider the extreme and defect of courage: a man 
who rushes to all danger, and a man who flees from everything. The proper application of 
the virtue of courage is a mean between the two, though Lippmann cautions, “We must not 
think of the mean as being a fixed point between the extremes. … The true mean is at the 
tension of push and pull, of attraction and resistance among the extremes.”276  
Though Lippmann very closely follows Aristotle, his critics often misunderstand this 
very crucial point in Lippmann’s work. Lippmann recognizes that the outcome of this sort 
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of political practice is “imprecise and inconclusive,” but that there” is little reason to think 
that the wisdom of the world can ever rise above these imperfections.”277 Lippmann 
essentially places man in a tensional, metaxic relationship at the center of liberal politics. 
The success of the liberal project depends on philosophers who know human nature, and 
can communicate it through the public philosophy to the democratic masses.278 The 
responsibility extends to those who must communicate the public philosophy and to those 
who must be open to it. Liberal politics then depend on philosophical openness, openness 
to the questions of eternity. Lippmann knows the intellectual milieu into which he writes is 
less than amenable to this suggestion, and he says near the end of his book that, “I have 
been arguing, hopefully and wishfully, that it be possible to alter the terms of discourse if a 
convincing demonstration can be made that the principles of the good society are not, in 
Sartre's phrase, invented and chosen — that the conditions which must be met if there is to 
be a good society are there, outside our wishes, where they can be discovered by rational 
inquiry, and developed and adapted and refined by rational discussion.”279 To push back 
against the “anomy of our society” a prudent public philosophy needs to be rearticulated 
that has at its core the belief that the principles of a good society are not merely contingent, 
but can be discovered through reason and refined through discussion. Though he grounds 
this seeking of public philosophy in nature, it is also a re-grounding in the fundamental 
faith of Liberalism that left to their own devices, given rights such as freedom of speech, 
they will move towards a good society. The addendum Lippmann offers, is simply that to 
keep this faith, a society must reject foundationlessness which is anathema to liberal order, 
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not to mention very ineffective and prone to authoritarianism. A public philosophy allows 
Lippmann a balance to the authority and legitimacy of popular government without 
devaluating and pushing executive authority to extreme ends. Lippmann recognizes that 
the premise of liberalism cannot be the condition of men’s souls, suggesting a return to 
religious rule or orders, but neither will a society flourish when it has at its heart no 
motivating principle. By remaining open to these principles, believing that they can be 
discovered and refined through reason, he pushes against both reactionaries and 
progressives, finally finding a home, or at least a foundation, for a sustainable liberalism. 
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Conclusion 
Essays was Walter Lippmann’s last book of political philosophy. It was a conclusion 
to a life in search of an understanding of the liberal regime, and the difficulty of the text 
reflects the nature of the intractable, vast, and uncertain problems faced by any study of 
politics. Essays is not meant to be a final standard of governance for which Lippmann was 
advocating, and as much was indicated by the tentativeness of the title, Essays in the Public 
Philosophy. Rather, it reflected a concentration of the arc of Lippmann’s career as a friendly 
critic for American democracy. 
 There is great consistency in the focus of Lippmann’s views, and in the way he 
approached politics, from the beginning of his career, until the end. However, this is not to 
suggest that his work forms a comprehensive political philosophy. There are continuities to 
be sure, even perhaps a consistent animating spirit, but Lippmann was too active a thinker, 
and too engaged in experimentation and public discourse to offer a systematic theory of 
politics. The value of his thought, seen most prominently by distilling it through his works 
of political philosophy, is in facilitating evaluation around a central theme: the sustainable 
liberal polity. 
 Lippmann’s intellectual journey traced, mirrored and reflected the journey of 
American liberalism in the 20th century, beginning in his early progressive idealism, and 
culminating in his return to the stability of human rights and political freedom. The 
purpose of this dissertation has been to understand this journey as a defense of the liberal 
democratic state, and the political freedoms upon which it depends. By appeal to both 
Nature and History in each phase of his career, Lippmann always positioned himself 
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between the reactionary seeking a return from liberalism’s excesses, and the progressive 
full of hope without restraint. Lippmann’s philosophical openness and thoughtfulness kept 
his outlook too philosophical to be ideological, and too curious to reject out of hand 
arguments from idealistic progressives or democracy’s more severe critics. Lippmann 
occupied a role of conscience and friendly critic, ultimately a consistent supporter of the 
liberal democratic state. Despite his eventual conclusion that liberalism lacked direction 
without the ‘traditions of civility,’ he was certainly no reactionary. Likewise, he was never a 
blithe idealist, displaying as early as Drift an intense concern about the direction and limits 
of scientific inquiry and organization. Through his entire career Lippmann had a sense that 
the indeterminable freedom of liberal society was both its great strength and its Achilles 
heel, and that it must be guided without conceding the extreme good it offers mankind.  
 In Preface Lippmann’s enthusiasm for the promise of the organization of liberal 
societies allowed him to embrace a host of typical progressive positions, but his theorizing 
was oddly conflicted by his Freudian psychoanalysis, a confused yearning for essentialism, 
and his misunderstanding of the founders’ constitutionalism. The young Lippmann saw the 
founders only as ‘routineers’ and missed the ways in which they also appealed to human 
nature as the guide to politics. Lippmann shared their distrust of democracy, but wouldn’t 
fully appreciate their agreements until decades later. Drift as a sequel to Preface fills in the 
inchoate executive functions of the leaders who ‘interpret will and sentiment’ around 
inflexible constitutionalism, painting Teddy Roosevelt as the archetypical industrial 
statesman capable of taking down barriers to progress. Yet at the culminating point of his 
argument Lippmann retreats from his own conclusion concerning authority. Though 
convinced that society’s lack of will and direction (drift) required scientific organization 
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(mastery), Lippmann could not escape the corollary problems of his own conclusion: what 
would then guide science? He recognized that no internal mechanism could guide science 
to a specific end in History, but rather that that end had to be found in some human 
investigation into the nature of things. Lippmann’s optimism in the future of scientific 
management suggested that he did have some measure of progressive faith in the direction 
and movement of History, but it was a faith furnished by the empirical progressivism of 
observable progress, declining scarcity, and expanding freedoms. His philosophical 
openness led him to question the direction of his own brand of scientific exceptionalism, 
grasping instead for another sort of guide. 
 After the First World War, and Lippmann’s conflicted relationship with Wilsonian 
idealism, many progressives were forced to renounce their empirical progressivism in 
favor of a fatalistic version that radically placed its hopes on apotheosis in History. But 
Lippmann was already questioning the logical conclusions of progressivism before the war, 
and was more concerned with the root causes of misrule. At the heart of his critique of the 
omnicompetent citizen and the tyranny of the uninformed masses was the understanding 
that the case for self-government depends on the extent to which the citizen can himself 
choose good government above the self-centeredness of his own opinions, and the pictures 
in his head. Lippmann’s policy prescriptions in the middle stage of his career underscore 
his continued insistence that the modern world required fresh thinking, unbound from old 
world taboos and mechanical thinking. However, he also sought a foundation in a notion of 
‘truth’ independent of the pseudo-environments of the ‘pictures in people’s heads.’ His 
endorsement of intelligence bureaus seems undemocratic, but his politics had moved from 
‘masterful’ statesmen alone, to a sincere focus on the preconditions for self-government. In 
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this manner he expanded the role of the democrat by attempting to describe some way to 
ensure both self-government and political freedom. 
 However, these two aims could not be easily reconciled. Lippmann had no 
legislative program to offer by the end of Phantom, and retreated into the moral realm of 
the individual in hopes of cultivating a spirit of the disinterested humanist who could be a 
better statesman or citizen in the dangerous, modern world to come. Lippmann laid some 
foundations for his later work in Essays, but ultimately tried to reject both History as a 
guide, and Nature. Morals was a tenuous concoction of experimental pluralism, and an 
essentialist longing which refused to acknowledge revelation in any capacity of authority. 
However, this subtly moved Lippmann to the precipice of his great problem: where is the 
authority needed to give liberalism its direction? By now his critique of the ‘acids of 
modernity’ and the resulting directionlessness of liberal society were taken for granted, 
and he hoped to rest in some great articulation of the ‘disinterested humanist’ who could 
serve the practical needs of society without subjecting himself to dogmas from History or 
Nature. Lippmann could not escape the critique of his old teacher, Santayana, that he had 
removed the humanity from his humanism, and was ultimately forced to move closer to a 
foundation in Nature by the time he wrote Essays (and perhaps Good) as he found it 
necessary to somehow ground his humanism in ‘tradition,’ and find direction by taking 
seriously the claims of Nature. 
 Lippmann was violently pulled back from his acetic humanism by the Wall Street 
crash of 1929, and all of its corollary theoretical and practical considerations for politics. 
Economic stability, one of the great promises of a successful liberalism, had been 
172 
 
threatened and its underlying premises brought into question. Lippmann’s difficult 
relationship with FDR and the New Deal had to do mostly with the distinction he drew 
between emergency measures, and unconstitutional reform, the former which he felt was 
necessary and proper. He was convinced that some measure of collectivism was necessary 
to account for the practical consequences of the modern economy, a conclusion he had 
reached through discussions with Keynes, but was also consonant with his early, very 
typically progressive concern with the exigencies of an economy within a closed frontier. 
And yet his advocacy for a limited, or ‘free’ collectivism developed at the same time he 
established a deeper understanding of how self-governance depends on good law and 
political freedom rather than simply the proper direction of authority, or the proper 
disinterested humanist disposition. He concluded that to stabilize a liberal democratic 
regime, and thwart the mounting totalitarianisms in Europe, and perhaps becoming 
present in FDR’s America, modern liberalism had to confront and re-interrogate its own 
foundations in search of a common drive, a common purpose. 
 Lippmann found this purpose in the ‘traditions of civility,’ and a fresh understanding 
of the public philosophy. Confronted with WWII and its aftermath, Lippmann concluded 
that the war had been a result of devalued executive authority out of balance with 
legislative, popular authority. The increasing secularity of the liberal world threatened 
liberalism in a fundamental way because it left no common ground, no public philosophy, 
wherein to debate, understand, and act upon political problems. Lippmann was looking for 
a way to keep the basic principles of liberalism and political freedom operative in a society 
no longer buoyed by the expectation of apotheosis in History. His attempt to reinvigorate 
the principles of the good society by remaining open to them, by practicing a prudent, 
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classical statesmanship, was his culminating suggestion of the last best means to sustain 
the liberal state. 
Nobody familiar with his career should be surprised to find Lippmann so 
comfortable asserting a prudent public philosophy whose creeping revival depends on the 
day to day activities of rearticulating it to the intractable mass public he described so well, 
and fought so hard to educate and understand. For all the messiness of political life which 
Lippmann was famed for both analyzing and confronting, he seems to have remained 
hopeful, despite his own brilliance in describing the challenges we face: 
“There is not much doubt how the struggle is likely to end if it lies between those who, 
believing, and care very much—and those who, lacking belief, cannot care very much.”280 
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Notes 
Following Ronald Steel and other Lippmann chroniclers and commentators I will cite 
Lippmann’s books by chapter reference. The reason for this convention is primarily 
because there are so many editions of his work, particularly in mass media paperback 
editions which make looking up citations by page number alone difficult. Lippmann 
typically writes in short form chapters, which make this version of indexing citation 
worthwhile, and it is why it has been so often employed by those who have studied him. 
What follows in this section of Notes is a list of books by Lippmann, both major works and 
reprints/compilations, and the appropriate abbreviation used in the text of the dissertation 
and in the shorthand citations. The full citation is contained in the bibliography. 
Major Works 
A Preface to Politics [Preface] 
Drift and Mastery [Drift] 
The Stakes of Diplomacy [Stakes] 
The Political Scene [Scene] 
Liberty and the News [Liberty] 
Men of Destiny [Destiny] 
American Inquisitors [Inquisitors] 
Public Opinion [Opinion] 
A Preface to Morals [Morals] 
Method of Freedom [Method] 
The New Imperative [Imperative] 
The Good Society [Good] 
U.S. Foreign Policy [Foreign] 
U.S. War Aims [Aims] 
Essays in the Public Philosophy [Essays]  
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